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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
1. Background 
 
Justice MM Corbett was appointed as a judge in 1963 and was appointed a judge of 
appeal in 1974. He became Chief Justice of South Africa in November 1988 and he 
retired in September 1993. During this thirty year career on the bench he has made a 
substantial contribution to the development of the law in South Africa. This was 
especially so in the field of the law of taxation. 
 
2. Interpretation of the Act: 
 
Justice Corbett was well known for his formative style which suited the tax cases over 
which he presided. A typical example of a case in which the interpretation of a section 
of the Act is required, would be to establish whether a particular taxpayer could be 
classified as a “manufacturer” in order to qualify for certain tax incentives that are 
applicable to manufacturers. Such an interpretation was required in Safranmark1, in 
which Justice Corbett, in his dissenting minority judgement, gave an excellent 
interpretation of the meaning of the word “manufacturing”. His interpretation, it is 
submitted, gives an accurate definition of the normal meaning of the word 
“manufacture”. He was of the opinion that it was up to the legislature to amend the 
section to include a wider meaning to the section. They later did so.  
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1SIR v Safranmark (Pty) Ltd, 43 SATC 235  
Where sections are vague, outdated or incomplete, the judgements that are delivered 
may cause amendments to be made to the Act. A major change to a leading section of 
the Act was the amendment of section 23(g) to exclude the wording “wholly and 
exclusively”. This amendment occurred shortly after the judgement was delivered in 
the Solaglass case2, which concerned the strict application of section 23(g). The court 
in that case did not apply apportionment of expenses incurred partly for trade and 
partly non-trade purposes. When the changes to section 23(g) were instigated, the 
legislature relied heavily on the judgements of Justice Corbett in Nemojim3, Pick n 
Pay4 and De Beers5, which, together with Rand Selections6, are the major 
apportionment cases in South African tax law.  
 
 
3. Substance over form 
 
Justice Corbett’s formative approach was evident in Elandsheuwel. The section 103 
cases of Gallagher, Louw and Burgess confirmed his formative approach to the 
legislation and the facts of the case. The fact that he applied a formative approach 
does not imply that he always overlooked the substance of the matter. When applying 
section 103 to tax avoidance, he used a formative approach. In other avoidance cases, 
such as Nemojim and De Beers, he did not use the formative approach, but used the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
2 Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1991 (2) SA 257 (A), 53 SATC 1. 
3 CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd, 45 SATC 241 
4 CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd, 49 SATC 132 
5 De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 47 SATC 229 
6 CIR v Rand Selections Corporation Ltd, 20 SATC 390 
substance approach. The substance over form approach may favour the 
Commissioner.  
 
4. International jurisprudence 
 
It is clear that Justice Corbett consulted overseas case law before he delivered 
judgements. In most of his judgements he refers to such cases, especially to the 
reports from the United Kingdom. This is very noticable in the Pick ‘n Pay case.  
 
Having been a scholar at Cambridge, he was exposed to a wider legal background. It 
did give him some insight and also personal contact with others in the legal field of 
the Commonwealth.  
 
The introduction of the principle of legitimate expectation by Justice Corbett was an 
important milestone in the development of the South African law.  It highlights his 
understanding of the law and its international development and his foresight in respect 
of the application and implementation of legal principles. The principle of legitimate 
expectation specifically targets the relationship between the government and the 
citizen. This principle has been applied in several court cases, which illustrates the 
value of Justice Corbett’s foresight in introducing it into South African law. This 
principle is embodied in our new Constitution. 
 
 
5. The Constitution 
 
Justice Corbett’s greatest legacy is probably that he was one of the main proponents 
of a Bill of Human Rights and its incorporation in the Constitution of South Africa. 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, 
contains a Bill of Rights.  The rights contained in the chapter are of general 
application insofar as the state and citizens are concerned. Many of the rights do, 
however, apply to tax administration and to how the South African Revenue Service 
conducts itself in dealing with the South African taxpayer.  
 
The Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights had a major impact on legislation 
in South Africa. Several cases were heard in the Constitutional court regarding 
sections of the Income Tax Act that were in contravention of the Constitution. Many 
amendments were made to the Income Tax Act to meet the terms of the Constitution. 
ABSTRACT 
 
Mr Justice Corbett made a substantial contribution to the South African tax law as he 
delivered several judgements during his long career on the bench. Starting from the 
lower ranks as a judge he became Chief Justice of South Africa. Precedents set by his 
judgements are considered important and indicative of the level of South African tax 
law.  
 
This dissertation observes his background, looks at the operations of the tax court in 
South Africa and examines whether his judgements were cited and applied in 
subsequent cases as accepted precedent. International case law is referred to, to 
compare his judgements with comparable international tax law. 
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CHAPTER 1 THE CONTEXT, DELINEATION, METHOD AND 
STRUCTURE OF THE INVESTIGATION 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 TAX LEGISLATION REQUIRES CONSTANT INTERPRETATION, 
REVISION AND REFINEMENT  
 
When it comes to taxes, everyone has a contribution. It was Albert Einstein, 
the celebrated physicist of the twentieth century, who observed the complexity 
of the laws of taxation and said1: 
 
“The hardest thing in the world to understand is the income tax.”  
 
Quick to add to this observation was a remark from an unknown comedian: 
 
“For every tax problem there is a solution which is straightforward, 
uncomplicated and wrong.” 
 
Predictably many opinions have been aired on the issue of tax avoidance and 
evasion:  
 
“The avoidance of tax may be lawful, but it is not yet a virtue.”      
- Lord Denning, a renowned English judge. 
 
“If you don't drink, smoke, or drive a car, you're a tax evader.”      
- Thomas S. Foley, an American politician. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
1 All quotes from The Quotation Page, an internet website: www.quotationspage.com 
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“The avoidance of taxes is the only intellectual pursuit that still carries 
any reward.” - John Maynard Keynes, economist. 
 
“The trick is to stop thinking of it as 'your' money.” – a Revenue 
auditor who wants to remain anonymous. 
 
Benjamin Franklin, a previous president of the United States said:  
 
“In this world nothing is certain but death and taxes - but at least 
death doesn't get worse every year” 
 
The quotes above take a rather light-hearted view of taxes. They illustrate the 
many views and different interpretations people have about taxes.   
 
Disputes arise as a result of the fact that taxpayers and the South African 
Revenue Services (“SARS”) have different interpretations regarding the 
application of the Income Tax Act2. Judgements of the High Court create 
precedents for these matters which are usually adhered to in subsequent court 
cases depending on the status of the court delivering the judgement.  Such 
judgements are also used by SARS and by taxpayers as a reference when they 
apply the Act to a specific circumstance. The Act is normally amended 
annually, though it is not unusual for more than one set of amendments to be 
promulgated during a year.  
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
2 The Income Tax Act no. 58 of 1962, as amended.  It will be referred to as “the Act”. 
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1.2 DELINEATION OF THE AREA OF RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation will research the contribution made by the former Chief 
Justice of South Africa, Justice M M Corbett, an extremely influential figure, 
to the advancement of clarity in tax law. He is an individual who has received 
wide acclaim in legal circles for his contribution to the interpretation and 
development of the law in South Africa generally, but in particular, the tax 
law.  
 
In this dissertation, the decisions of the court are analysed in respect of those 
cases in which Justice Corbett delivered a judgement, irrespective of whether 
his judgement was the majority or the minority judgement. Naturally, in those 
cases in which he delivered the majority judgement, the judgement created a 
precedent, unless it was subsequently overturned by legislation or it was found 
to be distinguishable on the facts and therefore was not followed. Some of his 
minority judgements have, however, served as persuasive authority in 
subsequent cases.  
 
1.3 THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
An analysis of the judgements delivered by Justice Corbett identifies and 
clarifies some important principles that apply in the tax system. Although 
some tax principles are peculiar to South Africa, Justice Corbett based his 
judgements on international trends and standards. He was a member of the 
panel of judges that considered most of the major tax cases that were brought 
before the Appellate Division between 1968 and 1992.  
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In referring to the judicial interpretation of codes and practices3, in The Nature 
of the Judicial Process, United States Supreme Court Justice Cardozo 
observed the following: 
 
“There are gaps to be filled. There are doubts and ambiguities to be 
cleared. There are hardships and wrongs to be mitigated if not 
avoided. Interpretation is often spoken of as if it were nothing but the 
search and the discovery of a meaning which, however obscure and 
latent, had none the less a real and ascertainable pre-existence in the 
legislator’s mind. The process is, indeed, that at times, but it is often 
something more. The ascertainment of intention may be the least of a 
judge’s troubles in ascribing meaning to a statute. The fact is, says 
Gray in his lectures on the Nature and Sources of the Law, that the 
difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the legislation has 
had no meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the statute 
never occurred to it; when what the judges have to do is not to 
determine what the legislature did mean on a point which was present 
to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not 
present to its mind if the point had been present.” 
 
According to Justice Cardozo, the judge, being the interpreter for the 
community of its sense of law and order, should supply omissions, correct 
uncertainties and harmonise results with justice by means of a method of free 
discretion. He quotes Eugen Ehrlich4, a German legal theorist and author in 
the 1920’s, in stating that “…in the long run there is no guarantee of justice 
except the personality of the judge”. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
3 Cardozo, Benjamin N. The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale University Press, 
USA, first published in 1921, p. 12. 
4 Ehrlich, Eugen. Das Zwingende und Nichtzwingende Recht im Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich, Jena, first published in 1899, p26. 
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The position taken by Justice Cardozo is that research into the principles 
underlying certain judgements contributes to a greater clarity on the same and 
similar issues to be decided on in the future. This is also the case in tax 
matters. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse Justice Corbett’s 
contribution to the development of the law of taxation in South Africa. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
 A literature review of the judgements that were delivered by Justice Corbett in 
relation to tax issues during the period he sat on the bench, is the research 
method used. Reports on South African Tax Cases were searched on 
LexisNexis Butterworths Complete Tax Library on CD Rom5 for all the tax 
cases in which Justice Corbett6 was involved. All the tax cases where Justice 
Corbett delivered a judgement are discussed in this dissertation. Other 
principles of law, such as the doctrine of legitimate expectation7 espoused by 
Justice Corbett and noted as a principle applied in tax matters, are discussed as 
and where appropriate during the course of this dissertation. The South 
African judgments that were delivered by Justice Corbett are also compared to 
similar tax cases and foreign decisions from Australia, Britain, New Zealand 
and Zimbabwe to see whether his judgements were in line with international 
trends and principles. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
5 Butterworths’ Complete Tax Library on South African Tax Law, South African Tax 
Cases and Silke on South African Income Tax. Update: December 2006 
6 See Appendix A. 
7 See Chapter 9. 
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The foreign cases that have been selected for comparison were heard in 
countries that have legal and tax structures that are similar to that of South 
Africa. In fact, many principles of the present Income Tax Act are based on 
the principles of the Australian Income Tax Act of 19018. Even newer 
legislation such as section 24F of the South African Act, which deals with film 
investments, has wording that differs very little from the wording of the 
equivalent Australian tax legislation.9 
 
In those instances in which the judgements of Justice Corbett were not applied 
in subsequent, similar cases, the possible reasons for its non-application are 
discussed. 
 
Tax reference books and articles were also consulted relating to his work on 
the bench.  
 
1.5       THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS RESEARCH: 
 
Justice Corbett gave many far reaching decisions on tax matters on which 
there was previously no certainty during the time that he was on the Bench. 
The principles derived from these decisions form part of the prevailing tax law 
____________________________________________________________________ 
8 The 1917 Income Tax Act of South Africa was based on the Income Tax Act from 
the newly formed federation of Australian colonies. The Australian federation was 
formed on 1 January 1901. Its Income Tax Act was passed in that year. By 1917 some 
necessary amendments were made and this piece of legislation was used as a base for 
the draft of the South African Income Tax Act.  
9 Australian films: Section 375 of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act of 1997. 
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and are a valuable addition to tax legislation. It will be seen from an analysis 
of his judgements during the course of this dissertation, that most of the 
principles espoused in his judgements have been accepted and applied in 
subsequent cases.  A judgement in the High Court creates a precedent or 
principle; it is adhered to thereafter, unless it is rejected in subsequent 
judgements or is overturned by legislation.  These principles provide the 
context within which the meaning of relevant concepts, words and phrases in 
tax law can be interpreted. 
 
When the tax authorities, the taxpayers and their tax advisors understand how 
the judiciary analyse and apply tax principles, concepts, words and phrases, 
they are in a better position to predict the outcome, should the matter be taken 
on appeal to a court 
 
Case law has provided a range of important principles, which have become 
part and parcel of the South African tax law. A thorough understanding of the 
principles enunciated by the courts is a pre-requisite for understanding the Act 
itself. The judgements delivered by Justice Corbett are excellent illustrations 
of how the judiciary, through the court system, elucidate the principles.  The 
court system includes the Constitutional Court, the various provincial 
divisions of the High Court, the High Court of Appeal and the Special Court 
for the Hearing of Appeals on Income Tax matters. 
 
1.6 THE STRUCTURE OF THIS RESEARCH REPORT  
 
A historical perspective should form an important part of any attempt to 
analyse the circumstances of the judgements delivered by Justice Corbett. He 
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was appointed as a judge in 1963 and his career ended in 1993. His personal 
history and the time frame within which he operated are discussed in 
chapter 2. Due to the changes that occurred over the years, some of his 
judgements have been superceded by new legislation although, remarkably, 
most of his judgements have stood the test of time. They are still valid and are 
used as a reference point. 
 
In chapter 3, the confines within which he operated regarding the prevailing 
theories on jurisprudence are discussed. For example, there was no Bill of 
Rights in operation during the course of his professional career. Legislation 
had to be enforced regardless of whether it infringed on what is now regarded 
as a fundamental right of a taxpayer. Attention is given to the possible effect 
that the prevailing political and judicial circumstances could have had on his 
judgements. 
 
Justice Corbett delivered judgements (both majority and minority judgements) 
in eighteen tax cases in the Appellate Division of which eight judgements 
went in favour of the Commissioner and ten in the favour of the taxpayers. 
The Commissioner was the appellant in ten of the eighteen cases.  Therefore, 
the majority of the cases were heard on appeal by the Commissioner, yet the 
majority of the cases were won by the taxpayers concerned. It is impossible, 
however, to conclude from the statistics that Justice Corbett was either pro or 
anti fiscus. Thus his judgements need further analysis and these judgements 
have been analysed in chapters 4 to 8. 
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Chief Justice Corbett was instrumental in advocating that the Bill of Rights be 
incorporated in the New Constitution of South Africa. The impact of the 
Constitution on the Income Tax Act is briefly discussed in chapter 9. 
 
Chapter 10, the final chapter of this dissertation, presents a summary of and 
conclusions regarding Justice Corbett’s contribution to the South African tax 
law.  
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CHAPTER 2  AN OVERVIEW OF JUSTICE CORBETT’S LIFE10 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 FAMILY HISTORY 
 
Gaining an understanding of the personal history of Justice Corbett can 
produce an insight into his outlook on life and therefore the judgements that he 
delivered. 
 
Michael McGregor Corbett was born in Pretoria on 14 September 1923. His 
father, Alan Frederick, and his mother, Johanna Sibella, called Sybil, (whose 
maiden name was Mcgregor) both had connections to the Anglo Boer War, 
albeit on different sides of that war. 
 
Sybil was born in South Africa. She was a granddaughter of Johannes Brandt, 
a former president of the Orange Free State Republic, and the daughter of 
Justice Alexander John Mcgregor.  Justice Mcgregor practised for some years 
at the Cape Bar.  
 
Alan Corbett, Michael’s father, came to South Africa with the 371st Squadron 
of Imperial Yeomanry. After the Anglo Boer War, he qualified as a lawyer at 
Cambridge University. He returned to South Africa to take up a position in the 
Department of Inland Revenue at its head office in Pretoria. At that time 
____________________________________________________________________ 
10 Condensed from Justice Corbett’s biography entitled The Quest for Justice – Essays 
in Honour of Michael McGregor Corbett by E Kahn, Juta & Co, Johannesburg, 1995. 
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income tax was only levied in the Cape Colony and later in Natal. The 
remainder of South Africa had no income tax at the time. Prior to 1914, 
revenue was raised in the country through the imposition of mining taxes and 
indirect taxes. After taking up a position in the department of Inland Revenue, 
Alan Corbett was involved in the drafting of the first Income Tax Act of the 
Union of South Africa, which was promulgated in 1914. He also admitted 
“responsibility” for drafting the 1922 Death Duties Act11. He ruefully 
confessed that his drafting of the Act had been criticized, but requested his 
critics to try their hand at an exercise of this nature. He became the 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue in 1929. For some years he was the editor 
of the publication South African Tax Cases12, a legal publication which reports 
on the major tax cases during a year.  
 
2.2 SCHOOLING AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
After Michael Corbett’s father, Alan, became Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue in 1929, Michael had to commute between Pretoria and Cape Town 
for the Parliamentary sessions, which usually took place from late January to 
July each year in Cape Town. Even before his appointment as Commissioner, 
Alan Corbett’s senior position in the Department of Inland Revenue frequently 
required him to be in Cape Town during the first half of the year. As a 
consequence, Michael Corbett attended school in both Pretoria and Cape 
Town. In Cape Town, he attended the highly regarded Rondebosch Boys High 
School.  
____________________________________________________________________ 
11 The Quest for Justice, p 9 
12 Published by Butterworths South Africa, 215 North Ridge Road, Durban.. 
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Initially he was a day scholar who boarded with a family friend, but from 
standard eight onwards he was a boarder in the school hostel.  At school he 
was a happy and very successful scholar who was also good at sport. He 
played rugby for all the A teams in his age groups and became a member of 
the second cricket eleven at a very young age. In June 1938, his father, Alan 
Corbett, reached the normal retirement age of 60 whereafter he and his wife 
settled in Cape Town.   Michael again became a day scholar. He matriculated 
in December 1939 at the age of 16.  By then, the Second World War had 
broken out. Michael wanted to enlist, but his parents wanted him to wait until 
he was 18. He therefore registered at the University of Cape Town for the 
Bachelor of Arts degree with the intention of proceeding to the LLB degree. 
Five years of study were required for the two degrees. At that stage, the so-
called legal BA course had a large component of law courses.  Michael also 
enrolled for the Latin courses at both first and second year level. 
 
On 14 September 1941, Michael, then in his second year of study at the 
University of Cape Town, turned 18. At that time the University had a policy 
which stated that, if a student enlisted in the forces during an academic year, 
he would be given credit for the courses for which he was registered. Michael 
decided to register for the third year of study for the BA degree in order to 
benefit from this generous concession. In April 1942, he enlisted in the South 
African Tank Corps, knowing that he would be awarded the BA degree. He 
later attended a course from September 1942 to March 1943 that prepared 
officers for duty in armoured cars.  
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Moray P Comrie MC, who commanded the First Royal 
Natal Carbineers, a motorized infantry battalion, was looking for officers 
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before proceeding north to the war zone. He recruited Michael who remained a 
proud member of the Carbineers throughout his period of active service and 
developed a close attachment to Natal. When the First Royal Natal Carbineers 
arrived in Egypt, all the unit was required to do was to undergo comprehensive 
training in that country.  The training was done in preparation for duty in Italy 
as part of the Sixth South African Armoured Division which participated in 
the campaign of the Eighth Army of the Allied Forces.  
 
Lieutenant Michael Corbett was involved in the Italian Campaign from April 
1944 to August of that year. He maintained a detailed record of his 
experiences with the Carbineers in Italy, comprising approximately 207 pages 
or 90 000 words. On the night of 13 May 1944, Michael nearly lost his life. He 
had been ordered to lead a strong fighting patrol and, if the enemy failed to 
reply to artillery fire, to investigate the lie of the land.   He recorded the 
following details of the ensuing events13: 
 
“There was no reply by the enemy. I wirelessed back ‘Going forward’. 
Suddenly, I heard close behind me a deafening explosion – I ducked – 
glanced back – then forward again, listening intently. Behind me the 
smoke was clearing away to show a huddled pile of men – three were 
lying quite still, the other two writhing in agony. Out of the patrol of 
ten I was the only one to have got off scot-free; four were killed, two 
were seriously wounded and three got small pieces of shrapnel not 
serious enough to cause them to be evacuated.” 
 
Rome fell to the Americans on 6 June 1944. At that stage, the Carbineers were 
en route to Florence. During his spell of leave, he went to Rome. With a group 
____________________________________________________________________ 
13 The Quest for Justice, p 13 
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of colleagues and friends he travelled in a truck to a beach outside Rome. On 
the way back, another army vehicle collided with the truck.  Michael’s left 
arm was broken and the fingers of his left hand torn off. After a long sojourn 
in hospitals in Italy, Michael was sent back to South Africa in a hospital ship.  
 
2.3      STUDY AT THE UNIVERSITIES OF CAPE TOWN AND CAMBRIDGE 
 
Michael was boarded out of the Army in May 1945.  He immediately enrolled 
for the LLB degree at the University of Cape Town. After completing his 
studies at UCT, he applied for a scholarship, the Elsie Ballot Scholarship, 
which was modelled on the Rhodes Scholarship.  His application was 
successful and he was admitted to Trinity Hall, a small Cambridge college, 
which was famous for its law training and rowing. 
 
Several South Africans were reading for a degree in law at Cambridge at that 
time. They included Gustav Hoexter, Douglas Shearer, Simon Roberts and 
Duchesne Grice14. Michael was permitted to proceed directly with Part Two of 
the Law Tripos. His law lecturers included Sir Percy Winfield, who taught 
English Law; C J Hamson, who taught Comparative Law; Glanville Williams, 
who taught Jurisprudence; and R M W Dias, who taught Roman-Dutch Law. 
In 1947, Michael obtained a first-class pass in the examination for the law 
____________________________________________________________________ 
14 CG Hoexter was later appointed a Judge of Appeal, Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of South Africa; DLL Shearer also became a Judge of Appeal, 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, KwaZulu Natal Provincial 
Division; Simon Roberts and Duchesne Grice became senior counsel. 
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degree.  Thereafter he read for the LLB degree, for which he also obtained a 
first-class pass in 1948.  
 
2.4 JUSTICE CORBETT’S PERIOD AT THE BAR 
 
Michael Corbett returned to Cape Town almost immediately and joined the 
Cape Bar in November 1948. It was notoriously difficult to obtain admission 
to the Cape Bar. In his first year, the gross earnings from his practice 
amounted to £132. To supplement the income from his practice, he did what 
many newcomers to the Bar do: he lectured and marked examination scripts in 
law subjects. He lectured at the University of Cape Town, of which he has 
remained a proud alumnus, and occasionally at the Technical College.  
 
In 1949, he married Margaret (Peggy) Luscombe. They had three children.  
 
His liberal sentiments attracted him to the War Veterans’ Torch Commando.  
The Torch Command was established in June 1951 and functioned under the 
presidency of Group Captain A G (‘Sailor’) Malan. The objectives of the 
Torch Commando, a political pressure group, were to protect the liberties of 
the subject, to promote racial harmony and to eliminate all forms of 
totalitarianism. Michael Corbett was a representative for the Western Cape 
Region. The Torch Commando criticised the then government’s apartheid 
policies. It should be noted that, in spite of being a member of the Torch 
Commando, which upheld an anti-apartheid approach, and being regarded as a 
judge with liberal views, Michael Corbett was appointed to the Bench by the 
then apartheid government. It is even more surprising that the same 
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government later endorsed him as the Chief Justice of South Africa when the 
position fell vacant after the retirement of Rabie CJ.   
 
After three or four years, his legal practice began to prosper. He received 
many briefs from leading firms of attorneys. These firms included Fairbridge 
Ardene & Lawton, the same firm in which his great-great-grandfather, 
Christoffel Brand, had worked for two years in approximately 1812, before he 
went to the University of Leiden. Michael Corbett’s practice was closely 
associated with that of Graeme Duncan QC with whom he held many junior 
briefs, largely chamber work.  
 
Michael Corbett is said15 to have modelled himself on Duncan’s austere court 
manner, diligent attention to detail, short opinions, and his manner of being 
carefully considered, completely objective and getting straight to the point.  In 
addition, he emulated Duncan’s helpfulness to juniors who were struggling in 
what appeared to them to be a stormy legal sea. In a number of cases, MM 
Corbett QC appeared with Graeme Duncan as his lead before the Appellate 
Division. 
 
Michael Corbett concentrated on commercial law in the course of his practice 
because civil cases proved more interesting to him. Although Michael Corbett 
did not always win, he was involved with several cases that were regarded as 
important in their field.16  
____________________________________________________________________ 
15 Quest for Justice, p 23 
16 For example, he appeared in the following cases, which were landmark cases in 
their fields: 
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2.5 Justice Corbett’s period on the Bench 
 
In 1961, Michael Corbett became one of the last South Africans to be granted 
the Letters Patent as Queen’s Council, before South Africa was declared a 
Republic in 1961. In 1963, he was appointed as an Acting Judge of the Cape 
Provincial Division of the Supreme Court. Although he had enjoyed his stint 
at the Bar, he could simply not refuse a request by the Judge President of the 
Cape Provincial Division, Andrew Beyers, to join him as a colleague. Michael 
Corbett regarded it as his duty to accept a position on the Bench, if he were 
asked to do so, irrespective of the sacrifice, financial or otherwise, that it 
entailed.   In this regard he wrote that17: 
 
“Whereas it was acceptable that an advocate would turn down an 
invitation to sit on the Bench on some ideological ground, such as the 
rejection of the death penalty, almost certainly others rejected an offer 
 
                                                                                                                                            
• South African Mutual Aid Society v Cape Town Chamber of 
Commerce, 1962 1 SA 598 (A).  The case dealt with delictual 
damages; 
• Stellenbosch Farmer’s Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd & 
another, 1962 1 SA 458 (A).  It dealt with trade-mark infringements; 
and 
• R Rohloff v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd, 1960 2 
SA 291 (A).  It dealt with the right of spouses to sue each other in 
delict for damages for harm done to person or property. 
17 The Quest for Justice, p. 26. 
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on other grounds, saying: ‘I rather like the work of senior practice. 
It’s interesting; you often get briefed by multinational corporations; 
you travel overseas; you have an exciting life; and what’s more a 
judge’s salary you know, really…’ ”  
 
From the outset, Mr Justice Corbett proved to be an ideal judge18. He had the 
same controlled, quiet manner as Mr Justice Ogilvie Thompson, who held him 
in high regard. A perfect gentleman, always extremely polite to counsel and 
witnesses, and never raising his voice in anger, he could still ask the incisive 
question in a gentle way. As is the case with so many judges, he found that 
criminal trials tended to become rather boring. Civil cases and appeals proved 
to be more interesting to him.  
 
A spell as acting judge of appeal followed when two vacancies in the highest 
court arose. Mr Justice H J Potgieter of the Appellate Division died in 1973 
and Chief Justice Ogilvie Thompson retired in 1974. Mr Justice Corbett 
became a permanent member of the Appellate Division in June 1974. 
 
As the years passed, Mr Justice Corbett climbed the ladder of seniority in the 
Appellate Division until he became senior Judge of Appeal. On 4 November 
1988, the then State President, Mr P W Botha, announced that Mr Justice 
Rabie, then acting Chief Justice, would retire and that Mr Justice Corbett 
would become the sixteenth Chief Justice of South Africa. Widespread 
expressions of appreciation and approval followed the announcement of the 
new appointment.  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
18 The Quest for Justice, p. 26. 
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During his period as a judge, major tax issues were addressed and in many 
instances he found himself at the forefront of interpreting and shaping the 
South African tax system.  
 
The distinction between the capital and the revenue nature of income and 
expenses continued to be hotly debated in the South African courts. Tax-
avoidance schemes became more prevalent during the course of his tenure as 
judge. He also had to deal with issues, such as the Lategan19 principle, that 
had been left unfinished by his predecessors.  
 
A new Income Tax Act was passed in 1962 and the continuous flow of new 
legislation from this time required interpretation by the courts. At the same 
time, many of the court cases that he was involved in were benchmarks or a 
basis for new tax legislation. Towards the end of his career, Justice Corbett 
was involved in the drafting of the new post apartheid Constitution for South 
Africa. It has had a major impact on existing legislation as various sections of 
some acts have had to be amended to comply with it. Various Draconian 
sections of the Income Tax Act, such as section 74, regarding search and 
seizure requirements, have had to be amended to bring them within the ambit 
____________________________________________________________________ 
19 Lategan v CIR, 1926, CPD, 2 SATC 16: The principle that emerges from this case 
is that an amount of gross income “accrues” to a taxpayer in the year of assessment in 
which he acquires the right to claim payment in the future and not in the year of 
assessment in which he is eventually paid.  In CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) 
(Pty) Ltd (Justice Corbett served on the panel) the Lategan case was held to correctly 
reflect the law.  
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of the Constitution and especially the Bill of Rights, which Bill is embodied in 
the Constitution. 
 
In the ordinary course of events, the Chief Justice would have occupied his 
position as Chief Justice until he turned 70 in September 1993. However, on 
10 February 1993, the then State President, Mr F W de Klerk, announced that 
the Chief Justice had accepted an invitation to “play a prominent role in the 
transitional process”. According to the press20, the continuation of Chief 
Justice Corbett in office was welcomed by Mr Mandela, the then leader of the 
ANC, “particularly given the wide respect and confidence he enjoys”. The 
Democratic Party spokesman on justice, Mr Tony Leon, endorsing the 
continuance of Chief Justice Corbett in Office, referred to the qualities 
necessary for a Chief Justice to “bridge the great divide between the old legal 
and constitutional order and the new”.  
 
Chief Justice Corbett played a major role in the drafting of the Interim 
Constitution21 which included the establishment of the Constitutional Court. 
After a visit to the United States in 1976, he had said that he had become a 
convert to a Bill of Rights, which has a power of review vested in the courts. 
In this regard he later commented that “What I said at the time caused many 
an eyebrow to lift in governmental and judicial circles22.” However, in the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
20 The Quest for Justice, p, 28. 
21 Act No. 200 of 1993 
22 The Quest for Justice, p. 40. 
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negotiations at CODESA23 it was accepted that a Bill of Rights should form an 
integral part of any new South African constitution. 
 
In a speech at the Fourteenth South African Law Conference in September 
199324, Mr Justice Corbett described what he understood to be a person who is 
suitably qualified for appointment to the Supreme Court:  
 
“… I detect an underlying sentiment that the task of a judge is not a 
particularly difficult one, and that a person with the required legal 
qualifications can do the job. In my view, this is an illusion and the 
sooner it is dispelled the better. The truth is that the task of the judge is 
one of the most difficult, if not the most difficult there is. And after 
more than thirty years on the Bench I think I can claim to speak with 
some authority on the subject. If I were to attempt to sum up in half-a-
dozen words the qualities which ideally a judge should have, I would 
say knowledge, experience, judgement, independence, character and 
industry.”  
 
“… I am not for a moment suggesting that all judges possess them. On 
the contrary, it is probably true that few, if any, incumbents of the 
bench measure up to the ideal. Nevertheless, those are the 
requirements of the job and the criteria against which candidates for 
the bench must be measured.” 
 
He went on to say that the ideal judge should have a sound knowledge of the 
law and the practice of the courts. In our system of very limited specialisation, 
____________________________________________________________________ 
23 The Convention for a Democratic South Africa negotiated a transitional 
government and interim constitution for South Africa in 1993, leading to an all 
inclusive democracy in 1994. 
24 1993 De Rebus, issue 959, pp. 962-3.  
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a judge in a trial division may, in the course of a single term, sit in on criminal 
sessions, in motion court and in a civil division.  In addition, the case before 
him may involve aspects of private law, administrative law or complex 
commercial topics such as bills of exchange, insolvency, company law and 
intellectual property. 
 
On the subject of experience, he said that a trial judge should have a vast well 
of experience from which to draw. During a single day he could be called 
upon to give many rulings on procedure, the admissibility of evidence and so 
forth. In many instances the judge should, from his experience, know almost 
instinctively what to do. It relates to both fact-finding and the application of 
the law to the facts. A judge must arrive at the truth, because many more cases 
are decided on the facts rather than on the law. 
 
Regarding the subject of independence, Justice Corbett said that “a judge must 
be beholden to no one.” 
 
He included temperament and personality in the quality of character. A judge 
should have the personality to maintain order and dignity in court proceedings. 
In his opinion, a judge should run the court. 
 
Justice Corbett had the following to say about the quality of industry: 
 
“…And finally industry… Undeniably the bench is no longer a 
leisurely job. Judges have to read many thousands of pages of record 
and heads of argument in preparation for each court term. They have 
to work for long hours, but they have to see to it that they produce with 
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the minimum delay what the parties have come to court for, that is, a 
judgement.” 
 
2.6       TRIBUTES TO JUSTICE CORBETT 
 
The following extracts from essays in honour of Justice Corbett are presented 
as illustrations of the high regard in which his colleagues held him as an 
individual and of their admiration for his contributions in the legal field: 
 
HH Nestadt25 provides the following description of Judge Corbett’s 
appearance and attitudes:  
 
“Michael has a trim figure. He is gentle in speech and manner. He 
plays a useful game of tennis, but is inclined, so to speak, to run round 
his backhand. Conservative in his dress, he is a true liberal.” 
 
In his essay on Corbett, A S Botha26 gave tribute to Justice Corbett saying that 
the key to justice is: The power of clear thinking. This power, he believed, is 
the key to achievement in all human endeavours on an intellectual plane. But 
not all judges are endowed to the same degree with the ability to think clearly, 
and so the power manifests itself with varying degrees of efficacy. This 
accounts for the fact that we have bad judges, good judges, better judges and a 
____________________________________________________________________ 
25 The Quest for Justice, p.111, The Chief Justice, an essay by HH Nestadt, BA LLB 
(Wits), Judge of Appeal, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. 
26 The Quest for Justice, Essays in Honour of Michael McGregor Corbett, Juta & Co, 
Johannesburg, 1995, p.103, an essay on “The Power of Clear Thinking” by A S 
Botha, BA LLB (Pret.), Judge of Appeal, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa. 
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few great judges. In the latter case the power at work can be observed at its 
glorious best. On this score he singled out, from amongst the giants of the 
past, the names of Innes and Schreiner. And from the contemporaries he added 
a single name: Corbett. He marvelled at the apparent ease with which some of 
the principles of estoppel were explained in the judgement of OK Bazaars v 
Universal Stores Ltd27. The judgement of Blyth v van den Heever28 had been 
allocated to Michael Corbett. When Botha read the draft judgement, he was 
stunned. Where uncertainty, confusion and chaos reigned in regard to the 
ambit of medical negligence, all of a sudden there was now order, clarity and 
certainty. The mass of material had been beautifully sorted out, arranged, 
analysed and evaluated; the issues stood resolved as if it had been a “piece of 
cake” to do so.  
 
C G Hoexter29 states the following about the personal qualities of Justice 
Corbett: 
 
“It has been given to very few judges of appeal to serve so long. None 
has done it with greater ability than Michael. Honorary doctorates 
have been conferred upon him by the Universities of Cape Town, 
Rhodes, Witwatersrand and the Free State. On the Bench he displays 
restraint, courtesy to counsel, and the supreme judicial virtue: to listen 
patiently to argument.” 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
27 OK Bazaars v Universal Stores Ltd, 1973, (2) SA 281 (C). 
28 Blyth v van den Heever,1980, (1) SA 191 (A). 
29 The Quest for Justice, p.107, A Tribute by CG Hoexter BA LLB (Cantab) Judge of 
Appeal, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. 
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D L L Shearer30 has added the following tribute:  
“We were at the same college at Cambridge – Trinity Hall. Already 
the qualities which have led him to the highest office in the legal 
profession were plain – great intellectual ability, assiduous pursuit of 
principle and a quiet tact which puts everyone at ease.” 
 
Lord Steyn31 phrases his tribute to Justice Corbett as follows:  
 
“Taking qualities of judicial temperament for granted, it seems to me 
that the tribute of greatness must be reserved for judges who satisfy 
five requirements which overlap to some extent. First there is style and 
theme. Then, critical faculties and powers of legal analysis.  Profound 
knowledge of the law. A great judge must have a coherent philosophy 
of the role of the courts of law as an arm of government in a broad 
sense. He must also develop the law in a principled manner. Michael 
Corbett has in my view displayed all the qualities which I have 
described.” 
 
T W Bennet32 summarises Justice Corbett’s contribution to the legal system as 
follows:  
____________________________________________________________________ 
30 The Quest for Justice, p.113, Cambridge Days,  an essay by DLL Shearer, BA 
(Hons) (Natal) LLB (Cantab), Judge of Appeal, Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa, KwaZulu Natal Provincial Division. 
31 The Quest for Justice, p. 115, Tribute to a Great Judge, An essay by Lord Steyn, 
PC BA LLB (Stell) MA (Oxon), Bencher of Lincoln’s Inn, Lord of Appeal in 
Ordinary, Great Britain. 
32 The Quest for Justice, p.123, Law Applicable to Land in SA, an essay by TW 
Bennet, BA LLB (Rhodes) PhD (Cape Town), Professor, Department of Public Law, 
University of Cape Town  
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“Among the notable judgements delivered by Chief Justice Corbett are 
those on the conflict of laws (also called private international law). 
His rulings in Sperling v Sperling33 and Ex parte Spinazze & Another 
NNO34 established new principles in Roman-Dutch private 
international law, although the careful assessment of the comparative 
merits of systems from abroad – a hallmark of Mr Justice Corbett’s 
decisions – gave these cases relevance beyond South Africa’s 
borders.” 
 
H Corder35 emphasises the contribution made by Justice Corbett to 
fundamental human rights in the country in the following words:  
 
“Corbett CJ’s judgement in Administrator, Transvaal v Traub laid the 
foundations for a flowering jurisprudence around the principle of audi 
alterem partem. He rejected the previously influential ‘classification’ 
approach which held that the rules of natural justice only apply to 
judicial and quasi-judicial decisions and not to those that were ‘purely 
administrative’. It was artificial reasoning.”  
 
H C Nicholas36 concentrates on Judge Corbett’s contribution in the field of 
patents and trusts by stating the following:  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
33 1975, (3) SA 707 (A). 
34 1985, (3) SA 650 (A). 
35 The Quest for Justice, p. 132, A bill of rights in a changing SA, n essay by H 
Corder, B Comm LLB (Cape Town), Professor, Department of Public Law, 
University of Cape Town.  
36 The Quest for Justice, p, 264, Opening the Door, an essay by HC Nicholas, BA 
LLB (Wits), Judge of the Supreme Court of South Africa. 
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“As a judge of appeal, Michael Corbett was a member of the court in 
the great case of Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd37, which was 
a landmark case in South African patent law and a storehouse of 
learning on the validity and infringements of patents. He became a 
specialist on trusts and wrote several articles and books on this 
subject.” 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
A person is influenced by many factors which affect his personal and 
professional life. Justice Corbett is no exception. His father was a lawyer as 
well as being the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for many years.  Michael 
Corbett grew up in this environment and the law later became his career.  
 
A major influence on his political persuasion was the fact that he had had first-
hand experience of World War II and became part of the post-War liberal 
humanitarian movement. He understood and supported the philosophies on 
human rights.  Later in his life he was instrumental in the incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution.  
 
He had a high regard for the law and the Bench. He studied at the Universities 
of Cape Town and Cambridge, which are renowned for the high standards of 
their law departments. In his practice he concentrated on commercial cases as 
opposed to criminal work. Justice Corbett clearly had a greater interest in the 
commercial and economic facets of the law, such as trusts and patent law, 
whilst the criminal facet appeared to “bore” him. This preference explains his 
____________________________________________________________________ 
37 Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd, 1972, (1) SA 589 (A). 
 28
keen understanding of tax issues, which are part of the commercial component 
of the law. 
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CHAPTER 3  JURISPRUDENCE  IN  SOUTH  AFRICAN  TAX LAW 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Like any judge, Justice Corbett’s judgements were influenced by his 
background and personal convictions38.  Additionally the legal system 
prevailing in the country concerned has a substantial influence on the 
judgements handed down. This chapter summarises the international theories 
on law, including taxation, and the interaction between government and its 
citizens that prevailed during the latter half of the 20th century. It presents the 
judicial background to the judgements delivered by Justice Corbett.  
 
Justice Corbett’s background indicates that he had liberal and humanist 
convictions.  As already previously mentioned, he was a member of the 
“Torch Commando”. These humanist convictions were in step with the 
international trend among jurists who believed that it was their task to deliver 
substantive justice. Their credo was that in order to be just, the judge must be 
independent. The question which can be asked is whether Justice Corbett was 
independent. This question can only be answered by referring to 
internationally accepted legal theories on independence.  
The brief summary that follows indicates how jurists the world over theorised 
about the independence of the judiciary during the period that Justice Corbett 
was in office. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
38 See chapter 2 
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A judge’s function is to interpret the law, not to make it39.  The promulgation 
of legislation is a process which is entirely at the discretion of Parliament, and, 
in the case of post apartheid South Africa is subject to the limitation of the 
Constitution, which ensures the independence of the courts.  
 
Justice Corbett had an excellent ability to interpret tax legislation.  However, 
loopholes in tax legislation are targeted by taxpayers who enter into, or 
develop elaborate schemes to avoid taxation. For many years the courts in 
South Africa, England and New Zealand have had to grapple with the issue of 
how to apply existing tax legislation to various tax-avoidance schemes, 
including how the principle of substance over form influences the evaluation 
of a tax avoidance scheme. Justice Corbett’s approach to tax avoidance will be 
compared to the approach taken by the judiciary, both locally and 
internationally. 
 
3.2 THEORIES ON JURISPRUDENCE 
 
In order to be able to evaluate a judgement meaningfully, it is necessary to 
present a brief analysis of some of the basic philosophies of the judicial 
system of the time. According to Bix40, all jurisprudence theories can be 
____________________________________________________________________ 
39 United States Supreme Court Justice Cardozo, N in The Nature of the Judicial 
Process (1921)  
40 Bix, B Jurisprudence: Theory and Context, second edition, Westview Press, 
London, 1999. 
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categorised into four groups. The four groups are41: law-enforcement; the rule 
of law as procedural justice; the protection of the basic rights of the citizen 
through pre-announced rules that are administered by the ordinary courts; and 
the rule of law as justice in the substantive sense.  Each of these groups of 
theories is discussed in turn in the sections that follow. 
 
3.2.1   Law enforcement 
 
According to the law-enforcement theory, the government rules in accordance 
with the law when its actions towards the citizens of that country are legally 
authorised by Parliament. This theory concerns a rule by law and not a rule 
under law. A citizen who feels aggrieved by a prejudicial government action 
may appeal against such action. The government concerned must then prove 
that the citizen was dealt with in terms of a valid legal rule. Once the 
government has proved that its action was correct in terms of legislation, it has 
discharged its responsibility.  For example, apartheid legislation such as the 
Group Areas Act, was legally authorised by Parliament and could deny its 
citizens the right to own property. In the context of taxation, the search and 
seizure provisions gave the Commissioner the right to enter a taxpayer’s 
premises without the authorisation or supervision by the court. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
41 The rule of law – a reassessment. An essay by A S Matthews BA LLB PhD (Natal), 
Professor and Head of Department of Private Law of the University of Natal. The 
essay is included in Fiat Iustitia, Essays in memory of Oliver Deneys Schreiner by 
Ellison Kahn, Juta & Co, Johannesburg, (1983). 
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The shortcoming of this theory is that it says nothing about the content or the 
form of laws. It could result in the denial of the citizens’ most fundamental 
human rights.42  
 
3.2.2 The rule of law as procedural justice 
 
The crux of the rule of law theory, is the regulating of a society in accordance 
with the law. In his article, The rule of law and its virtue, Joseph Raz43 states 
the main principles as follows: 
i) Laws should be prospective, open and clear. 
ii) Laws should be relatively stable and not change too often. 
iii) Open, stable and general rules should govern subordinate 
legislation. 
iv) There should be an independent judiciary charged with the 
application of the law to cases brought before it. 
v) The principles of natural justice should be observed. 
vi) The courts should have the power of review in order to ensure 
the implementation of the above principles. 
vii) The courts should be easily accessible to the subjects of the 
state. 
viii) The discretion of crime-preventing agencies should not be 
allowed to pervert the law. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
42 The rule of law – a reassessment, an essay written by A S Matthews. The essay is 
included in Fiat Iustitia, Essays in memory of Oliver Deneys Schreiner by Ellison 
Kahn, p. 127. 
43 The rule of law and its virtue, (1977) 93 LQR, p. 195. 
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Clearly this theory, together with Dicey’s approach, which was developed in 
England, forms the basis of our new Constitution. 
 
3.2.3 Dicey’s approach: the protection of the basic rights of the citizen through 
pre-announced rules that are administered by the ordinary courts 
 
Dicey’s approach is concerned with justice in the material sense.  It stands for 
the legal protection of civil liberties and is famous for its principles, namely: 
i) No one shall be subject to penalties except for a distinct breach of law 
that is established before the ordinary courts. 
ii) The principle of equality before the courts. 
iii) The subject is more effectively protected when rights and remedies are 
incorporated into the ordinary law of the land. 
iv) Observance of legality in the form of clear pre-announced rules 
administered by independent courts.44 
Dicey’s approach became prevalent in the latter half of the 20th century in 
common law countries, including South Africa. 
 
3.2.4   The rule of law as justice in the substantive sense. 
 
The International Commission of Jurists has become the chief exponent of the 
most expansive theory of the rule of law by making the theory the epitome of 
the achievement of justice in its fullest sense. The Commission made the 
following grand statement in this regard at its conference in Lagos in 1961: 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
44 The rule of law – a reassessment, p. 128. 
 34
“The rule of Law is a dynamic concept which should be employed to 
safeguard and advance the will of the people and the political rights of 
the individual and to establish social, economic, educational and 
cultural conditions under which the individual may achieve his dignity 
and realize his legitimate aspirations in all countries, whether 
dependent or independent.” 
 
The “law enforcement” theory and the theory of “the rule of law as justice in 
the substantive sense” are extremist theories and probably not achievable in 
practice.45 This very liberal theory has been partially incorporated in the New 
Constitution as far as it was practical, mainly in the Bill of Rights. 
 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
 
Justice Corbett’s stance against apartheid indicates his opposition to the law 
enforcement theory. His belief in human rights probably typifies him as a 
follower of the rule of law as justice in the substantive sense. This position 
explains his formative approach to tax law which is clearly seen from the 
judgements he gave in tax cases46. Professor D M Davis47 remarks that Justice 
Corbett had “adopted a literal and formative approach to tax legislation, 
____________________________________________________________________ 
45 The rule of law – a reassessment, p. 128. 
46 Examples of Justice Corbett’s formative approach are: CIR v Louw, 45 SAT C113 
(discussed in chapter 4) , Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SIR, 39 SATC 163 
(chapter 5) and De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 47 SATC 229 (chapter 6). 
47 An essay by D M Davis on “Substance over form in tax law: The contribution of 
Mr Justice Corbett” - The quest for justice, p. 151. 
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thereby curbing the powers of Revenue and providing greater certainty as to 
the rights of taxpayers.” 
 
His approach rather reflects the approach by Dicey described in 
paragraph 3.2.3, which was adhered to by astute jurists of that time. 
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CHAPTER 4   TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the early seventies, several incidences of alleged tax avoidance were taken 
to the South African courts to determine the extent and ambit of section 103, 
the general anti-avoidance section of the Act. The first of these cases in that 
decade was SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert48; Corbett J was a member of 
the panel of judges in that case. 
  
As already mentioned, the English courts adopted the judicial anti-avoidance 
principle of substance over form49 during the 1980’s. This was a major change 
from the courts’ approach, which, up to that point, had been formative. This 
led the South African judiciary, in the late 90’s, to develop the substance over 
form principle in line with that of the United Kingdom and other countries50.  
 
Initially, the substance over form principle amplified the general anti-
avoidance section 103. Subsequent amendments to section 103 have 
incorporated some substance over form elements. These amendments were 
____________________________________________________________________ 
48 1971 AD, 33 SATC 113. 
49 See chapter 3. 
50 IRC v Duke of Westminster, 1936, AC 1 (HL), WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC, 1982, 
AC300 (HL) All ER 865 and Furniss v Dawson, 1984, AC 474 (HL) 1 All ER 530. 
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prompted by the various judgements given and incorporates provisions to 
prevent some of the avoidance schemes attempted by taxpayers. 
 
Justice Corbett presided over two court cases in which the Commissioner 
appealed on the grounds that the taxpayer had entered into a scheme that fell 
within the ambit of section 103(1). These cases are described in the paragraphs 
4.3 and 4.4. 
 
4.2  SUBSTANCE OVER FORM PRINCIPLE IN TAX LAW 
 
4.2.1 The application of substance over form principle in the United Kingdom 
 
In his article on Justice Corbett, Professor Davis (supra) writes that for many 
years the House of Lords adopted a literal approach to the interpretation of tax 
law. The concept that the taxpayer is entitled to arrange his affairs in so as to 
minimise his tax liability was enshrined in English jurisprudence in the case of 
IRC v Duke of Westminster51. This was the case until the 1980’s when the 
courts subtly changed their approach and developed a comprehensive judicial 
anti-avoidance doctrine. 
 
It is generally accepted that the first step in this development was taken by the 
House of Lords in WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC52. This case dealt with a scheme to 
create tax losses which could be offset against profits in unrelated transactions. 
The taxpayer created a company, the investment in which was represented by 
____________________________________________________________________ 
51 IRC v Duke of Westminster, 1936, AC 1 (HL). 
52 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC, 1982, AC300 (HL) All ER 865. 
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two debt instruments. One debt paid no interest whilst the other paid a 
substantial rate of interest, above market rates. The interest rates were fixed so 
that the interest that the debts produced could offset the gains and losses on 
disposal. When the taxpayer later disposed of the low interest debt, he claimed 
a tax loss. Had the House of Lords followed the Westminster doctrine, the 
taxpayer might well have won his case. However, Lord Wilberforce held that 
the statute should not to be interpreted literally, but should be interpreted in 
the light of the context and purpose of the legislation. The court rejected the 
argument that only Parliament should be entitled to prevent tax avoidance by 
means of legislation which plugs a hole that had hitherto been exploited by the 
taxpayer. Lord Wilberforce said that: 
 
“While the techniques of tax avoidance progress and are technically 
improved, the courts are not obliged to stand still. Such immobility 
must result either in a loss of tax, to the prejudice of other taxpayers, 
or to Parliamentary congestion or to both. To force the courts to 
adopt, in relation to closely integrated situations, a step by step, 
dissecting, approach which the parties themselves may have negated 
would be a denial rather than an affirmation of the true judicial 
process… The capital gains tax was created to operate in the real 
world, not that of make-believe.” 
 
Shortly after delivering its decision in Ramsay (supra), the House of Lords 
was confronted with another complex scheme53.  This scheme was intended to 
convert a non-deductible bad-debt loss on a claim by a parent company against 
a subsidiary into a deductible loss on stock. In disallowing this loss, Lord 
Diplock stated the following: 
____________________________________________________________________ 
53 IRC v Burmah Oil Co Ltd, (1981), 54 TC 200 (HL). 
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“It would be disingenuous to suggest, and dangerous on the part of 
those who advise on elaborate tax avoidance schemes, to assume that 
Ramsay‘s case did not mark a significant change in the approach 
adopted by this House in its judicial role to a preordained series of 
transactions into which there are inserted steps that have no 
commercial purpose apart from the avoidance of liability for tax.” 
 
The House of Lords further extended this anti-tax-avoidance approach in 
Furniss v Dawson54. This case concerned a company that wanted to transfer 
stock into a controlled company, located in the Isle of Man, which was sold to 
an independent purchaser. The transfer of the stock to the Isle of Man 
company was exempt from capital gains tax under a provision which 
permitted a controlling corporation to transfer stock to its subsidiary. The Isle 
of Man company was not subject to English tax. Consequently, the taxpayer 
hoped to avoid tax on the sale, at least until the disposal of the shares in the 
Isle of Man company. In finding for the Revenue, the House of Lords 
confirmed that the principle in such cases was that tax should be imposed in 
accordance with the end result and should take into account the step by step 
approach, especially when a step is inserted that has no commercial purpose 
apart from the avoidance of a tax liability. In the step by step approach, the 
courts normally look at the validity of each separate step. 
 
Professor Davis notes that these developments place enormous power in the 
hands of Revenue. Lord Brightman conceded as much when he stated that the 
approach in Furniss v Dawson converted the problem of defining prohibited 
forms of tax avoidance into a question of fact that is to be determined by the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
54 Furniss v Dawson, 1984, AC 474 (HL) 1 All ER 530. 
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Commissioner.  The Commissioner initially decides whether the steps taken 
by the taxpayer were premeditated and whether they had a commercial 
purpose. This trilogy of cases marked a major departure from the Westminster 
approach, namely to arrange one’s affairs to minimise tax.  
 
Professor Davis observes that the uncontrolled nature of the power which 
appeared to be concentrated in Revenue caused the House of Lords to review 
this approach in Craven v White55. Significantly, this case also concerned a 
transaction which used an Isle of Man company to avoid tax on the proceeds 
of the sale of shares. In Craven’s case, however, the transfer of the shares to 
the Isle of Man company occurred at a time when both the ultimate sale of the 
stock and the terms of the sale were uncertain. In a split decision, the majority 
of the House of Lords sided with the taxpayer on the grounds that the sale of 
the Isle of Man company was not a preordained transaction within the context 
of the test set out in Furniss v Dawson. Delivering the main judgement, Lord 
Oliver confirmed that the court should adopt a narrow approach to the 
development of a judicial anti-avoidance doctrine. Lord Oliver’s conservative 
approach to the liberal Furniss v Dawson test is reflected in the following 
passage: 
 
“… judges are not legislators and if the result of a judicial decision is 
to contradict the express statutory consequences which have been 
declared by Parliament to attach to a particular transaction which has 
been found as a fact to have taken place, that can be justified only 
because, as a matter of construction of the statute, the court has 
____________________________________________________________________ 
55 Craven v White, 1989, AC 398 (HL) 3 All ER 495. 
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ascertained that which has taken place is not, within the meaning of 
the statute, the transaction to which those consequences attach.” 
 
Professor Davis is of the opinion that, in general, English courts are required 
to adopt a more aggressive approach to tax avoidance than South African 
courts.  This different approach is the result of the absence of a general anti 
tax-avoidance provision in the United Kingdom income tax legislation that is 
comparable with the provision that appears in section 103(1) of the South 
African Income Tax Act. Nevertheless, the House of Lords has subsequently 
followed a more cautious approach to the interpretation of tax legislation as 
illustrated in Craven v White and particularly in Ensign Tanker Leasing Ltd v 
Stokes56 and IRC v Fitzwilliam57. 
 
4.2.2  Conclusion on the substance over form principle 
 
The South African courts have recently began to follow the English and 
international trend in applying the principle of substance over form58. 
Professor Davis points out, as already mentioned above, that the principle of 
substance over form has the danger of placing uncontrolled power in the hands 
of Inland Revenue. He suggests that a narrow approach to this anti-avoidance 
doctrine is necessary.  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
56 1992, 1 AC 665 (HL). 
57 1993, 1 WLR 1189 (HL). 
58 See Relier (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 60 SATC 1, and Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and 
Another v CIR, 58 SATC 229 
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The ensuing chapters will show that Justice Corbett was more inclined to 
focus on the form of a transaction (the literal or formative approach). This 
approach curbed the powers of the Department of Internal Revenue and 
provides greater certainty regarding the rights of taxpayers. 
 
In the following paragraphs, an analysis is undertaken to determine the extent 
to which the English and New Zealand judiciary approach the substance over 
form principle and the impact their approach has had on the judgements 
delivered by Justice Corbett in similar cases. It is to be expected that some 
cases will contain conflicting perspectives. Naturally, Justice Corbett cannot 
be considered to be the sole architect of the judgements that he delivered. 
Credit is also due to the representatives and opposing counsel who presented 
well-founded arguments, as well as to the input delivered by the other judges 
on the panel. 
 
4.3  GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE: AVOIDANCE OF ESTATE 
DUTY 
 
In the case of Secretary for Inland Revenue v Gallagher59, Justice Corbett was 
required to determine whether section 103(1) was applicable in the 
circumstances. In 1968, the taxpayer entered into a scheme for the ultimate 
benefit of his children. At that time the taxpayer held shares in public 
companies that were quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
59 1978 (2) SA 463(A), 40 SATC 39 
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The taxpayer then formed another company named Stanley Patrick Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd (‘SPH’) and at the same time created trusts for the benefit of his 
three children and donated his shares in SPH to the trusts. In terms of the trust 
deeds, all of which contained identical provisions, the trustees were directed to 
distribute the income received to the child concerned.  
 
As a consequence of these donations, the trustees of the three trusts became 
the holders of the entire share capital of SPH. Thereafter the taxpayer entered 
into a written agreement with SPH in terms of which he sold to the company 
his assets, namely, the shares in the public companies. The purchase price 
remained a debt that SPH owed to the taxpayer and was payable on demand. 
 
In determining the taxpayer’s liability for normal tax for the 1969, 1970 and 
1971 tax years, the Commissioner applied the provisions of section 103(1) of 
the Act.  For this purpose the Commissioner included in the taxpayer’s income 
the income that SPH had derived from the assets which he had sold to it and 
assessed him accordingly.  
 
Justice Corbett said:  
 
“The four elements of section 103(1) which are required to warrant a 
determination by Inland Revenue are set out in SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth 
& Joubert (supra) at 571E-H. The first three requirements for the 
application of the above section were established. The only issue for 
decision before the court a quo was whether the taxpayer had 
discharged the onus of proving that the avoidance or the postponement 
of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was not 
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the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or 
scheme.” 60 
 
Justice Corbett indicated that the main point made by the Commissioner’s 
counsel appeared to be that the taxpayer could not have failed to appreciate 
____________________________________________________________________ 
60 Section 103(1) states that:  
Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that any transaction, operation or 
scheme whether entered into or carried out before or after the commencement of 
this Act, and including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the 
alienation of property)-- 
a)       has been entered into or carried out which has the effect of avoiding or 
postponing liability for the payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by 
this Act or any previous Income Tax Act, or of reducing the amount 
thereof; and 
[inserted after the Gallagher case] 
b)       having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation 
or scheme 
i)          was entered into or carried out-- 
aa)     in the case of a transaction, operation or scheme in the context 
of business, in a manner which would normally be employed 
for bona fide business purposes, other than the obtaining of a 
tax benefit; and 
bb)    in the case of a transaction, operation or scheme, being a 
transaction, operation or scheme not falling within provisions 
of item (aa) by means or in a manner which would not 
normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a 
transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the 
transaction, operation or scheme in question; or 
ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be 
created between persons dealing at arm's length under a 
transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, 
operation or scheme in question; and 
 
[Subpara (i) substituted by s.29(1)(a) of Act No.36 of 1996].   
 
c)       was entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purposes of 
obtaining a tax benefit; and the Commissioner shall determine the liability 
for any tax, duty or levy imposed by this Act, and the amount thereof, as if 
the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried 
out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he deems 
appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, 
postponement or reduction. 
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that, by divesting himself of considerable income-producing assets, he would 
substantially reduce his liability for income tax and that consequently such 
reduction must have been at least one of the main purposes of the scheme. 
Justice Corbett said that it is improbable 
 
• that the taxpayer could have been advised that there would be no 
income tax advantage to be derived from the scheme and  
 
• that the taxpayer could have accepted the advice and embarked upon 
the scheme without having the reduction of his income tax as one of 
his main objectives. 
 
Section 103(1) did not define the avoidance of estate duty as a tax that applied 
to this section at the time. Thus, the main purpose of the taxpayer was to avoid 
the payment of estate duty, and therefore, the appeal by the Commissioner was 
dismissed.  
 
Section 103(1) was subsequently amended in the light of the Gallagher 
judgement to encompass the situation in which a transaction, operation or 
scheme is entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purpose of 
avoiding, postponing or reducing the liability of a taxpayer for the payment of 
tax, duty or levy under any law administered by the Commissioner. As a result 
of the amended wording of the subsection “… a scheme which has been 
entered into or carried out which has the effect of avoiding or postponing 
liability for the payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by this Act or any 
previous Income Tax Act, or of reducing the amount thereof…” the 
Commissioner can attack a scheme if its effect is to avoid any tax levied in 
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terms of the Income Tax Act and, in addition, the abnormality and other 
requirements of the section are satisfied. 
 
4.3.1    Application of the principles derived from the Gallagher case 
 
The Hicklin61 case concerned a sale by the taxpayer of all his shares in a 
private company that had distributable profits. His indebtedness to this 
company was eliminated with the sale of the shares.   
 
The Commissioner raised the question whether the distributable profits were 
taxable as dividends in the taxpayer’s hands and the requirements of section 
103 had to be applied to the facts of the case. The High Court, referring to the 
Gallagher decision overruled the decision of the Special Tax Court and found 
that the Commissioner’s reliance upon the provisions of section 103 of the Act 
was not maintainable, and accordingly, allowed the appeal with costs.   
 
 Although Justice Corbett did not deliver the judgement in Burgess v CIR62, he 
was a member of the court in the case. This case is a good example of a 
“formative” approach as applied by Justice Corbett during his years on the 
bench.  
 
The taxpayer embarked on a scheme whereby money was borrowed from a 
bank and invested for a short period in an insurance policy. The value of the 
policy was expected to appreciate. At the end of the period of the insurance, 
____________________________________________________________________ 
61 Hicklin v SIR, 1980, (1) SA 481 (A), 41 SATC 179 
62 1993, SA 161 (A), 55 SATC 185. 
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the bank would be repaid and the profit would be enjoyed by the taxpayer. The 
liability for the total interest accrued during the first year although interest was 
only payable in arrears. As no income was payable before the end of the first 
year, the liability to pay interest resulted in a tax loss which would be off-set 
against other income of the taxpayer. The insurance scheme had been 
marketed as a tax-saving device. The taxpayer sought to deduct his liability for 
interest in terms of section 11(a) upfront, but the Commissioner disallowed the 
deduction. 
 
Grosskopf JA made it clear in his judgement that the Commissioner’s decision 
was not based on section 103(1) of the Act.  Therefore, the sole question to be 
decided was whether the taxpayer carried on a trade within the meaning of 
section 11(a). The Commissioner raised two arguments. Firstly, he suggested 
that the taxpayer’s actual purpose in making the investment was to reap the 
reward which flowed from the fiscal advantage of the transaction. In other 
words, the scheme envisaged the enjoyment of a commercial return to be only 
an incidental benefit. Secondly, the particular investment could not amount to 
the carrying on of a trade that is sufficient to bring the deduction within the 
ambit of section 11(a). To support these arguments, the Commissioner mainly 
relied on English case law, particularly those cases that promoted a substance 
over form approach. 
 
Grosskopf JA disagreed with the Commissioner on these points.  He stated 
that: 
 
“If a taxpayer pursues a course of conduct which, standing on its own, 
constitutes the carrying on of a trade, he would not …cease to be 
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carrying on a trade merely because one of his purposes, or even his 
main purpose, in doing what he does is to obtain some tax advantage.” 
 
On the basis of the facts, the Commissioner attempted to argue along the lines 
of Melamet J’s finding, in ITC 149663, that the package of agreements had no 
commercial basis and that the true purpose of the transaction was not to carry 
on a trade, but to save tax.  In both cases the claiming of interest as a 
deduction up-front, created a tax loss. Overall the schemes were hardly 
profitable and in each case the main aim was to create a tax loss. 
 
Had the court adopted a substance over form approach, which is similar to the 
approach adopted in the trilogy of English cases already discussed before in 
this chapter, the result might have been different. Unlike the United Kingdom, 
South Africa has a general anti-tax-avoidance section in its Income Tax Act.  
 
According to Professor Davis64, the Burgess case was an accurate reflection of 
the nature of the South African Income Tax Act as it was before the substance 
over form approach changed the face of anti-tax avoidance provisions adopted 
from England. The judgements in Burgess and Gallagher are good examples 
of the formative approach to the interpretation of fiscal legislation by Justice 
Corbett. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
63 53 SATC 229 
64 An essay by D M Davis on Substance over form in tax law: The contribution of Mr 
Justice Corbett. The Quest for Justice, p. 151. 
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It should also be noted that section 103(1) was changed some time after this 
case, to include the bona fide business purposes test. According to this test the 
court should decide if a transaction was concluded like a normal business 
transaction, creating normal rights and liabilities, then it should not fail the 
“normality yardstick”. This test forces the court to consider the normality of 
the transaction from a business point of view, similar to that of the substance 
approach. 
 
The new general anti-avoidance rule is inserted as Part IIA of Chapter III of the 
Income Tax Act and replaces the previous section 10365. The GAAR opens by 
describing what an “impermissible avoidance arrangement” is in section 80A66. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
65 Revenue Laws Amendment Act, No. 20 of 2006 
66 Section 80A provides that an avoidance arrangement (or an arrangement which 
results in a tax benefit) is an impermissible avoidance arrangement if:  
1. Its sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit; and  
2. A tainted element is present. There are three tainted elements although their 
formulation may vary depending on the context in which an arrangement was 
carried out or entered into.  
2.1 Abnormality (sections 80A(a)(i), 80A(b) and 80(c)(i));  
2.2 Lack of commercial substance (section 80A(a)(ii)); or  
2.3 Misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act (section 80A(c)(ii)).  
The abnormality element is largely based on the previous section 103 and precedent 
developed in South Africa. The lack of commercial substance element is based upon 
precedent in both the United Kingdom and the United States and would adopt what 
the House of Lords has referred to as an “unblinkered” approach to complex multi-
step “composite transactions.. The misuse or abuse element has its inspiration in 
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The powers that the Commissioner has with respect to an impermissible 
avoidance arrangement are set out in section 80B. The remaining provisions, from 
C to L, expand on these first two provisions and deal with certain procedural 
issues that arise.  
 
The main elements of the new GAAR remain reduction of taxes and the 
abnormality of the transactions. The abnormality element is largely based on the 
previous section 103 and precedent developed in South Africa. The development 
of this part of the tax law has been retained in the new legislation. 
 
 
4.4  SECTION 103(1) AS APPLIED TO LOANS TO SHAREHOLDERS 
FROM A COMPANY 
 
The formative approach of Justice Corbett was also adopted in Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue v Louw67.  The taxpayer, a civil engineer, had practised in 
partnership with Van Wyk under the name Van Wyk and Louw. During 1966, 
this taxpayer and his partner decided to ‘incorporate’ the practice in an 
unlimited company. The company Van Wyk and Louw Incorporated was 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Canadian and certain European jurisdictions approaches to impermissible tax 
avoidance. The two new elements are intended both to remedy the well-recognised 
weaknesses in the current abnormality requirement and to expand the scope of the 
GAAR to address as many forms of impermissible tax avoidance as possible.  
 
67 1983 (3) SA 551(A), 45 SATC 113. 
 51
formed, which bought the business from the partnership. The purchase 
consideration was to be paid by the company, partly by means of an allotment 
of shares to the erstwhile partners and partly by crediting loan accounts in 
their names in the books of the company. 
 
Immediately after incorporation, the directors’ loan accounts, representing a 
portion of the purchase price, were in credit. Subsequently, unsecured non 
interest-bearing loans that the company had made to the directors eroded these 
credits with the result that by approximately 1971/1972 the directors’ loan 
accounts were all in debit. Furthermore, the amounts that the taxpayer 
received from the company for salary and dividends were materially less than 
the income which had accrued to him as a partner in the partnership.  
The Commissioner issued revised assessments for the 1966 and 1967 tax 
years, including the aforementioned proportion of the share of the company’s 
income, with the company itself being regarded as having no income.  
 
Corbett JA delivered the judgement.  He found nothing wrong with the fact 
that the partnership changed to a company as it was normal business practice 
to do so68. He held that the large after-tax profits of the company and the 
disparity between, on the one hand, the taxpayer’s yearly aggregate of salary 
and dividends and, on the other, his partnership income, made it very probable 
that if the taxpayer and his co-directors had not received the amounts by way 
of loans, they would have received them by way of additional salary and/or 
dividends.  It was furthermore upheld that this probability was confirmed by 
the co-mingling of salary, dividends and loans in the books of the company. In 
____________________________________________________________________ 
68 See SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert, 1971, 33 SATC 113 
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the circumstances, there was only a remote possibility of the loans being 
called up by the company and the taxpayer’s contention of a ‘reserve’ upon 
which the company could draw in time of need was untenable. Accordingly, 
the effect of the loan transactions was to avoid or postpone (but probably only 
to postpone) liability for income tax and therefore section 103(1) applied.  
 
By applying the four tests contained in section 103(1), the abnormality of the 
transactions was proved. On an examination of the facts, it was found that the 
cumulative effect of the evidence indicated that, had the loans to directors not 
been made, the taxpayer and his co-directors would have received equal 
amounts, or amounts equal to a substantial proportion of such loans, in the 
form of either salary or dividends. This was an application of the formative 
and literal approach.  By considering the facts of the case, the avoidance of tax 
was proved. 
 
4.4.1  Application of the ‘test of normality’ in the Louw case 
 
The formative approach that was applied by Justice Corbett in the Louw case 
and his reference to the “normality yardstick” between parties to a transaction 
was approved and applied in several cases thereafter. 
 
The Louw case was discussed in ITC 154269. The taxpayers incorporated a 
second-hand car venture and then sold their goodwill (“drawing-power”) to a 
company. The question that arose was whether the consideration received 
____________________________________________________________________ 
69 (1989) 54 SATC 417 (O). 
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constituted ‘know-how’ in terms of paragraph (gA) of the definition of gross 
income in section 1 of the Act and therefore of a revenue nature. 
 
It was held that the consideration that the taxpayers received for the sale of 
their goodwill was of a capital nature and therefore not taxable as the receipt 
did not fall within the ambit of paragraph (gA) of the definition of gross 
income. Furthermore, it was held that the decision in Louw did not support the 
contention that the provisions of section 103 were applicable to the facts of the 
case. The following specific mention was made of Justice Corbett’s dictum70 
in respect of the test of section 103: 
 
 “In such a case should the court, in applying the ‘normality’ 
yardstick, take account of the special relationship between the 
erstwhile partners and the company which they have formed, or ignore 
it and apply the yardstick as though the company were a stranger? I 
do not see how the court can ignore this special relationship and yet 
give proper effect to the concluding words of section 103(1).” 
 
“For it is of the very nature of the incorporation scheme that the 
company to which the practice is sold by the partners will have as its 
shareholders and directors the self-same partners and will be 
controlled by them. Those are the realities of the situation. Moreover, 
it must be borne in mind that in a case such as the present, the 
transaction is a multiparty one to which all the partners and the 
company are parties; and each partner contracts both with the 
company and his fellow partners and seeks to extract from the 
transaction the best possible advantage for himself.” 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
70  54 SATC 417, p. 423. 
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The judgement delivered in ITC 162571 also cites and discusses the Louw case. 
The taxpayer–company deducted interest on the money which it had borrowed 
to pay a portion of the purchase price of immovable property from which it 
derived rental income. The Commissioner contended that the real intention of 
the parties was not that the taxpayer should acquire the property in question 
from the existing close corporation, but simply that the members of the close 
corporation should derive the benefit of the enhanced market value of the 
property. It was questioned whether the taxpayer had the honest intention of 
purchasing the property and whether the existing close corporation had the 
honest intention of selling it. 
 
The court relied on the observations of Corbett JA in Louw to decide whether 
section 103 should be applied. It was held that no abnormal rights or 
obligations were created and that therefore section 103 could not be applied. 
 
Another case in which the principles of the Louw case were applied, was ITC 
163672. In that case, the taxpayer disposed of its assets to the lessor and then 
leased those assets in a sale and leaseback agreement. The taxpayer claimed 
the deduction of the rental paid in terms of section 11(a). The Commissioner 
disputed the scheme on the grounds that the transactions concerned were 
simulated and, alternatively, that they ought to be ignored in terms of 
section 103(1). This argument was based on the fact that the lessor, a financial 
institution, took transfer of ownership of the assets, while the taxpayer carried 
all the risk associated with ownership. The court held that the agreements in 
____________________________________________________________________ 
71 1995, 59 SATC 383. 
72  1997, 60 SATC 267. 
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question were genuine sale and lease-back agreements. One of the determining 
factors was that the parties were not “connected” parties.  
 
The court also applied the normality test that was used in the Louw case.  In 
determining whether any tax avoidance was effected in the Louw case, Justice 
Corbett adopted what may be termed a “but for” test73.  He phrased it as 
follows  
 
“Ask oneself the question whether, but for the loans, equivalent or 
even lesser amounts would probably have been received by the 
taxpayer in a taxable form, that is as salary or dividend.” 
 
The following was said in the Louw case74 regarding the application of the 
normality (the “but for”) test:  
 
“The question as to what the company, directed by the taxpayer and 
his co-shareholders, would have done had the directors’ loans not 
been made, was not canvassed in evidence. This is not altogether 
surprising. The ipse dixit of the taxpayer in answer to this hypothetical 
and essentially controversial question could hardly have carried much 
weight. The answer to the question must rather be sought in the 
inference to be drawn, as a matter of probability, from the known and 
undisputed facts.” 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
73  45 SATC 113, p. 579. 
74  45 SATC 113, p. 579.  
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4.4.2 Conclusion regarding Louw   
 
Whereas the House of Lords, in Duke of Westminster, adopted a “literal” 
approach to interpreting tax legislation, the trilogy of cases that commenced 
with Ramsay (supra) followed a “purposive” approach to interpretation. The 
court searched for the legislative purpose that applied in the introduction of the 
legislation and, having found it, based its interpretation on it. In CIR v Louw, 
Corbett JA was confronted with this approach. According to Professor Davis, 
Corbett JA adopted a literal approach to the interpretation of section 103(1).  
The general anti-tax-avoidance section, that is section 103(1), contained four 
separate requirements that had to be fulfilled before Revenue could 
successfully apply it to set aside what was otherwise acknowledged to be a 
legal transaction.  
 
Section 103(1)(b)(ii) provided that the transaction, operation or scheme in 
question should have created rights or obligations which would not normally 
be created between two persons who deal at arm’s length in a transaction, 
operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme 
concerned. The section sets out the so-called “normality” requirement. The 
question that arose, is what was meant by a “normal” transaction.  
 
In dealing with an argument by Revenue in the case of the conversion of a 
professional partnership into a company, with consequent tax savings, Corbett 
JA (as he then was), concluded as follows in delivering the unanimous 
judgement of the court75 that in applying the “normality” yardstick, the court 
____________________________________________________________________ 
75 45 SATC 113 at page 137 and 138 
 57
cannot ignore the special relationship and yet give proper effect to the words 
of section103 (1)(b). For it is the very nature of the incorporation scheme that 
the company to which the practice is sold by the partners, will have as its 
shareholders and directors the self-same partners and will be controlled by 
them. The transaction is a multiparty one to which all the partners and the 
company were parties; and each partner contracted both with the company and 
his fellow partner and sought to extract from the transaction the best possible 
advantage for himself. 
 
The judgement illustrates how, in reaching his decision, Justice Corbett 
adopted a literal approach to the words of the section. In this way he 
introduced a contextualized objective test for ascertaining normality. 
 
Applying only a subjective test (testing the taxpayer’s intention) would take a 
considerable part of the “sting” out of section 103(1) and would, in many 
cases, make it exceedingly difficult for Revenue to succeed in applying the 
section. 
 
Professor Davis76 states that not all our courts have adopted this subjective 
approach to section 103(1).  In ITC 149677, the taxpayer made an investment 
in a plantation venture by joining an en commandite partnership, which had 
been set up to carry on the business of timber-plantation farming for an 
indefinite period. The promoters of the scheme had created several 
____________________________________________________________________ 
76 An essay by D M Davis on Substance over form in tax law: The contribution of Mr 
Justice Corbett.  The quest for justice, p.153. 
77 ITC 1496 (1991), 53 SATC 229  
 58
partnerships, each consisting of fewer than twenty partners. Four partnerships 
had been set up. A total of 72 investors as well as one managing partner had 
entered into these partnerships. Each partner was expected to make a 
contribution to the working capital of the partnership. In order to raise this 
money, the taxpayer borrowed funds from the bank and was required to issue a 
promissory note for the amount borrowed plus the total interest compounded 
over the period. The taxpayer then attempted to deduct in full the working 
capital contribution, as well as the total amount of interest in terms of section 
11(a), in conjunction with section 23(g), of the Income Tax Act.  
 
Revenue disallowed this deduction in terms of section 103(1) of the Act. Mr 
Justice Melamet upheld Revenue’s approach. From an analysis of the facts, he 
found that78: 
 
“…The transactions were entered into and carried out in a manner 
which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying 
out of transactions of a partnership or partnerships and further had 
created certain rights and obligations not normally created between 
persons dealing at arms length in a scheme or transactions of this 
nature.” 
 
Professor Davis points out79 that, although Melamet J pointed out a number of 
abnormalities in the facts, no attempt was made to compare the particular 
transactions with transactions of a similar nature, that is, other plantation 
____________________________________________________________________ 
78 ITC 1496 (1991), 53 SATC 229 at p 253D 
79 An essay by D M Davis on Substance over form in tax law: The contribution of Mr 
Justice Corbett.  The quest for justice, p.153. 
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ventures. Melamet J’s approach appeared to be that because the “scheme in the 
present instance was designed to exploit what was thought to be loopholes in 
the Income Tax Act and hence, as the purpose of the transaction was to save 
or avoid tax, there was no need to contextualise the nature of the transactions, 
for by definition, they were artificial and contrived.”80 
 
Whereas Corbett JA’s approach in the Louw judgement amounted to an 
invitation to the courts to examine the context within which the transaction in 
question takes place and to classify the normality of the transactions in terms 
of the genus of such transactions, Melamet J appears to have confused the 
purpose and the normality requirements.  
 
In brief, once the transaction has been entered into with the purpose of saving 
tax, there would appear to be little need to investigate the context in which the 
transaction was entered into in order to determine normality. Professor Davis 
submits that if Melamet J had adopted the approach that was applied in the 
Louw case, the evidence of comparable partnerships and the manner in which 
their transactions were structured would have been of crucial importance to 
the determination of whether the partnership in ITC 1496 had engaged in an 
abnormal transaction. Louw’s case was not discussed or applied in ITC 1496. 
As the partnership in ITC1496 may have been considered not abnormal 
compared with similar partnerships, he submits, that had there been an appeal, 
the outcome of ITC 1496 might have been reversed, unless valid reasons could 
be given for not applying the principles contained in the Louw case. 
Unfortunately ITC 1496 was never taken to the High Court of Appeal.  
____________________________________________________________________ 
80 ITC 1496,1991, 53 SATC 229 at p 254B 
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According to Silke81, the normality or abnormality of a transaction should not 
be judged solely in terms of whether the parties are independent persons who 
deal with one another at arm’s length. This is an important factor that should 
be taken into consideration, but it is not necessarily conclusive. It could well 
be that, in a particular transaction between two parties who are not 
independent persons that deal at arm’s length, the manner and means that is 
contemplated in section 103(1)(b)(i) may be the normal procedure for that 
particular transaction. For example, it is not an abnormal arrangement for a 
father to sell assets to his child or for a sole beneficial shareholder in a 
company to sell the assets to his company and to leave the purchase price in 
the form of an interest-free loan. But the requirements of section 103(1)(b)(ii) 
should also be satisfied, namely that the transaction should not have created 
rights or obligations for persons that would not normally be created for 
persons who deal at arm’s length. Therefore, because the father or the sole 
shareholder has left the purchase price in the form of an interest-free loan, it 
could be held that the transaction created a right that would not normally be 
created for persons who deal at arm’s length; that the taxpayer has not 
satisfied the requirement of normality; and, if the avoidance of tax were the 
sole or main purpose, then section 103(1) should apply. It is imperative that 
the transaction should not only be judged in terms of the manner in which it 
was entered into or carried out, but also in terms of the rights or obligations 
that it creates. Even if the method that was adopted might be regarded as being 
normal, the taxpayer might still have failed to satisfy the requirement of 
normality if any of the rights or obligations that were created should prove to 
____________________________________________________________________ 
81 Silke, The test for normality, chapter 19.13. 
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be abnormal. The rights or obligations should be those that would normally be 
created for persons who deal at arm’s length in a similar transaction.  
 
The circumstances under which the transaction was entered into or carried out 
as well as its nature should be considered. It was for this reason that in CIR v 
Louw the control exercised by the shareholders over the company was a factor 
that was favourably considered by the court regarding the question about the 
normality of the rights or obligations created upon their sale of their 
professional practice to the company.  
 
If a shareholder transfers assets to a company that cannot pay him for them 
with the object of carrying out a transaction for the purpose of avoiding tax, he 
would, prima facie, be inviting the application of section 103(1).  For 
example, should he sell those assets at values that are less than their current 
market price or if he should leave the purchase price as an interest-free loan, 
then he would create rights or obligations that would not normally be created 
by persons who deal at arm’s length. However, exceptions do apply, for 
example, it could be considered normal for relatives not to charge interest to 
one another. 
 
Developments subsequent to Louw have resulted in amendments to section 
103(1). The substance of a scheme should be determined in order to test its 
“normality”, but only in relation to business transactions. This amendment 
would not, however, have changed the outcome of the Louw case. The 
“normality yardstick” that was developed and applied by Justice Corbett is 
still used as a valid principle in the application of section 103(1) in non-
business schemes and transactions. 
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CHAPTER 5  GROSS INCOME – CAPITAL VERSUS REVENUE 
 RECEIPTS AND SOURCE 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, the judgements of Justice Corbett delivered in relation to:   
 
z Whether a receipt is of a capital or revenue nature; 
z the apportionment of receipts between capital and revenue; and  
z the source of income 
will be discussed. 
 
Capital v revenue receipts 
 
The definition of gross income in the Income Tax Act states that receipts or 
accruals of a capital nature are not included in the definition and are therefore 
not subject to income tax. However, since 2001 all capital gains are subject to 
Capital Gains Tax in terms of section 26A read together with the Eighth 
Schedule of the Act. Before 2001 it was very beneficial for the taxpayer to 
prove the capital nature of the profit that he had made on the sale of an asset, 
as it was not subject to taxation. The beneficial rewards of having a receipt 
classified as being of a capital nature are still available as only twenty five 
percent of a capital gain is included in the individual taxpayer’s taxable 
income, unless the capital gain is specifically excluded from being taxable 
income, for example, the capital gain made on certain personal-use assets.  
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Justice Corbett could not escape the capital-versus-revenue tussle between 
taxpayers and the revenue authorities. He delivered judgements in the 
following three cases regarding the issue of capital versus revenue:  JM 
Malone Trust82, Elandheuwel Farming83 and Rile Investments84. These cases 
mainly cover the question whether the profit made on the sale of property in a 
property company is taxable. These cases are discussed separately in 
paragraph 5.2 of this chapter. 
 
Apportionment of receipts between capital and revenue 
 
In Tuck85, Justice Corbett made an apportionment between capital and revenue 
in a case in which a taxpayer received a single lump sum payment.  Prior to 
this case, it was generally accepted that a receipt should be considered to be 
either capital or revenue in nature and that it could not be apportioned. 
 
Source of income 
 
In January 2001, South Africa introduced the principle of residence based 
taxation86 and changed the basis of taxation from the “source of the income” 
____________________________________________________________________ 
82 JM Malone Trust v Secretary for Inland Revenue, 1977 (A), 39 SATC 83 
83 Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v. SIR, 1977 (A), 39 SATC 163 
84 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Rile Investments (Pty) Ltd, 1978 (3) SA 732(A), 40 
SATC 135 
85 Tuck v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, 1988 (3) SA 819(A), 50 SATC 98 
86 The definition of gross income was changed to include “all income received by 
residents of South Africa”. 
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to “the residence of the person receiving the income”. Thus the source of 
income has now become of relevance only in respect of non-residents who are 
only taxed on income that is derived from a South African source. However, 
the judgement of Justice Corbett in Essential Sterolin Products (Pty) Ltd v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue, remains one of the leading cases dealing 
with the issue of establishing the source of income. 
 
5.1.1  Receipts in a realisation company or a trust are of a capital nature 
 
In JM Malone Trust v Secretary for Inland Revenue87, the taxpayer formed a 
trust which made substantial profits on the sale of erven in a township which it 
owned. 
 
The material conditions of the trust deed which were relevant to this appeal 
read as follows: 
 
“The objects for which the Trust is established shall be: 
…to purchase immovable property and take transfer of such properties 
or land into the name of the Trust and to sell such properties or land 
when the Trustee considers it necessary or desirable to do so.” 
 
After the taxpayer’s death, the executor experienced difficulty in completing 
the establishment of the township and accordingly transferred the property to 
the trust. At the hearing before the Special Court, the executor testified that the 
purpose of clause 2(a) of the trust deed was to enable the trust to acquire a 
residence for the taxpayer.  This would occur after the demolition of the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
87 1977 (A), 39 SATC 83 
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existing dwelling on the property, consequent upon the layout of the township.  
However, the trust had not acquired any property other than the township 
property concerned. 
 
It was held that the correct conclusion to be drawn from the facts was that, 
instead of himself implementing his resolve to realise the property through the 
township scheme, the taxpayer (or his estate) had created the trust as a vehicle 
for such realisation and to introduce additional safeguards for his children.  
Therefore the trust was purely a realisation trust within the principles espoused 
in the Berea West88 case. 
 
In the Berea West case, a realisation company was used to realise a capital 
asset without falling foul of the “crossing of the Rubicon” principle89. 
Realisation companies now have limited application since the introduction of 
Capital Gains Tax.  Paragraph 12(2)(c) of the Eighth Schedule of the Income 
Tax Act provides for the valuation of property when there is a change in the 
intention in regard to the use to which an asset will be put, for example, a 
change from holding it as a capital asset to holding it as a revenue asset or vice 
____________________________________________________________________ 
88 Berea West Estates v SIR (1976 AD), 38 SATC 43 See also Realization Company v 
COT 1951 (1) SA 177 (SR), (1950 SR 182), 17 SATC 139; C H Rand v Alberni Land 
Co Ltd 7, TC 629 and Commissioner of Taxes v British Australian Wool Realisation 
Association Ltd [1931] AC. In ITC 1450, 1988, 51 SATC 70, and CIR v Pick ‘n Pay 
Employee Share Trust, 1992 AD, 54 SATC 271, the courts held that the proceeds on 
the sale of shares were capital because the shares were not acquired in a profit-making 
scheme. 
89 See Natal Estates Ltd v SIR, 37 SATC 193 
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versa. This enables a taxpayer to protect his capital profit. Current legislation 
thus allows protection of the vested capital profit. No longer does the “all or 
nothing” approach apply, as was the case in Berea West and Natal Estates. 
 
In the Malone case, Justice Corbett applied the principle of a realisation 
company, which principle had been established in the Berea West case 
(supra). The object of the trust was clearly stated as being a realisation trust of 
an estate.  This was also the key element in the Berea West case. 
 
As discussed in a preceding section, Justice Corbett favoured the formative 
approach. Therefore it was not surprising that in this case he also applied this 
philosophy. Nevertheless, the facts of the case were simply that the realisation 
of property that had been in the family for a very long time were regarded as 
being capital in nature. No real attempt had been made to enter into a profit-
making scheme, although the reason for the lack of such an attempt may have 
been a shortage of cash to fund a scheme of that nature.  
 
Very few references have been made to this case as the facts pertaining to it 
are similar to that of the Berea West case and the judgement of the court 
followed the precedent that had been set in the Berea West case. 
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5.1.2  A company is not independent of its shareholders when the nature of a 
transaction is to be determined. 
 
In Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SIR90, the taxpayer company had been 
formed to acquire a farm. The shareholders were members of the same family. 
The company let the farm to one of the shareholders who farmed on it for a 
number of years. All the shareholders later sold their shares to D and his wife. 
In the same month, the purchasers sold eighty percent of their shares at the 
same price to a number of other persons. D and the other shareholders had 
previously been associated with companies that had engaged in the business of 
buying and selling land. Simultaneously there were rumours that a property 
developer was interested in acquiring the land from the company for the 
purpose of development in the area.  
 
The shareholders held a meeting at which they were informed by a 
shareholder, who had had dealings with the developer, that the latter was 
prepared to pay a considerable price for the land. No contract was entered into 
with the developer.  Some five months later the shareholders decided that the 
property should be offered to the Klerksdorp Municipality.  The latter bought 
the property. The company enjoyed a net profit on the sale of the land.  
 
The Secretary for Inland Revenue taxed the company on the profit that it had 
made on the sale of the property. The majority of the judges on the bench91 
held that the only true conclusion that could be reached from the evidence was 
____________________________________________________________________ 
90 1977 (A), 39 SATC 163 
91 Wessels, Trollip and Hofmeyer JJA. 
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that the company had originally acquired the property as a fixed asset, but that 
the intention had changed to that of operating a business that employs the 
property as its trading stock. 
In his dissenting judgement92, Corbett JA was of the opinion that the court a 
quo (of which the judgement had been upheld by the majority of the Appellate 
Division) had  
 
“failed to properly distinguish between the intentions of the …[D] 
group in acquiring their shares in the taxpayer company and the 
intentions manifested by them as directors, in the conduct of the affairs 
of the company”. 
 
While the majority of the judges found no difficulty in lifting the corporate 
veil and treated the company as if it were synonymous with its shareholders, 
Corbett JA, using the formalistic approach, made a clear distinction between a 
company and its shareholders. He said: 
 
“What they [the shareholders] purchased, the shares and the loan 
account, they at all material times retained. There was no re-sale of 
items of property, either at a profit or at all. What was eventually sold 
was property belonging to the taxpayer company and the proceeds of 
this sale accrued not to the shareholders but to the company. It is true 
that the company, guided by the directors, lent an amount representing 
the major portion of the proceeds to its shareholders…. These 
proceeds could never lawfully become the property of the 
shareholders: they had to be carried to a capital reserve.” 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
92 With which Kotze JA concurred. 
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The separation of the activities and intentions of the shareholders from those 
of the company is hardly the approach which would be adopted by a judge 
following a substance-over-form approach. The substance of the 
Elandsheuwel transaction was that the individual shareholders benefited from 
the proceeds of the property that was owned by the company.  The company 
entered into this property transaction as a result of the change of its 
shareholding. To avoid paying tax, the taxpayer company had to convince the 
court that there is an important legal distinction between the intention of the 
company and that of its shareholders.  
 
While the majority refused to be persuaded, Mr Justice Corbett’s approach 
confirmed that there is scope for a formalistic argument as far as tax 
legislation is concerned93. 
 
The fundamental issue for the taxpayers in Elandsheuwel was whether a 
company is independent of its shareholders when there is more than one 
shareholder? Justice Corbett’s minority approach was to uphold the 
independence of the company. His approach has been referred to in several 
subsequent cases. 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
93 The Quest for Justice, An essay by D M Davis on Substance over Form in Tax 
Law: The Contribution of Mr Justice Corbett, p. 155. 
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5.1.2.1 Application of the Elandsheuwel case - distinction between the 
shareholders and the company    
 
In the following cases, both local and international, some support but mostly 
opposition, has been found for Justice Corbett’s approach, namely, that a clear 
distinction should be made between the shareholder and the company in which 
he or she owns shares. 
 
 In the Malan case 94 a company, the shareholders of which were a consortium 
of five persons of which the taxpayer was one, had obtained an option to 
purchase a farm situated near Vredenburg and Saldanha. This farm was in an 
area for which three large development projects with ancillary industrial areas 
were then envisaged. The consortium intended to exercise the option through 
the company on the abovementioned property, if satisfied that the farm had 
potential for development as an industrial township. 
 
A third party, NK Properties Ltd, offered to purchase 51 per cent of the 
consortium’s shares in the company. In support of the contention that the 
profit in issue was a capital accrual, reliance was placed upon the testimony of 
the taxpayer as showing that he had held his shares in the company as a capital 
asset to earn income, and it was submitted that the transaction concluded with 
NK Properties Ltd amounted to the acquisition of the desired ‘capital-rich 
partner’ in the project of developing the property as an industrial area.  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
94 Malan v KBI, 43  SATC 1 
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In the evidence given by the taxpayer, it was indicated that his intention was to 
develop an industrial township through the company and to distribute the 
resultant profits in dividends to its shareholders. The shareholders were 
basically opposed to selling their shares; it was, however, the only practical 
method to raise the necessary additional capital. The court found that in the 
absence of any adverse credibility finding, the court should accept the 
taxpayer’s evidence. The taxpayer had thus discharged the onus imposed on 
him in terms of section 82 and the appeal was accordingly allowed with costs. 
 
Reference was made to Elandsheuwel. However, it is submitted that the Malan 
case is an application of the minority decision in Elandsheuwel. The 
shareholders in the company, including Malan, sold their shares and the profit 
on the sale of shares was regarded as capital in nature. 
  
In ITC 140695 the Elandsheuwel case was cited, but distinguished. The court 
was required to decide whether the profit that a private company had made on 
the sale of property was of a revenue or of a capital nature. The company had 
only two shareholders and they had an equal shareholding. The property had 
been held as an investment since 1968 and was sold in 1980. The new 
shareholder, who acquired a 50 per cent shareholding in 1978, had always 
desired to sell the property. Based on the facts, no change in the company’s 
intention could be established. The profit at issue was held not to be taxable. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
95 1985 (T), 48 SATC 12 at 14 & 16 
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In delivering the judgment of the court, the President, Nestadt J, said that 
when the taxpayer concerned is a company, which can only think and act 
through the medium of living beings, then, depending on the circumstances, 
evidence of the state of mind or intention of the persons in effective control of 
the company may provide an important indication as to the intention of the 
company itself in relation to the matters in issue.96 Moreover, account should 
be taken of changes that occur in shareholding and which cause the control of 
the company to pass into new hands, because the advent of new controllers 
may bring about a change in the intentions of the company (Elandsheuwel 
Farming).  
 
When the taxpayer is a company, the objectives of the company that are 
formulated in its memorandum of association is another consideration of some 
importance.  However, the widespread practice in South Africa of framing 
objectives in very wide terms may reduce the significance of this factor. 
 
In continuing, Justice Nestadt stated that there was no reason not to accept the 
original shareholder’s testimony that his intention to retain the property as an 
investment had never changed until the decision was taken to sell it. He had at 
no time consented to any profit-making scheme involving the company’s fixed 
property. The speculative dealings in which he and the new shareholder had 
engaged were not qua shareholders and directors of the taxpayer company.  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
96  Secretary for Inland Revenue v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd, 1975(2) SA 652(A), 37 
SATC 87 at 669 
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In these circumstances, Justice Nestadt concluded that, based on the principle 
that the taxpayer company, as a legal persona, has its own identity that is 
separate from that of its shareholders and to have regard to them would be 
tantamount to piercing the corporate veil to an unjustified extent. As far as the 
taxpayer was concerned, it never proceeded to the business of trading. The 
sale to the new shareholder merely triggered a decision by it to realise, for 
sound commercial reasons, its property, which, until then, had been held as an 
investment. In other words, there was merely a decision to sell.  
 
This judgement distinguishes ITC 1406 from the majority decision in the 
Elandsheuwel case. Nestadt J did not read the Elandsheuwel decision as an 
indication that the mere fact that the new shareholders were land speculators 
was sufficient proof that the taxpayer company changed its intention to that of 
a taxable, profit-making scheme. New factors had intervened in Elandsheuwel. 
They are referred to by Wessels JA 97 and by Trollip JA98. The entire 
shareholding had changed. The use of the property as a farm was discontinued. 
The new shareholders took the initiative in disposing of it and the only reason 
to do so was to make a profit.  
 
However, in ITC 1406, one shareholder, who owned fifty percent of the 
shareholding, remained the same, while the second shareholder sold his fifty 
percent stake in the company. The use of the property in the company had not 
changed. On the evidence presented, a purchaser was not actively sought for 
the property. There was indeed no reason to sell. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
97 on p.112 
98 on p.115 
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The majority decision in the Elandsheuwel case, however, was applied in ITC 
141899. The taxpayer, an individual, made a profit on the sale of immovable 
property. The property was acquired to avoid litigation that would arise from 
the previously aborted sale. The court had to decide whether the profit that 
was made was of a revenue or of a capital nature. Intention was the relevant 
criterion. Intention was to be inferred from the acts and the dealings in 
property by the taxpayer. 
 
The court held that, by applying the principle established in Elandsheuwel 
Farming, the Commissioner had correctly regarded the sum concerned as 
revenue. In delivering the judgement of the court, the President, Conradie AJ, 
specifically referred to Justice Corbett’s minority judgement as follows: 
 
“The legal problem which arises is this. Where a taxpayer 
acknowledges that a property is purchased for the purpose of 
immediate resale, but denies that his motive was to make a profit on 
the resale, whether that property is held on capital or on revenue 
account, I think one should keep a necessary perspective on the 
expression ‘for purpose of resale at a profit’. It is an expression which 
is commonly used in income tax cases. It does not mean that one must 
necessarily make a profit by virtue of the resale. It does not mean that 
one’s motive for purchasing the property must necessarily be to make 
a profit. All that it means is that the taxpayer treats the asset as part of 
his floating capital and not as part of his fixed capital. In this regard, 
Corbett JA in his judgment in Elandsheuwel Farming, sets out the 
matter very clearly.” 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
99 (1986), 49 SATC 42 on p. 44 
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Conradie AJ said that when a taxpayer sells property, the question regarding 
whether the profit that is derived from the sale is taxable in his hands, depends 
on the further enquiry as to whether the sale amounted to the realisation of a 
capital asset or whether it was the sale of an asset in the course of carrying on 
a business or in pursuance of a profit-making scheme. When a single 
transaction is involved, it is usually more appropriate to limit the enquiry to 
the simple alternatives of a capital realisation or a profit-making scheme. In its 
normal and most straightforward form, the latter connotes the acquisition of an 
asset for the purpose of reselling it at a profit. This profit is then the result of 
the productive turn-over of the capital that is represented by the asset and 
consequently falls into the category of income. The asset in effect constitutes 
the taxpayer’s stock-in-trade or floating capital. In contrast to this the sale of 
an asset that was acquired with a view to holding it either in a non-productive 
state or in order to derive income from the productive use thereof, and is in 
fact so held, constitutes a realisation of fixed capital and the proceeds are an 
accrual of a capital nature. 
 
Justice Conradie proceeded to explain that the passage he had referred to 
earlier from Justice Corbett’s minority judgement in Elandsheuwel, makes it 
quite clear that the phrase “for the purpose of resale at a profit” is simply 
another way of saying that the asset is held as stock-in-trade or as part of the 
taxpayer’s floating capital. Floating capital is capital that is not turned to 
account by holding it and making productive use of it, but by disposing of it. 
He explained that when a taxpayer intends not to hold the asset as capital and 
to derive an income from its productive use, but to turn it into account by 
disposing of it, it appears that it cannot be said that that asset was held on 
capital account.  
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This distinction between floating capital and fixed capital to determine the 
capital or revenue nature of a receipt was, however, dismissed by the majority 
of the court in the Pick n Pay Employee Share Trust case100.  In that case the 
majority judgement used the profit making scheme principle as the main 
criteria for establishing whether a receipt is of a capital or a revenue nature. 
Although the taxpayer did not have the intention of making a profit, there was 
a continuous flow of share dealing activities and profit making was an 
important factor in the business. The court held that any receipts accruing to 
the Trust from the sale of shares to employees were purely fortuitous in the 
sense of being an incidental by-product. The sole purpose of acquiring and 
selling shares was to place them in the hands of eligible employees. The court 
therefore found the profit in the Trust to be of a capital nature. 
 
5.1.2.2 Lifting of the corporate veil as applied in the United Kingdom 
 
The following cases illustrate how the courts in the United Kingdom have 
approached the issue of capital versus revenue profits in relation to corporate 
and individual identity. Firstly, ownership of a company owning the assets is 
looked at. This was the point of debate in Elandsheuwel; if the shareholders 
controlled the company, were their intentions the intentions of the company? 
The general rule is that a controlling shareholder is normally associated with 
the actions and transactions of the company. Opposed to the controlling 
shareholder, minority shareholders are generally not responsible for the 
actions and transactions of a company in the United Kingdom. Minority 
____________________________________________________________________ 
100 CIR v Pick n Pay Employee Share Trust, 54 SATC 271 (A) 
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shareholders can therefore not derive any tax benefits, or tax losses, from a 
company. This was the issue in Irving v Tesco Stores (Holdings) Ltd101.  
 
In that case, the taxpayer company entered into a scheme whereby its 
subsidiary was to buy a ship in partnership with the Shell group of companies. 
The object of the scheme was to enable the taxpayer company to claim the 
capital allowances incurred on the acquisition of the ship for 87% of the 
purchase price. In the UK, this group relief is possible as a tax loss can be 
transferred to another company in the same group, provided that the other 
company controls the affairs of that company. 
 
The UK Income Tax Act defines “control” of a company as a power to 
conduct the company’s affairs by the holding of shares or possession of voting 
power or by virtue of control conferred by the articles of association, which 
are normally powers conferred on the directors. 
 
It was held that Holdings did not have control over the affairs of the 
partnership and accordingly was not entitled to claim group tax relief in 
relation to the expenditure incurred by  the purchase of the ship.  
 
It appears that the majority shareholding does determine the intentions of the 
company. This is in contrast with the dissenting judgment of Justice Corbett in 
Elandsheuwel. Several individuals were shareholders of Elandsheuwel 
Farming (Edms) Bpk, the majority of them were involved in the buying and 
selling of property as a trade in their personal capacities. The shareholders 
____________________________________________________________________ 
101 [1982] 881 ChD 
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who did not involve themselves with the trade in property were caught in the 
same net as the trading shareholders in Elandsheuwel. 
 
5.1.2.3 Lifting of the corporate veil as applied in New Zealand 
 
The approach in New Zealand102 is similar to that of the majority decision in 
Elandsheuwel. 
 
In Traveller & Ors v Commissioner of Inland Revenue103 the facts were 
similar to Elandsheuwel in that the company also changed shareholders whilst 
the property was a fixed asset in the company for several years. 
The taxpayers were shareholders in the Kuratau Land Company Ltd (“the 
company”). The company owned approximately 10 acres of land on the shores 
of Lake Taupo, which either sublet the land or granted each shareholder a 
licence to occupy a section of the land. The company issued licences to 
shareholders to occupy their plots during 1960 to 1963.  
 
It was resolved at the 1977 annual general meeting that the company would 
issue freehold titles and thereafter be liquidated. Neither the shareholders nor 
their predecessors were the beneficial and equitable owners of the sections 
____________________________________________________________________ 
102 See also for “shareholders” and “intention”: Rangatira Limited v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (1994) 16 NZTC 11,197 High Court Wellington; Taunton Syndicate 
v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1982) 5 NZTC 61;  
103 Traveller & Ors  v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1992) 14 NZTC 9, High 
Court Hamilton 
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prior to 1977. The resolution taken in 1977 was the first formal record that the 
shareholders desired to liquidate the company and receive a free title.  
 
Although the company was aware that the shareholders were developing their 
sections, it was unaware that they were expending considerable time and 
money in reliance upon a common intention that freehold titles would be 
transferred to them when it was demanded. It is clear that the minority 
shareholders developed their land without the company being expected to 
know about it. 
 
The taxation implications of liquidation and distribution in specie and the sale 
of sections of freehold land to non-company members were considered. The 
Commissioner claimed that if the company had wound up and distributed in 
specie the sections held by the shareholders, then he would deem the 
distribution to be a sale of the land at market price and the company would be 
taxed on the resulting profit. In addition, he would deem the distribution to be 
a dividend to shareholders, which was taxable at that stage. 
 
The court held that the Commissioner had correctly regarded the transactions 
as constituting revenue. Although the treatment would be different in South 
Africa104, this case shows that New Zealand does see the shareholders of a 
company as part of the company and not completely separate entities. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
104 In South Africa in a similar situation, the dividend would be exempt from tax in 
the hands of the shareholders; however, secondary tax on companies would be paid by 
the company on its revenue profits distributed. 
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As far as intention goes, New Zealand uses virtually the same tests as South 
Africa in determining whether a profit is of capital nature or not. This 
principle is reiterated in Case H101105. The taxpayer was involved as a partner 
in two partnerships. The two partnerships purchased two adjoining dairy 
farms. Before finalisation of the transfer of the farms, they had become less 
enthusiastic about their venture because of personal reasons and the 
unsuitability of the farm for grazing. Their solicitor advised them to sell. The 
Commissioner assessed the taxpayer on the profits from the sale and the 
taxpayer objected. The issue was whether the taxpayer had purchased the 
farms with the purpose or intention to resell at a profit. 
 
The court held that the partners' intentions and the structure of the purchase 
and sale transactions were fully consistent with a venture embarked upon with 
the intention of a short-term resale at a profit. The profit was therefore of a 
revenue nature and taxable. 
 
5.1.2.4 Conclusion on Elandsheuwel 
 
Tax avoidance schemes that have been devised to avoid tax by labelling 
revenue as a capital profit, have failed in the courts in various parts of the 
world. It used to be a good idea to place an investment in a property or shares, 
in a separate company. However, this scheme did not succeed in the case of 
Elandsheuwel, because the majority decision lifted the corporate veil on the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
105 Case H101 (1986) 8 NZTC 683 
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new shareholders who were also land speculators and taxed the profits of the 
company as revenue profits. Similar judgements have been given by the courts 
in the UK and New Zealand, as described in the examples given previously in 
this chapter. However, the lifting of the corporate veil has been criticised in 
cases where the investments were held as capital on a long term basis106.  
   
A minority judgment does not create a precedent, yet it can be persuasive. The 
minority judgement of Justice Corbett has been referred to more often than the 
majority judgement. Out of ten references by the courts to Elandheuwel, six 
referred to Justice Corbett’s minority judgement. Although later judgements 
on the proceeds of the sale of property have not in all instances followed the 
outcome of Justice Corbett’s minority judgment, the rules that he laid down 
have been applied – only in very special circumstances should the corporate 
veil be pierced. 
 
In Elandsheuwel107, Justice Corbett identified three main criteria to decide if a 
profit on the sale of property by a company is taxable or not, namely: 
 
Criterion 1: Is the company totally separate from its shareholders for tax 
purposes? 
 
South African taxation differs from that in other countries in respect of the fact 
that in South Africa, taxable income and assessed losses cannot be transferred 
____________________________________________________________________ 
106 See Berea West Estates (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 38 SATC 62 and ITC 1418 discussed 
earlier in this chapter. 
107  Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms ) Bpk v SIR, 39 SATC 163 at 181 to 186 
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between a company and its shareholders as is the case in countries such as 
New Zealand, Australia and the UK. In those countries the intention of each 
individual shareholder can be identified and dealt with separately. According 
to Nestadt J in ITC 1406 (supra): 
 
“…Where the taxpayer concerned is a company, which can only think 
and act through the medium of living beings, then, depending on the 
circumstances, evidence of the state of mind or intention of the persons 
in effective control of the company may provide an important 
indication as to the intention of the company itself in relation to the 
matters in issue.108 Another consideration of some importance in the 
case of a taxpayer which is a company is the objects of the company as 
formulated in its memorandum of association, although the well-
known practice in South Africa of framing objects in very wide terms 
may, in a particular case, reduce the significance of this factor109.” 
 
It is submitted that if the memorandum of association clearly states that the 
company’s intention is of a capital nature, then the intentions of the 
shareholders may be ignored. This principle was established in the Berea West 
Estate case (supra) and confirmed by Justice Corbett in the JM Malone Trust 
case (supra). Yet the onus remains on the taxpayer to prove to the court the 
real circumstances and what the real intention was. 
 
Criterion 2: Does a change in shareholding change the company’s intention? 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
108  Secretary for Inland Revenue v. Trust Bank of Africa Ltd, 1975(2) SA 652(A), 37 
SATC 87  on p. 669 
109  Natal Estates case (supra) on p. 197 F-H 
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The majority judgement in Elandsheuwel, rather than the minority judgement 
of Justice Corbett, has been accepted by our courts as correct. But each case 
depends upon the circumstances as was pointed out by the majority decision, 
namely: 
  
“…account must be taken of changes in shareholding which cause 
control of the company to pass into new hands since the advent of new 
controllers may bring about a change in the intentions of the 
company.110” 
 
In the Elandsheuwel case, the change in the shareholding accounted for more 
than 80% of the shareholding.  It was therefore a change in the control of the 
company, and together with other factors present in that case, which lead to 
the piercing of the corporate veil. The change in the shareholding in ITC 1406 
(supra) was only fifty percent of the shareholding and the conclusion was 
drawn that no piercing of the corporate veil was necessary as there had been 
no change in the control of the company.  
 
Therefore, where there is a substantial change in shareholding, the minority 
shareholders’ share of after-tax profit may be compromised. The change of 
control can bring about a change in intention.  
 
The courts do not follow a formative approach when the intention of the 
company is being established, as was suggested should be done by Justice 
____________________________________________________________________ 
110 Nestadt JA in ITC 1406, 48 SATC 12 
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Corbett in his minority judgement in Elandsheuwel (supra). A wider approach 
is followed by the courts111.  
 
Criterion 3: Has the principle of substance of an agreement rather than its 
form been accepted by the judiciary? 
 
Justice Corbett’s minority judgement in Elandsheuwel’s decision did not 
accept the principle of substance over form. In most instances in subsequent 
cases the courts were keen to apply the substance over form rule112 such as in 
the Trust Bank case where it was stated that the purpose for which a 
transaction was entered into can, in the case of a company, be proved as to the 
state of mind or intention of the persons in effective control of the affairs of 
the company.  
 
In the Malan case (supra) the shareholders themselves convinced the court 
that their intention in holding shares in a property company was of a capital 
nature. The court looked at the contract of the sale of their shares in the 
property company to obtain more capital, as well as the fact that they had an 
intention to invest in the long term in this property company. In this case the 
individual shareholders were not taxed on the profit on the sale of their shares. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
111 See ITC1406, 48 SATC 12; ITC 1418, 49 SATC 42 and CIR v Pick ‘n’ Pay 
Employee Share Trust, 54 SATC 271 as discussed in # 5.1.2.1.  
112 See ITC 1418, 49 SATC 42 discussed earlier in this chapter, Also ITC 1406, SIR v 
Trust Bank of Africa Ltd, 1975(2) SA 652(A) at 669F, 48 SATC 12 and C:SARS v 
Metlika Trading Ltd and Others, 66 SATC 345 
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References have often been made to Justice Corbett’s minority judgement in 
the Elandsheuwel case and the courts have applied the criteria laid down in his 
judgement to reach a verdict. His reasoning was legally sound, but in respect 
of the control of a company he was on the side of the minority shareholders 
who did not have a history of dealing in land. It has become apparent from the 
examples from the United Kingdom and New Zealand that the controlling 
shareholders do control the intentions of the company.  
 
In a number of cases Mr Justice Corbett adopted a formative approach to 
applying tax law. This approach is probably best illustrated in his dissenting 
judgement in Elandsheuwel. 
 
It is submitted that the majority judgement in Elandheuwel had one 
shortcoming in that it resulted in the minority shareholders being treated the 
same way as the majority shareholders. The company was taxed on a profit on 
the sale of the property which was held for decades. Its long term investment, 
clearly of a capital nature, was taxed as if it were revenue. The minority 
shareholders should have been allowed to treat their investments as capital as 
they clearly had long term intentions with their shareholding in the property 
company. 
 
A more equitable outcome would have been to value the property at the time 
of the change of intention. The capital profit arising at the stage of the change 
of intention would remain capital in nature. Profits arising after that date 
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would be revenue in nature. This is currently the position in terms of the 
Eighth Schedule113 to the Act. 
 
5.1.3 Intention on the sale of land  
 
In Secretary for Inland Revenue v Rile Investments (Pty) Ltd, 1978 (3) SA 
732(A) 40 SATC 135, the taxpayer had acquired ownership of two properties. 
Between 1965 and 1969 many changes took place in the shareholding of the 
taxpayer company. By 1 April 1969 Nedbank had acquired effective control of 
the taxpayer and on 19 September 1969 the taxpayer sold the two properties to 
Nedbank Medical Centre Ltd (“NMC”) for R 300 000. The purchase price was 
paid as follows: R 76 000 in cash and by allotting and issuing to the taxpayer 
448 000 shares (credited as fully paid up and having a nominal value of 
R 224 000) in NMC. 
 
It was held by Corbett CJ that an analysis of the facts revealed that while the 
taxpayer’s original intention in acquiring the properties remained obscure and 
its intention might at the earlier stages of the development projects have been 
mixed (either to sell the properties at a profit or to hold them as a long-term 
investment – with neither intention dominant), it was established that as from 
1 April 1969 it was the intention of all the taxpayer’s shareholders (including 
the controlling shareholder Nedbank) to treat the properties as a capital asset; 
and – rejecting the submission to the contrary by counsel for the Secretary – 
that there was sufficient evidence of more than a mere change of intention to 
____________________________________________________________________ 
113 Paragraph 12(2)(c) of the Eighth Schedule treats the event as an acquisition when 
an asset commences “to be held by that person as trading stock”  
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justify the Special Court’s finding that, at any rate after the advent of 
Nedbank, the said properties were held by the taxpayer as assets of a fixed 
capital nature. The court upheld the taxpayer’s contention. 
 
5.1.3.1 Application of the principle of Rile Investments 
 
In CIR v Malcomess Properties (Isando) (Pty) Ltd, 53 SATC 153 at 164, 1991 
(2) SA 27 (A), the taxpayer had acquired property in 1969 with the intention 
to hold it as a capital asset from which it would derive income by way of 
rentals. That intention remained unchanged until 1975 when the shareholders 
in the holding company resolved that it should be wound up and its assets 
(which included the property) be realised.  
 
The profit derived from the sale of the property was held to be of a capital 
nature. The court relied on the statement in Secretary for Inland Revenue v 
Trust Bank114 that the purpose for which a transaction was entered into can, in 
the case of a company, be proved as to the state of mind or intention of the 
persons in effective control of the affairs of the company. The court also relied 
on the dictum by Corbett JA in Rile Investments: that where the company held 
property as long term capital, then the proceeds on the sale were capital in 
nature. 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
114 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd, 1975(2) SA 652(A) at 
669F 
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5.1.3.2 Conclusion on Rile Investments 
 
According to Silke115 the following are important considerations in 
determining whether a profit made on the sale of land constitutes an accrual of 
a revenue nature: The intention of the taxpayer (owner) when he first acquired 
the land and later when he sold it; his activities in relation to the land up to the 
time of deciding to sell it; and the light which such activities may throw on the 
taxpayer’s assertions regarding his intention116. When the taxpayer is a 
company, then, depending on the circumstances, evidence of the state of mind 
or intention of the persons in effective control of the company may provide an 
important indication as to the intention of the company itself.  This is contrary 
to Justice Corbett’s minority judgement in Elandsheuwel and in line with the 
majority judgement in that case. Thus, account should be taken of changes in 
shareholding which cause control of the company to pass into new hands, 
because the advent of new controllers may bring about a change in the 
intentions of the company, depending on the circumstances. Another 
consideration of some importance is the objects of the company as formulated 
in its memorandum. However, the well-known practice in South Africa of 
____________________________________________________________________ 
115 Silke: Chapter 3.1: Intention – the golden rule, paragraph 651 
116 In his dissenting judgment in CIR v Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd 1956, (1) SA 602 
(A), 20 SATC 355 at 365 Schreiner JA put the matter into perspective: “There is no 
legislative provision that makes the intention of the taxpayer decisive of whether the 
receipt or accrual was of a capital nature or not. The decisions of [the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court] have recognized the importance of the intention with 
which property was acquired and have taken account of the possibility that a change 
of intention or policy may also affect the result.” 
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formulating objects in very wide terms may, in a particular case, reduce the 
significance of this factor. 
 
Ultimately the courts will consider whether any dominant factor may have 
caused the nature of a transaction to be capital or revenue, whether it was 
when the property was acquired, during the course of its possession or at the 
time of its sale. In Rile Investments, Justice Corbett considered the dominant 
intention at the time of the sale and the facts surrounding the sale. The fact that 
the major shareholder retained the property within its group after the sale was 
concluded was convincing evidence that the sale was not of a revenue nature 
and that the intention of the major shareholder was to have a longer term 
investment.  
 
5.2  APPORTIONMENT OF RECEIPTS BETWEEN CAPITAL AND 
REVENUE 
 
Until Tuck v CIR117, the view was that receipts received by a person were 
either of a capital nature or of a revenue nature. If it was revenue in nature, it 
was taxable at the normal tax rate. It was normally not possible for someone to 
have one receipt which was partly capital and partly revenue in nature. It was 
also not possible to have a receipt which is neither revenue nor capital - in 
Pyott v CIR118 Davis AJA said: “This is a half-way house of which I have no 
knowledge”. However, in Tuck v Commissioner for Inland Revenue Justice 
____________________________________________________________________ 
117 1988 (3) SA 819(A), 50 SATC 98 
118 Pyott Ltd v CIR (1945 AD), 13 SATC 121 
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Corbett found it possible to apportion a receipt into its constituent components 
of capital and revenue.  
 
The taxpayer, Mr Tuck, received 826 shares in American Home Products 
Corporation of New York (‘American Home’) in terms of what was called a 
“management incentive plan” (“Plan”). In assessing the taxpayer for income 
tax, the Commissioner for Inland Revenue included this amount in the 
taxpayer’s taxable income. On appeal by the Commissioner, the court a quo 
held that the dominant purpose of the Plan was to reward excellence in 
management and to encourage employees to render such service.  It 
furthermore held that the principles relating to the sterilisation of assets had no 
application and that no part of the receipts in issue was of a capital nature. 
 
Counsel for the taxpayer submitted to the Appellate Division – with citations 
from cases in delict and the criminal law that deals with causation –  that the 
causally relevant factor that resulted in the taxpayer’s receipt of the shares was 
his compliance with the restraint; and that therefore the entire sum in issue 
was of a capital nature. As an alternative, counsel for the taxpayer submitted 
that the receipt of shares was attributable, at least in part, to observing the 
restraint; that an apportionment was competent; and that a 50/50 
apportionment was appropriate in the circumstances. 
 
Corbett JA held that: 
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(i)  the preferable criterion was the one that is stated in Lever Bros119, 
namely: What work, if any, did the taxpayer do in order to earn the receipt in 
question; what was the quid pro quo which he gave for the receipt? 
(iii) both elements were causally relevant factors and both were equally 
important.  
(iii) the element of service was plainly of a revenue nature, while the 
element of restraint was equally plainly of a capital nature, 
(iv) in the absence of any other acceptable basis of apportionment, a fifty-
fifty apportionment would be fair and reasonable and therefore the taxpayer 
was only liable for the fifty percent portion relating to services rendered. 
 
5.2.1  Application of the apportionment principle in Tuck 
 
The principle that apportionment is fair and reasonable, was referred to in 
several cases. 
 
In ITC 1479120 the taxpayer claimed a machinery investment allowance. It was 
held that where certain of the plant and machinery was used both for 
manufacture and other usage, then the use of the plant and machinery in the 
process of manufacture should be determined on the basis of the time spent by 
such plant and equipment in the process of manufacture in relation to the time 
spent in the process other than manufacture – an apportionment could then 
take place as suggested in Tuck. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
119 CIR v Lever Bros, 1946 AD, 14 SATC 1 at 8 – 9 
120 1989 (T), 52 SATC 264  at 275 
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In CIR v VRD Investments (Pty) Ltd121, the taxpayer and fellow distributors 
formed a consortium with the object of acquiring a competitor’s business, 
selling off all its assets and then sharing the ensuing loss. The taxpayer then 
claimed a deduction of its share of the loss in terms of section 11(a). The 
question to be answered was whether the loss incurred in these circumstances 
was of a capital or revenue nature. 
 
The court held that expenditure which is incurred in order to operate a 
business more economically is of a revenue rather than of a capital nature, 
provided that the expenditure is sufficiently closely connected to the income-
earning operation of the business so as to be regarded as part of the cost of 
performing it. Expenditure incurred for the acquisition or recovery of a share 
in the market is typically of a capital nature. Justice Scott remarked: 
 
”The question is: what apportionment should be made? No 
arithmetical basis for apportionment is possible but that does not 
preclude an apportionment from being made (see Tuck). In all the 
circumstances, it seems to me that an apportionment on the basis of 
25% of the expenditure being of a capital nature would be fair and 
reasonable to both parties.” 
 
 
Justice Scott followed Tuck in sanctioning an arbitrary apportionment as 
any other form of apportionment did not seem to fit the circumstances. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
121 1993, (4) SA 330 (C), 55 SATC 368 at 381  
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In C:SARS v McRae122 the taxpayer received several lump sum payments from 
his employer. The question was whether the court a quo had correctly decided 
that one half of the amounts received by the taxpayer were of a capital nature 
and therefore did not constitute gross income.  It was held that the applicable 
principles were those enunciated in Tuck. The taxpayer actually received 
benefits prior to termination of his employment, as was the case in Tuck. It 
was held, accordingly, that the apportionment made by the court a quo on the 
basis of 50% of such receipts constituting revenue income was correct. 
 
Another application of Tuck was found in ITC 1725123. The taxpayer, a dairy 
farmer, had received a lump sum payment being compensation for damages 
suffered by him for major harm caused to his farming operation as a result of 
defective feeds supplied to him. The taxpayer suffered both a loss of cattle and 
of milk production. His genetic breeding programme was damaged with a 
resulting loss of goodwill. 
  
The court held that apportionment, on the basis of Tuck, was clearly deserving 
of application. Since there was more than one causally relevant factor to be 
considered, the court was entitled to rely upon the dictum in Tuck where 
Corbett JA (as he then was) said: 
 
“What this court really has to determine is the causally relevant factor 
which resulted in the accrual to and the receipt by the taxpayer of the 
shares in question. It has been held that it is necessary to determine 
____________________________________________________________________ 
122 2001 (C), 64 SATC 1 at 6-7  
123 2000 (C), 64 SATC 223 at 230-1 
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the ‘originating cause’ of amounts being received as income for the 
purpose of determining the ‘source’ of that income. . .” 
 
The court held accordingly that the compensation paid to the taxpayer should 
be apportioned so that two-thirds was attributable to the loss on his genetic 
breeding program and one third to the loss of profits. 
 
5.2.2  Conclusion on the principle of apportionment in Tuck  
The application of the apportionment concept in the context of capital or 
revenue receipts or accruals is not in conflict with the proposition that all 
receipts by or accruals to the taxpayer should fall into either the one category 
or the other, “there being no halfway house”124. There should, however, be a 
visible and legal means to split the income. Apportionment will only occur 
when there are two or more distinct legal causae, which give rise to a receipt 
or accrual, which consists of both a capital and revenue component.  
 
An interesting question that emerges from the Tuck judgement is whether the 
applicability of the principle of apportionment can be extended to the area of 
source. The approach followed by the Court in the Tuck case, it is submitted, 
does not preclude this principle from being extended to the source of income. 
Corbett JA used the Lever Bros’s originating cause test in deciding that two 
legal causae existed. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that it is within the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
124 In Pyott Ltd v CIR 1945, AD 128, 13 SATC 121 Davis AJA, who delivered the 
judgement of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, refused to countenance 
the concept of an amount that was both ‘non-capital’ and ‘non-income’, describing it 
as a ‘half-way house’ of which he had no knowledge. 
 95
legal framework of the principles as laid down in the cases of Tuck and Lever 
Brothers, to apportion source. 
 
The facts of these two cases were different and they dealt with different 
aspects of the definition of “gross income”, yet the Lever Brothers principle 
was applied in a way that was applicable to Tuck and the principle of 
apportionment, at least in the sphere of capital and revenue issues, has now 
been established in the South African tax law. This is also the case as regards 
the apportionment of expenditure, which is discussed in chapter 8. 
 
Justice Corbett, it is submitted, developed the law relating to apportionment of 
income based on sound legal and equitable principles. 
 
5.3  SOURCE OF INCOME 
 
In 2001, South Africa changed from taxing receipts based on the source of the 
receipts to a system based on the residence of a taxpayer. This change in 
regime reduced the importance of the source of income for South African 
residents for tax purposes. Nevertheless, for non-residents, source still remains 
an important principle. 
   
In Essential Sterolin Products (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue125, the taxpayer, a South African resident, had registered a medicine 
in West Germany through Hoyer and Company (‘Hoyer’).The taxpayer also 
____________________________________________________________________ 
125 1993 (4) SA 859 (A), 55 SATC 357 
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established the I Company, which was registered in Switzerland, to market its 
product.  
 
A “sale and manufacturing agreement” was entered into whereby Hoyer would 
acquire all the issued shares in the I Company. A clause that related to the 
payment of the consideration included an amount of DM 4 million that was 
due in terms of a conditional right of the buyer to manufacture before the 
licence was transferred. The Commissioner included the DM 4 million (R1 
847 148) in the taxpayer’s taxable income and referred to it as the “inability 
agreement”. 
 
In his judgement, Corbett CJ held that at the time when the “sale and 
manufacturing agreement” and the “inability agreement” were entered into, 
the business operations from which the taxpayer derived its income, were 
conducted predominantly outside South Africa. This aspect was regarded to be 
of fundamental importance. The entire foundation of the taxpayer’s business 
rested upon the rights that flowed from the registration of the patent, the trade 
mark rights and the contractual rights, all of which were acquired and 
exercised in West Germany. Accordingly, the originating cause of the receipt 
arising as a result of the “inability agreement”, and therefore its source, was 
not within South Africa.  
 
Corbett CJ stressed that there may, in individual cases, be a number of causal 
factors and stated that in the circumstance of the case it was appropriate to 
determine the dominant or main or substantial or real and basic cause of the 
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receipt126. He unfortunately did not mention the reasoning in his previous 
decision in the Tuck case relating to the apportionment of income into its 
contributing causal parts. Yet the words seem to allow, or at least do not 
exclude, the possibility of an apportionment of source in circumstances where 
this might be warranted.  
 
He quoted the remarks of Isaacs J, delivering the judgment of the High Court 
in Australia in the case of Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxes127: 
 
“The Legislature in using the word ‘source’ meant, not a legal 
concept, but something which a practical man would regard as a 
real source of income . . . (T)he ascertainment of the actual source 
of a given income is a practical, hard matter of fact.” 
 
Justice Corbett pointed out that in applying these general principles, the 
courts128 have adopted certain rules and criteria for locating the source of 
particular types of accrual or receipt, such as dividends, annuities, director’s 
fees, interest, payment for services, rent, royalties, and so on. None of these 
would seem to have relevance to the somewhat unusual character of the 
“inability consideration” of Essential Products. Of fundamental importance in 
____________________________________________________________________ 
126 Extract from Income Tax Cases and Materials by Emslie, Davis, Hutton and 
Olivier,2001. 
127 (1918), 25 CLR 183 at 189-90 
128 See Liquidator, Rhodesia Metals Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes, 1938 AD 282, 9 
SATC 363, at 300;  CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd, 1946 AD 441, 14 SATC 
1 at 454. 
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this case is that at the time when the “sale and manufacturing agreement” and 
the “inability agreement” were entered into, the business operations from 
which the taxpayer derived its income were conducted predominantly outside 
South Africa.  
 
The question of apportionment, therefore, did not arise in this case since the 
manufacture of the active substance by the taxpayer – the only significant 
activity which took place in South Africa - was not a significant causal factor 
in relation to the inability consideration. 
 
5.3.1. Application of the Essential Sterolin Products principle (source)  
 
In First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v C:SARS129  the court had to 
decide whether interest income accruing to the taxpayer from international 
financing transactions, was received “from a source within . . . the Republic” 
as contemplated in the definition of gross income in section 1. The taxpayer 
provided foreign currency to individual South African corporate clients as part 
of a loan facility agreed to in South Africa. The foreign currency was made 
available in New York and had to be repaid there. 
  
The court held, applying the principles enunciated in Essential Sterolin 
Products (Pty) Ltd v CIR, that the source of the interest was located in South 
Africa and was correctly held by the court a quo to have been part of the 
taxpayer’s gross income and therefore subject to tax. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
129 2002 (SCA), 64 SATC 245 at 252 
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The legal principles that hold sway in matters involving questions of source 
were articulated by Corbett CJ in Essential Sterolin Products and the 
principles and approach laid down in the case were not in any way at variance 
with the judgment of Watermeyer CJ in the Lever Bros130 case. The court 
stressed that apart from the fact that contractually the foreign currency had 
been made available to the borrowing client in New York and had to be repaid 
there, all the other important factors which caused the interest income to arise 
(and which constituted the dominant cause of the receipt of the interest) had 
their origin in South Africa and flowed from the taxpayer’s business activities 
and operations here. Moreover, the narrow view taken by the taxpayer 
focussed only on where the funds had been made available and had to be 
repaid and it overlooked the need to have regard to the essence of the whole 
transaction which generated the interest with a view to determining the 
location of its source. 
 
 In applying the principles set out in the Lever Brothers’ case, the court ruled 
that although the basic calculations were made in foreign currency and then 
converted into South African rand, the debts in issue were incurred by the 
taxpayer’s South African clients in South Africa and the interest was paid by 
them in rand after having been debited against their South African accounts 
and, as far as the add-on interest and forward cover premium to which the 
taxpayer was entitled in respect of each transaction was concerned, these were 
debited and paid in South African rand in South Africa and, accordingly, the 
source of the interest income derived by the taxpayer was in South Africa and 
not overseas. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
130 CIR v Lever Brothers  and Unilever Ltd, 14 SATC 1 
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5.3.2  Conclusion on source of income: 
 
With the advent of residence-based taxation in South Africa, the decision in 
the Essential Sterolin Products case has become of minor importance. 
However, in the applicable circumstances where the issue of source is under 
consideration, the source of the income should be established in accordance 
with the principles that were laid down in that case. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Justice Corbett’s formative approach was evident in his minority judgement in 
Elandsheuwel. It favoured the taxpayer. Although his reasoning was legally 
sound, when it came to the control of the company he was on the side of the 
minority shareholders who did not have a history of dealing in land. It became 
apparent from the cases subsequent to Elandsheuwel in South Africa as well as 
cases in United Kingdom and New Zealand, that the intention of the company 
is determined by the controlling (majority) shareholders. Yet both the majority 
and minority judgements in Elandsheuwel had an unsatisfactory outcome. It 
was a case of all or nothing for the taxpayer. Today a more equitable result is 
possible: according to paragraph 12(2)(c) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, 
the property should be valued at the time of the change of intention. A proper 
apportionment between capital and revenue profit is thus possible. 
 
In the Tuck case, Justice Corbett found that two causally relevant elements 
were equally important regarding the lump sum received by the taxpayer. The 
element of service was plainly of a revenue nature, while the element of 
restraint was plainly of a capital nature. Therefore, in the absence of any other 
 101
acceptable basis of apportionment, an arbitrary 50:50 apportionment was 
considered to be fair and reasonable. The judgement of Justice Corbett on the 
receipts being capital or revenue in nature in the Tuck case flies in the face of 
previous judgements131, where the “all or nothing” approach was followed. 
 
In Essential Sterolin Products, the business that was sold had its operations, 
from which it derived its income, predominantly outside South Africa. Justice 
Corbett concluded that the entire foundation of the taxpayer’s business 
depended on the rights that flowed from registration; the patent and trade mark 
rights; all of which were acquired and exercised in West Germany. 
Accordingly, the originating cause of the receipt of the consideration, and 
therefore the source thereof, was found not within South Africa.  
 
In the Essential Sterolin Products case Justice Corbett laid down the principles 
of source if a South African taxpayer sells shares or commodities in a foreign 
entity to a foreign taxpayer. However, with the advent of residence-based 
taxation in South Africa, this decision has become less important. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
131 Such as in Pyott Ltd v CIR, 1945 AD 128, where the full amount received was 
taxed, because there was no “halfway house” on receipts at that point in time. 
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CHAPTER 6    GENERAL  DEDUCTIONS 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Justice Corbett was involved in several cases regarding expenses that  
taxpayers had claimed in terms of the general deduction formula. He made a 
major contribution to the interpretation of the general deduction formula and 
the search for “equity” in taxation with his involvement in six major landmark 
decisions132 in this regard. 
 
Each of the six cases he was involved with, is analysed by comparing it to 
subsequent local cases in which the principles concerned, were applied.  It is 
also compared to foreign cases in order to ascertain whether the principles 
were consistent with international practice. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
132 The following cases are discussed in this chapter: 
- Nemojim and De Beers Holdings. These cases concerned the 
deduction of opening stock, apportionment of expenses in dividend 
stripping and the taxpayer’s lack of a profit motive. 
- Standard Bank and Pick ‘n Pay. In these cases expenses had to be 
apportioned between “use and non-use for trading purposes”. 
 -  Edgars Stores and Golden Dumps.  These cases concerned issues 
which were relevant to the incurral of expenses. 
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6.2  APPORTIONMENT OF EXPENSES  
Section 23 (g) of the Act, until 1992, prohibited the deduction of “any moneys 
claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, which are not wholly 
or exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of trade”133. The question 
that arose, is whether apportionment was allowable when a single lump-sum 
expenditure was laid out for more than one purpose. 
 
6.2.1 Background  
 
Many items of expenditure are incurred with mixed motives. A taxpayer who 
carries on more than one trade might incur lump-sum expenditure for the 
benefit of his various trades. Expenditure may be incurred partly for the 
purpose of earning ‘income’ as defined in section 1 and partly for the purpose 
of deriving income that is exempt from tax in terms of section 10 of the Act. It 
may also be incurred partly for the purpose of deriving income and partly for 
the purpose of acquiring a fixed capital asset for the business. In a 
Zimbabwean case134, Beadle J said: 
 
“It seems to me that where the operations of a taxpayer earning the 
non-taxable amounts are identical in character to those earning the 
‘income’, and there are no extraordinary expenses which can be 
allocated either to non-taxable amounts or ‘income’, then if the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
133 The amended section 23(g) now reads as follows: “… any moneys, claimed as a 
deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent to which such moneys were 
not laid out or expended for the purposes of trade”. 
134 Local Investment Co v COT 1958 (3) SA 34 (SR), 22 SATC 4 
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proportion which the non-taxable amounts bear to the gross income is 
approximately the same as the proportion which the capital invested in 
the operations earning the non-taxable amounts bear to the total 
capital invested, this proportion is a fair basis for apportionment.” 
 
These situations should be distinguished from the case where expenditure is 
incurred partly for the purpose of earning income and partly for private or 
domestic purposes or for purposes not connected in any way with the trade 
that the taxpayer carries on. In a situation of this nature it may be said that the 
expenditure was not wholly or exclusively incurred or expended for the 
purposes of trade and therefore no portion was deductible in terms of the 
previous version of section 23(g).135 
 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill of 1992 
when section 23(g) was amended, it was stated: 
 
“…it has been the long-standing practice of Inland Revenue [now 
SARS], which has in the past been accepted by the courts, to allow an 
apportionment of expenditure incurred partly for purposes of trade 
and partly for purposes other than trade.” 
 
A share-dealing company is exempt from tax on almost all of its receipts and 
accruals of dividends, but expenditure that it incurs in carrying on its business 
of share dealing is allowed as a deduction in the determination of its taxable 
income. Such expenditure is allowable as having been incurred in the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
135 ITC 1385 (1984) 46 SATC 111 at 116 
 105
production of income which is not of a capital nature.  The income is produced 
in the form of the proceeds that arise on the disposal of shares that constitute 
trading stock. The expenditure is usually not incurred in the production of the 
exempt dividend income and consequently not excluded as a deduction in 
terms of section 11(a) or section 23(f). 
 
Dividend-stripping operations and schemes were able to profit from the 
distinction that the Act makes between, on the one hand, the dividends that a 
share-dealing company earns and which are usually exempt from tax, and, on 
the other hand, the proceeds of the shares that it holds as its trading stock, 
which constitutes gross income and from which the cost of the shares and all 
other associated costs may effectively be deducted. A typical scheme of this 
nature operated as follows. A dividend-stripping company would buy shares in 
another company as trading stock, usually a cash flush company. The buying 
company then caused the target company to declare and distribute a tax-free 
dividend out of its undistributed profits; and then sell the shares, depleted in 
value, at a ‘loss’.  The loss represented the difference between the cost of the 
shares and their selling price. The two advantages that were to be gained were, 
firstly, a loss that could be set off against other income and, secondly, the 
effective receipt, in the form of tax-free dividends, of what would otherwise be 
the taxable proceeds of the disposal of the shares. 
 
The authorities did not display much enthusiasm for this form of tax 
avoidance. Their initial response was an attempt, as demonstrated in Hicklin v 
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SIR136, to frustrate the objectives of the seller by means of section 103(1), 
which seeks to combat schemes for the avoidance of tax. This attempt failed. 
 
An exception to the rule, that the expenditure that is incurred by a share-
dealing company in carrying on its business is deductible in full, was provided 
by CIR v Rand Selections Corporation Ltd137. The company involved in this 
case derived its income from, inter alia, share dealing and dividends. On 
1 October 1948, it held shares in a company referred to as ‘Lace’. On 
18 December 1948, it bought a further large number of shares in the company, 
knowing that the company was to go into liquidation. The court had to decide 
what proportion of the total original cost of the shares could be deducted from 
the income of the company.  
 
Centlivres CJ, who delivered the judgment of the majority of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court, held that the company had incurred the full 
cost in the production of the total sum received during the year.  However, a 
portion of the total receipts consisted of (tax-free) dividends; therefore a 
portion of the cost had to be regarded as having been incurred in the 
production of dividends and was therefore inadmissible as a deduction. He 
also held that the amount to be deducted in terms of section 11(a) could not be 
determined arbitrarily, as had been done by the Commissioner, but should be 
determined in the proportion to the “non dividend income” element of the total 
____________________________________________________________________ 
136 Hicklin v SIR, 1980 (1) SA 481, 41 SATC 179 
137 CIR v Rand Selections Corporation Ltd, 1956 (3) SA 124(A), 20 SATC 390 
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receipts produced by the expenditure. Corbett JA, in his judgement in CIR v 
Nemojim (Pty) Ltd138, extended the principle to dividend stripping operations 
rather than just limiting the principle in the Rand Selections case (supra) to 
liquidation dividend schemes. 
 
6.2.2 Apportionment in the case of dividend stripping 
 
In delivering his judgement in the Nemojim case, Corbett JA noted that the 
appeal involved a financial operation known as “dividend stripping”. The 
taxpayer was a private company which purchased shares in another company 
amounting to R992 125.  
 
He furthermore observed that it appeared that the accounting methods that 
were provided for by section 22, and which could be applied without difficulty 
in the case of normal trading operations, could not be applied without 
adaptation in exceptional cases. He regarded Nemojim’s trading operations as 
indeed representing an exceptional case. He took the closing stock value and 
therefore its costs, after its dividends had been “stripped” from the company to 
be R379 234. 
 
Justice Corbett concluded his judgement as follows:  
 
“I am of the opinion that the court a quo came to an incorrect 
conclusion in regard to the manner in which Nemojim should be taxed 
in regard to its dividend stripping operations. Contrary to the court a 
____________________________________________________________________ 
138 1983 (4) SA 935(A), 45 SATC 241 
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quo, I hold that in a case such as this, expenditure incurred in the 
acquisition of shares relating to companies where dividend stripping 
occurred should be apportioned in accordance with a formula.”  
 
The formula used by Justice Corbett followed the formula used in the 
Guardian Assurance139 case, namely, to apportion the expense or purchase 
price of the shares to equal the cost of the shares after the dividend was 
declared.  Therefore the purchase price allowed as a deductible expense for tax 
purposes would be the ex-dividend price. This formula effectively closed the 
loophole for dividend stripping operations.  
 
6.2.3 Application of the apportionment principle developed in Nemojim 
 
In Tuck v CIR140, a case already discussed in paragraph 5.2 above and which 
dealt with apportionment in relation to a receipt into its capital and revenue 
components, apportionment was held to be appropriate. It was found in that 
case that a 50/50 apportionment would be fair and reasonable. 
 
Gerber v CIR 141 concerned a dividend-stripping scheme of which the facts 
were similar to that of the Nemojim case. By applying the principles that were 
derived from Nemojim, the court disallowed the expenses relating to the 
dividend in a dividend stripping scheme. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
139 SIR v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA) Ltd 1976 (4) SA 522 (A), 38 SATC 111 
140 1988 (3) SA 819 (A), 50 SATC 98 at 114 & 115.  
141 1989 (4) SA 855 (A), 51 SATC 183 at 187, 190, 192 and 194  
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In Van Blommestein v KBI142, the taxpayer claimed interest paid as a 
deduction. In terms of a will, the taxpayer’s inheritance was subject to an 
obligation to pay the amount stipulated in a bequest to his two sisters and their 
children. These obligations were to be secured by mortgage bonds that were 
registered over the inherited farm. In terms of the will, the taxpayer was 
obliged to pay interest on the bonds to his two sisters. The court had to decide 
whether the taxpayer could deduct such interest in terms of section 11(a). It 
held that, in view of fact that the taxpayer had inherited both productive and 
non-productive assets and that the bond obligations related to both, the 
principle of apportionment, as applied in Nemojim, was to be applied. 
Accordingly, the court held that the taxpayer’s interest expenditure was to be 
apportioned in the ratio of the value of the income-producing assets that he 
had inherited to the value of the inheritance as a whole.  The income-
producing assets amounted to 60% of the taxpayer’s inheritance and therefore 
he was allowed to deduct 60% of the interest that he had paid. 
 
6.2.4 Application of the general deduction formula143 as applied in Nemojim 
 
In delivering the judgment of the Court in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 
____________________________________________________________________ 
142 59 SATC 221 at 226 & 235, 1997 (C) 
143 Schreiner JA said in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd, 
1955 (3) SA 293A at 299G: “In deciding how the expenditure should properly be 
regarded, the court clearly has to assess the closeness of the connection between the 
expenditure and the income earning operations, having regard both to the purpose of 
the expenditure and to what it actually affects.” 
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 Standard Bank of SA Ltd 144, Corbett JA alluded to the importance of the 
purpose of the expenditure concerned and the closeness of its connection with 
the relevant income-earning operations (or exempt income received), when 
applying the general deduction formula (s 11(a)) and its negative counterparts 
(s 23(f) and(g)) of the Act.  He mentioned Nemojim and cited extensively from 
the Allied case145 in formulating the following principles:  
(1) The closeness of the connection between the expenditure and the 
income-earning operations should be assessed. The same general test 
applies to the provisions of section 23(f) of the Act. 
(2) More specifically, in determining whether interest (or other like 
expenditure) that is incurred by a taxpayer in respect of moneys 
borrowed for use in his business is deductible in terms of the general 
deduction formula and its negative counterparts in the Act, a 
distinction may in certain instances have to be drawn between two 
scenarios.  The one scenario is a case in which the taxpayer borrows a 
specific sum of money and applies it for an identifiable purpose. The 
other scenario is a case in which, as in the Allied Building Society case, 
the taxpayer borrows money generally and upon a large scale in order 
to raise floating capital for use in his (or its) business as a banker.  
 
The court found that the vital enquiry related to the Bank’s purpose in 
borrowing the moneys upon which it paid interest. Then the court had to 
determine the closeness of the connection between the borrowings (and 
interest paid) and the acquisition of the redeemable preference shares (and 
____________________________________________________________________ 
144 1985 (4) SA 485 (A), 47 SATC 179 at 194  
145 CIR v Allied Building Society, 1963 (4) SA 1 (A), 25 SATC 343,  
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dividends received). The court concluded that there was no sufficiently close 
connection between the Bank’s payment of interest and its receipt of 
dividends on the redeemable preference shares. Thus the court concluded that 
the expenditure was not incurred in the production of exempt income, which 
would make it inadmissible for deduction under section 11(a). The interest 
expense was therefore allowed in full as it was not directly linked to the 
earning of the exempt dividend income. 
 
In Ticktin Timbers CC v CIR146, the court relied on Justice Corbett’s dictum in 
Nemojim regarding the general deduction formula. The court had to decide 
whether interest that was incurred by a close corporation on capital that had 
been borrowed from its only member was deductible in terms of sections 11(a) 
and 23(g). It was held that the enquiry should proceed by examining, on the 
facts of each case, firstly, whether the expenditure in question could be 
classified as expenditure actually incurred in the production of income and, 
secondly, whether its deduction was prohibited by section 23(g), as was the 
case in Nemojim. It was found that the taxpayer had incurred the interest-
bearing debt in order to make a distribution to its sole member, because 
without the loan there would have been no distribution and without the 
distribution there would have been no loan. Therefore the interest was not 
deductible in terms of section 11(a) as read in conjunction with section 23(g).  
In C:SARS v Van der Westhuizen147, the taxpayer and his brother each owned 
50% of a company that carried on fishing and farming operations. The 
taxpayer purchased his brother’s 50% interest by obtaining finance from the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
146 [1999] 4 All SA 192 (A), 61 SATC 399 at 401  
147 2001 (C), 63 SATC 191 at 195-6,  
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company’s bank. The taxpayer claimed that such interest expenditure had been 
incurred in the production of income. It was held, with reference to Justice 
Corbett’s dictum regarding the general deduction formula in Nemojim, that the 
link between the expenditure incurred by the taxpayer to acquire his brother’s 
member’s interest and his income-producing activities were clearly shown in 
the evidence and was therefore deductible. 
 
6.3      THE LACK OF A PROFIT MOTIVE 
 
In De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue148, Justice 
Corbett found it hard to believe that a taxpayer would enter into a transaction 
without the object of making a profit.  In fact, the object of the transaction 
appeared to be to make a loss. The perception of Mr Justice Corbett’s pro-
fiscus approach has been based on his decision in this case149. 
 
The taxpayer company was a share dealer. In 1973, it acquired shares in a 
company called Engelhard Hanovia SA (Pty) Ltd (“Engelhard”) with the 
intention of placing that company into voluntary liquidation. Due to changes 
in legislation, the taxpayer decided to implement a transaction in which it 
would sell its shares in Engelhard to an associated company for R1. It 
reflected the cost of the shares as trading stock, namely R4 159 937.  In the 
1979 tax year, it sought to deduct the loss on the sale of the Engelhard shares, 
____________________________________________________________________ 
148 1986 (1) SA 8(A), 47 SATC 229 
149 An essay by D M Davis on “Substance over Form in Tax Law: The Contribution 
of Mr Justice Corbett” - The Quest for Justice at page 148. 
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that is, the difference between R4 159 937 and R1. The Commissioner 
disallowed this loss.  
 
The Appellate Division raised the issue of section 23(g), which, at that time, 
prohibited the deduction of money “not wholly and exclusively laid out or 
expended for the purpose of trade”. Corbett JA, delivering the judgement of 
the court, decided that section 23(g) was the applicable section. He found that 
the taxpayer was a share dealer, but that the Engelhard shares had not been 
acquired for the purposes of its trade. Corbett JA reasoned as follows: 
 
“I have already indicated that the absence of a profit does not 
necessarily exclude a transaction from being part of the taxpayer’s 
trade; … A loss must, in order to satisfy section 23(g), be shown to 
have been so connected with the pursuit of the taxpayer’s trade, e.g. on 
the ground of commercial expediency or indirect facilitation of the 
trade, as to justify the conclusion that, despite the lack of profit motive, 
the moneys paid out under the transaction were wholly and exclusively 
expended for the purposes of trade.. . . . Generally, unless the facts 
speak for themselves, this will call for an explanation from the 
taxpayer.” 
 
In applying this test to the facts, Corbett JA held that the taxpayer had not 
entered into a normal share-dealing transaction. The scheme was not entered 
into to make a profit, but to register a loss and ultimately to obtain a 
substantial tax deduction. In short, Mr Justice Corbett extended the limitation 
of a tax deduction in terms of section 23(g) by equating trade with profit. In 
this manner he was able to examine the substance of the transaction, namely 
the exploitation of certain loopholes in the Act in order to construct a tax loss. 
In this case it was suggested that the Appellate Division had followed recent 
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jurisprudence in England where the courts favoured a substance-over-form 
approach. As one commentator argued "…in order to achieve his 
disallowances… he has… had to ride roughshod over the trading stock 
provisions of the Act in order to achieve so-called equity”.150 
 
The definition of “trading stock” was amended after the De Beers Holdings 
decision to include “any consumable stores and spare parts acquired… to be 
used or consumed in the course of his trade”.  This was done, because it was 
clear, that, in the light of Corbett JA’s comments, such items did not fall 
within the definition. Taxpayers thereafter did not add back the value of their 
consumable stock on hand at the end of their year of assessment to taxable 
income, based on the definition of trading stock in De Beers. This caused a 
loss to the fiscus and, as has been indicated above, the definition of trading 
stock in section 1 of the Income Tax Act was subsequently amended to 
include consumables as stock in terms of section 22 of the Act. 
 
6.3.1 References to “profit motive” as discussed in the De Beers Holdings 
judgement 
 
The judgement in the De Beers case has been referred to on several occasions 
regarding the issue of the “profit motive”: 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
150 “The Appellate Division and Equity in Taxation” an essay by T Emslie in the 
Income Tax Reporter, No. 26 (1987) at p51.  
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In CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust151, the Trust contended 
that the proceeds from its disposal of the shares in question constituted 
amounts of a capital nature that are excluded from ‘gross income’ as defined 
in section one of the Act. Furthermore, the representatives of the Trust 
contended that it was created and maintained to enable employees to purchase 
shares in their employer company and that it did not acquire shares with the 
intention of reselling them at a profit in a profit-making scheme. The Trust 
was continuously engaged in share-dealing during the years of assessment 
concerned.  
 
It was held that, irrespective of the number of transactions that occurred, the 
receipts that flowed from the carrying on of a business were to be considered 
to be revenue if the business were conducted with a profit motive, that is, as 
part of a profit-making venture or scheme. To hold otherwise would amount to 
a departure from earlier authoritative judgements. The normal way in which a 
share trader operates, is to buy shares and then to resell them at a profit (cited 
De Beers Holdings). The Trust had no such intention. While a profit motive is 
not essential for the carrying on of a business, its presence or absence is an 
important factor in determining whether a business is being conducted.  
 
Justice Smalberger said:  
 
“Whether the Trust was carrying on a business by trading in shares 
must be determined applying ordinary common sense and business 
standards. Even if the Trust could be said in a broad sense to have 
____________________________________________________________________ 
151  1992 (A), 54 SATC 271 at 280  
 116
been conducting a business, it was not a business carried on as part of 
a scheme of profit-making. Receipts of a revenue nature (in the form of 
profits) accrue to a trader who acquires and disposes of shares as part 
of a scheme of profit-making (per De Beers Holdings). The purpose of 
the scheme was not one of profit-making. A dealer doing business in 
shares can be expected to engage freely in the market; to buy and sell 
at the most advantageous times and prices according to the dictates of 
the market. This is not what the Trust did. It bought when it was 
obliged to and sold when it was required to.” 
 
It was accordingly held, in a split decision (3:2), that any receipts accruing to 
the Trust from the sale of shares were not intended or aimed at making a 
profit, but were purely fortuitous in the sense of being an incidental by-
product. The receipts were therefore non-revenue because they were accruals 
of a capital nature that fell beyond the definition of gross income and for that 
reason they were not subject to tax. 
 
Profit-making schemes create revenue income. Justice Corbett wanted to 
extend this principle to deductions, namely to allow deductions in a profit 
making scheme, but disallow deductions if there is no profit making motive, 
such as in the De Beers case. In the Pick n Pay Employee Trust case, the court 
applied this principle from the De Beers case on the income of the trust. 
However, this profit motive principle is not applicable on the expenditure side. 
There are various reasons why a transaction has no profit motive - being 
obliged to buy and sell shares, such as in the circumstances of the Pick n Pay 
Employee Trust case. Other examples of deductible expenses or losses include 
selling at a loss for competition purposes, clearing out old stock, improving 
market share, even shares can be sold at a loss for various reasons. However, 
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stripping shares of its value by paying out dividends is not allowed as a 
deduction152. 
 
In CIR v Sunnyside Centre (Pty) Ltd153, the taxpayer deducted interest on loan 
transactions in terms of sections 11(a) and 23(g) of the Act. The taxpayer had 
borrowed interest-bearing money from a bank and applied part of the funds to 
repay its indebtedness to a holding company and lent the balance at interest to 
the holding company. The purpose and effect of the loan that the taxpayer 
received was to repay its interest-bearing debt to the holding company and to 
lend the balance to it with interest. 
 
 It was held that the transaction at issue was not connected with the taxpayer’s 
trade and that it had a purpose other than that of deriving income. Therefore, 
in accordance with De Beers Holdings, in the absence of an explanation or of 
facts that speak for themselves in a manner that is favourable to the taxpayer, 
the moneys were not expended for the purposes of trade.  
 
In ITC 1292154, the taxpayer had claimed to deduct losses incurred by him in 
carrying on the trade of letting a house. The Secretary disallowed the 
deductions claimed and dismissed the subsequent objection. The Special Court 
established that the house in issue was at the seaside and had been built by the 
taxpayer as a vacation residence. Thereafter, when not occupying the house 
____________________________________________________________________ 
152 The perceived tax advantages of dividend stripping were not permitted in CIR v 
Nemojim (Pty) Ltd, 45 SATC 241 
153  58 SATC 319 at 325-6 
154 (1979) 41 SATC 163 
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himself, he occasionally let it to private individuals. He later concluded a 
contract with his employers where, for an annual rental, members of their staff 
used the house when he himself was not using it. 
 
The Special Court found that the taxpayer’s real object was to minimize the 
cost of having a vacation residence and that there was no prospect of him 
making any profit at all by letting the house. A prerequisite of deductibility of 
expenditure is that there must be a real hope, based not on fanciful 
expectations, but on a reasonable possibility of earning a profit. Since in the 
circumstances no such real hope existed, no portion of the losses was 
deductible. 
 
However, in a similar situation in 1997, in Special Board Decision No 79, the 
taxpayer appealed against the disallowance of his objections to his Income Tax 
assessments for the tax years 1990, 1991 and 1992. The objections were in 
each case to the refusal of the Commissioner for Inland Revenue to allow as 
deductions from the taxpayer’s gross income a net loss arising out of expenses 
incurred by the taxpayer relating to a certain residential property owned by the 
taxpayer. The net loss arose in each of the 3 tax years after setting off, against 
the expenses, the rental income which accrued to the taxpayer from the letting 
of the property. The amounts of the expenses were not in dispute.  
   
The taxpayer stated that he changed his intention regarding the property from 
a holiday home to a business proposition due to the following facts – 
 119
1. After the divorce his decision to retain the property was influenced 
because he regarded the property as an investment in a growth area 
particularly as a vacation point. 
2. He needed an investment with capital growth because at the time he 
was employed by a small company which did not have a pension fund. 
He had subscribed to a Retirement Annuity Policy but did not regard it 
as adequate. He felt he would be destitute on retirement if he did not 
have an asset to sell to supplement his pension.  
 
The Board accepted the taxpayer’s evidence. Citing the De Beers case, the 
Board found that the necessity for the achievement of a profit for the conduct 
of a trade, “if not dead, has certainly been dealt telling blows”. The court 
concluded that the taxpayer embarked on the trade of letting the property, as 
he had no need for a holiday home after his divorce. The appeal was upheld as 
the profitability of the investment had no bearing on the deductibility of the 
losses. 
 
6.3.2 Application of the definition of stock in De Beers Holdings 
 
Before De Beers there had been no previous court case in South Africa 
regarding the treatment of stock for tax purposes. Justice Corbett was obliged 
to consider the accounting treatment of stock in AC106, the South African 
General Accounting and Auditing Practice principle dealing with the treatment 
of stock, and also the definitions that appeared in the Oxford English 
Dictionary. Very little could be gained from the judgements in cases that had 
been heard in other countries.  
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Corbett JA analysed the definitions and concluded that: 
 
“The definition falls naturally into two parts per section 1: 
 (1) anything produced, manufactured, purchased or in any 
other manner acquired by a taxpayer for purposes of manufacture, 
sale or exchange by him or on his behalf, or 
 (2) anything where the proceeds from the disposal will form 
part of his gross income. 
To stretch the definition to cover things acquired without the intention 
to sell would introduce a hypothesis which would not come to pass and 
to do so would do violence to the plain words used.” 
 
In Richards Bay Iron & Titanium (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR155, Marais 
JA followed the definition of stock by Justice Corbett in De Beers.  
 
In Syfrets Participation Bond Managers Ltd v C:SARS156, the taxpayer had 
made investments in participation mortgage bonds. According to the taxpayer, 
it constituted “trading stock” for the purposes of section 11(a). The court had 
to decide whether, if section 22(1) were applicable, the value of the trading 
stock, that is, the participation mortgage bonds had, for the purposes of that 
provision, diminished below its cost, thereby entitling the taxpayer to the 
appropriate deductions. 
 
It was held that the taxpayer’s own participation mortgage bonds did not fall 
within the first or the second part of the definition of ‘trading stock’ in 
section 1 of the Act as the taxpayer failed to show that the participation bonds 
____________________________________________________________________ 
155  58 SATC 55 at 68, 1996 (1) SA 311 (A) 
156  63 SATC 1 at 6-7 , 2000 (SCA) 
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were going to be sold or exchanged. Furthermore, even if it did fall within the 
definition, and contrary to what was said in De Beers Holdings, the definition 
of stock was not exhaustive and the participation bonds which the taxpayer 
held could not be regarded as stock. The court pointed out that the appellant 
was not “trafficking” in participations, it was not “purchasing and selling” 
participations in order to generate an income from such activity; its own 
involvement in participations was temporary and incidental to its true vocation 
which was to administer the scheme in return for its agreed commission and, 
as such, its “holding” of participations was prima facie of a capital and not of 
a revenue nature. 
 
6.3.3 Conclusion on De Beers Holdings 
 
The De Beers case is an example of a case in which Mr Justice Corbett 
supposedly adopted a pro-fiscus approach. An analysis of that judgement 
reveals that the court applied some of the provisions of section 23(g) to 
disallow a substantial deduction, which had clearly been the major objective of 
the transaction. The only possible criticism of the judgement could be that the 
court equated the word “trade” with “profit” so that the lack of a profit motive 
meant that the taxpayer was not trading and therefore could not claim a 
deduction. In isolation, this approach to the section concerned can hardly be 
equated with the purposive approach to the interpretation of tax legislation that 
has been adopted in certain English cases.  
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According to Professor Davis157, Justice Corbett extended the limitation of a 
tax deduction, in terms of section 23(g), by equating trade with profit. In this 
manner Justice Corbett was able to examine the substance of the transaction 
that comprised the exploitation of certain loopholes in the Act in order to 
construct a tax loss. It has been suggested that in this case the Appellate 
Division followed the jurisprudence that was applied in England, where the 
courts favoured a substance-over-form approach. Justice Corbett showed that 
he was not inflexible in his approach to a tax problem. He was able to change 
from a normally formative approach to a substantive approach in, what he 
considered, the appropriate circumstances.  
  
 
6.4 THE CLOSE CONNECTION BETWEEN EXPENSES INCURRED 
AND RELEVANT INCOME-EARNING ACTIVITIES (THE 
PRODUCTION OF INCOME). 
 
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Standard Bank of SA Limited158, the 
Bank claimed deductions for three years of assessment in respect of interest 
paid on money borrowed. The Commissioner for Inland Revenue disallowed a 
portion of each of these deductions. The Bank received income in the form of 
dividends. These dividends were exempt and not taxable in the hands of the 
Bank (by virtue of section 10(1)(k) of the Act). The Commissioner contended 
____________________________________________________________________ 
157 An essay by D M Davis on “Substance over Form in Tax Law: The Contribution 
of Mr Justice Corbett” - The Quest for Justice at page 151. 
158  1985 (4) SA 485(A) ,47 SATC 179 
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that a proportionate amount of the interest paid to depositors on the deposited 
money should be disallowed as a deduction, as it related to expenses which 
produced exempt income. The Bank disputed the validity of this contention. 
 
In delivering the judgment of the court, Corbett JA referred to Nemojim 
(supra) and alluded to the importance of the purpose of the expenditure 
concerned and the closeness of its connection with the relevant income-
earning operations (or exempt income received) when applying the general 
deduction formula (section 11(a)) and its negative counterparts (section 23(f) 
and (g)) of the Act.  After citing extensively from the Allied Building Society 
case159, he concluded that: 
 
(a) All money borrowed goes into a common pool, which constitutes a 
fund that is used for all purposes. 
(b) Generally the institution’s expenditure in the form of interest on 
borrowed money is not aimed at any particular form of utilisation of 
the borrowed money.  Rather, it is dictated by the very nature of the 
institution’s income-earning operations of borrowing all money offered 
cheaply and then lending out dearly as much thereof as it can possibly 
invest. 
 
The court held that the immediate purpose of the Bank in borrowing money is 
to obtain the floating capital with which to run its business. The cumulative 
effect of the factors that had been indicated, as well as the insignificance of the 
amount of dividends against the total receipts, established that there was not a 
____________________________________________________________________ 
159 1963 (4) SA 1 (A), 25 SATC 343 at 357 
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sufficiently close connection between the Bank’s payment of interest and its 
receipt of dividends on the redeemable preference shares to warrant the 
conclusion that such payment (or part thereof) constituted expenditure that had 
been incurred in the production of exempt income. The appeal was 
accordingly dismissed. 
 
This case was used by financial institutions to structure deals with clients 
whereby, instead of lending money to the client when the client was in an 
assessed loss situation, the financial institution rather invested in the company 
through redeemable preference shares. The tax efficiency of such convertible 
loans have been limited by the introduction of the anti tax-avoidance section 
103(5) which deems the interest received on such preference shares to have 
accrued to the moneylender. 
 
6.4.1 Application of the close connection between expenses incurred and 
related income-earning activities as applied in the Standard Bank case 
 
In ITC 1603160, a partnership embarked on a scheme in terms of which it 
repaid the taxpayer his portion of his capital account, which he then used to 
pay the balance of the bond on his property. Pursuant thereto, another loan 
was advanced by the bank under the same bond. The loan was paid to the 
partnership and credited to the taxpayer’s capital account. The court had to 
decide whether the interest paid on the loan was deductible by the taxpayer in 
terms of section 11(a) read together with section 23(g). 
  
____________________________________________________________________ 
160   58 SATC 212 at 215-6 
 125
The court held that the taxpayer was entitled to the deduction of the interest 
expense that he had incurred on the mortgage bond over his home in terms of 
section 11(a). Although an essential motive of the taxpayer, in undertaking the 
scheme, was to gain a tax advantage, the real issue was whether the expense 
had been incurred in the production of income. 
 
In determining the answer to the question regarding the closeness of the 
relationship between expenses and income-earning activities, the court 
followed Justice Corbett’s test in Standard Bank161, a test which is now well-
established: 
 
“. . . (I)t is settled law that generally, in order to determine in a 
particular case whether moneys outlaid by the taxpayer constitute 
“expenditure incurred in the production of the income”, important 
factors are the purpose of the expenditure and what the expenditure 
actually effects. And in this connection the court has to assess the 
closeness of the connection between the expenditure and the income-
earning operations (see Nemojim).’ 
 
In CIR v Ticktin Timbers162, the sole member of the taxpayer close corporation 
charged interest in respect of its continued use of money owed to it. The court 
held that the transactions in issue were devised to ensure that the taxpayer 
helped to pay the interest which the sole member owed to the trusts, the 
intention being to increase the sole member’s income and not that of the 
taxpayer. Therefore, the loans were created where none were needed for the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
161 47 SATC 170 at152 
162 1997 (C), 59 SATC 260 at 263 
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taxpayer’s income-producing activities. Accordingly, the interest at issue had 
not been incurred in the production of income and was not deductible in terms 
of section 11(a).  Based on the principle in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd, 
the question to be asked is: What is the purpose for which the money was 
borrowed? The answer is that the taxpayer’s purpose was to discharge the 
distribution debt. The answer makes it clear that the issue does not concern 
expenditure incurred in the production of income. 
 
6.5  WHEN IS APPORTIONMENT APPROPRIATE? 
 
CIR v Pick ’n Pay Wholesalers163 is a celebrated case164 that involved large 
donations to the Urban Foundation, an organisation that was concerned with 
the upgrading of housing and the provision of community facilities. The 
company argued that the donations were a means of “indirect advertising” and 
were intended to secure valuable publicity. The announcement of the 
donations achieved sufficient publicity to have a positive effect on the 
taxpayer’s turnover. At that time, section 23(g) required that expenditure to be 
deductible had to be wholly or exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade, 
as was decided in the Solaglass case165. It raised the issue of whether the 
taxpayer’s purpose was solely to promote its business or whether it had a dual 
nature, including philanthropy.  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
163  1987 (3) SA 453(A), 49 SATC 132 
164 Silke on South African Income Tax at § 7.3 
165 Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1991, (2) SA 257 (A), 53 SATC 1. 
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The majority of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court found that, on 
the balance of probabilities, the taxpayer failed to show that, in making the 
donations, it did not have both a philanthropic and a business purpose.  The 
result was that its claim for a deduction was disallowed. The minority of the 
presiding judges considered that its sole aim was to acquire indirect 
advertising and that “the expenditure was entirely divorced from the element 
of charity for charity’s sake”. 
 
In the case of Bourne and Hollingsworth Ltd v Ogden166, the High Court 
refused a deduction for certain subscriptions that the company had made to the 
nearby Middlesex Hospital. The Inspector had allowed previous subscriptions, 
but the dispute in this instance concerned an abnormally large payment. 
Rowlatt J articulated the element of munificence or beneficence, which is 
often present in charitable giving and which can be a purpose that is additional 
to any business purpose. It appears that the less “selfish” the expenditure, the 
greater the likelihood of a non-business (and therefore a non-allowable) 
purpose.  
 
Ironically, the dissenting judgement of Nestadt JA in the Pick ‘n Pay case, was 
based on the same grounds as the dissenting judgement of Corbett JA in the 
Elandsheuwel case – that the company is separate from its shareholders and 
that their intentions may be different167. Nestadt JA said: 
  
____________________________________________________________________ 
166 Bourne and Holingsworth Ltd v Ogden, [1929] 13 TC 349 
167 See paragraph 5.1.2 
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“As Centlivres CJ said in CIR v Richmond Estates(Pty) Ltd 1956(1) SA 
602(A) at 606G: ‘A company is an artificial person with no body to 
kick and no soul to damn and the only way of ascertaining its intention 
is to find out what its directors acting as such intended’.” 
 
Justice Nestadt concluded that, in the circumstances under consideration, care 
should be taken not to merge Mr Ackerman’s activities and intentions in his 
capacity as a director of the Urban Foundation and those in conducting the 
affairs of the taxpayer, where Mr Ackerman was then the managing director 
(see the minority judgment of Corbett JA in Elandsheuwel Farming):  
 
“Prima facie, the payment was therefore made with a charitable 
purpose and the taxpayer’s evidence confirmed that this was at least 
partly the purpose thereof. Accordingly, the taxpayer did not show that 
it was “wholly or exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade” 
merely by showing that it also had a business objective and that the 
donation resulted in a business advantage. The taxpayer’s purposes 
and motivations coincided and the two cannot be distinguished in this 
case.”168 
 
Despite Justice Nestadt’s disagreement over the stance taken by Justice 
Corbett in his majority judgement, the position taken by Justice Corbett was 
not an about turn from his minority judgement in the Elandsheuwel case. 
Consideration was given to the fact that the same individual was involved in 
both organisations. It could also not be substantively proven that there was a 
____________________________________________________________________ 
168 See eg Boarland v Kramat Pulai Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 1122(Ch) at 1129D-F; 
Nemojim’s case(supra) at 947H-948C;65 and  De Beers Holdings(Pty) Ltd v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1986(1) SA 8(A), 46 SATC 47 at 36I-37B.66  
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direct link between the advertising expenses and the related income.  
Therefore the expense was considered to be (partly) philanthropic. It is 
submitted that, in this judgement, Justice Corbett distanced himself from his 
usual formative approach and followed the substance-over-form route. This 
change in approach caused his judgement to appear pro-fiscus. 
 
The duality rule169, as used in the United Kingdom tax law, prevents the 
deduction of expenditure for mixed purposes. This rule was incorporated by 
Justice Corbett into South African tax law in the Pick n Pay case.  However, 
the rule does not prevent the apportionment of expenditure and the subsequent 
deduction of that portion of the expenditure that was incurred wholly and 
exclusively for business purposes.  
 
It is settled law in both United Kingdom and South Africa that, when 
expenditure is incurred for dual purposes in which one of the purposes is not a 
trading purpose and the expenditure on trade cannot be separated and 
identified, then no portion of the expenditure is deductible170. 
 
Expenditure in the form of subscriptions to charitable organisations is the 
generous act of good citizens. There is, therefore, a duality of the capacity in 
____________________________________________________________________ 
169 From Butterworths’ British Tax Law – The duality rule at page 216 
170 Odhams Press v Cook [1940] 3 All ER 15(HL); Ransom v Higgs [1973] 2 All ER 
657(CA); Ransom v Higgs [1974] 3 All ER 949(HL); Also see ITC 698 17 SATC 97; 
ITC 734 18 SATC 202; ITC 847 22 SATC 77; Odhams Press v Cook [1940] 3 All ER 
15(HL) at 20; Ransom v Higgs [1973] 2 All ER 657(CA) at 690E-692G and 699B-D; 
Ransom v Higgs [1974] 3 All ER 949(HL) at 958E-959A, 962E-963A, 968H-969E 
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which such payments are made, namely, partly as trader and partly as 
citizen.171 However, whether the explanation for the rejection of claims for the 
deduction of subscriptions is remoteness or duality, the deduction of such 
payments is rarely allowed. For example, subscriptions in the form of 
charitable donations to a hospital are not deductible.172  
 
The changes to section 23(g) in the Act, to allow apportionment, came into 
effect after the Pick n Pay case. If the legislative changes had taken place prior 
to the Pick n Pay case, the judgement may have been entirely different. 
However, Justice Corbett was rightly or wrongly applying the duality rule in 
disallowing this expense. It is submitted that apportionment should have been 
allowed as it was proved that some publicity was received by the taxpayer. All 
that was necessary was some basis to apportion. 
 
6.5.1 CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.5.1.1 Conclusion regarding apportionment 
 
Justice Corbett was criticised for apportioning expenses in the Nemojim and 
De Beers Holdings cases and for not apportioning expenses in the Pick n Pay 
Wholesalers case. In all three cases the taxpayers came off second best. Judge 
Corbett did not apportion expenses in the Standard Bank case and found in 
favour of the taxpayer, a decision which benefited the taxpayer. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
171 Bentleys, Stokes and Lowless v Beeson (Inspector of Taxes) [1952] 2 All ER 82 
172 Bourne and Hollingsworth Ltd v Ogden (Inspector of Taxes) [1929] 14 TC 349 
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The Pick ‘n Pay case was probably the most celebrated of the four cases 
decided by Justice Corbett regarding the apportionment of expenses. It was a 
50/50 tussle between the taxpayer and the Commissioner. Justice Corbett 
sided with the duality rule173 and could not distinguish a point at which the 
advertising began and the donation ended. His decision might have been 
influenced by the fact that the Urban Foundation received donations that were 
mainly of a philanthropic nature and businesses did not as a general rule, use 
the Foundation as an advertising vehicle.  
 
It is submitted that probably in the Pick n Pay case, counsel for the taxpayer 
did not indicate a convincing way to apportion the expenses. Justice Corbett, 
to justify apportionment, needed some convincing in this respect. It should be 
noted, however, that an arbitrary apportionment appeared to be permissible as 
had the 50:50 apportionment in the Tuck case174. The taxpayer submitted 
details of increased sales to prove the validity of the advertising expense. It is 
probable, however, that with the subsequent changes to section 23(g) that the 
court would have decided to apportion on some basis. 
  
6.5.1.2 Profitability and the deductibility of losses 
 
According to Silke175, it is not a requirement of the general deduction formula 
that the taxpayer should set out to achieve a “profit” in an accounting or 
____________________________________________________________________ 
173 CIR v Pick n Pay Wholesalers, 49 SATC 132 on  p 148 
174 see paragraph 6.2 
175 At § 7.11 
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economic sense. However, the absence of a profit motive or of the prospect of 
making a profit, together with other factors, might indicate that the taxpayer 
did not incur a particular expense in the production of income, or wholly or 
exclusively for the purposes of trade.  
Corbett JA, as he then was, clearly highlighted the lack of a profit motive 
when he delivered the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court in De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR, namely: 
 
 “Where, however, a trader normally carries on business by buying 
goods and selling them at a profit, then as a general rule a transaction 
entered into with the purpose of not making a profit, or in fact 
registering a loss, must, in order to satisfy section 23(g), be shown to 
have been so connected with the pursuit of the taxpayer’s trade, for 
example, on ground of commercial expediency or indirect facilitation 
of the trade, as to justify the conclusion that, despite the lack of a 
profit motive, the moneys paid out under the transaction were wholly 
and exclusively expended for the purposes of trade . . . . Generally, 
unless the facts speak for themselves, this will call for an explanation 
from the taxpayer.” 
 
The first major case in which Mr Justice Corbett supposedly adopted a pro-
fiscus approach was the De Beers Holdings case and thereafter followed by the 
Pick n Pay case. In both cases Justice Corbett interpreted the provisions of 
section 23(g) in order to disallow substantial deductions. The only possible 
criticism of the judgement in the De Beers case could be that Justice Corbett 
equated the word “trade” with “profit” so that failing to demonstrate a profit 
motive meant that the taxpayer was not trading and hence he could not claim a 
deduction. Considered in isolation, this approach to the section can hardly be 
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equated with the purposive approach to the interpretation of tax legislation that 
was adopted in certain English cases176.  
 
In order not to dilute the tax base, it is important for the fiscus to disallow non-
trading deductions. Thus section 23 is there to protect the fiscus. Justice 
Corbett battled with the phenomenon in which a business willingly operates at 
a loss. A situation could arise in which the loss was not real, only a book 
entry, as was the case with De Beers and Nemojim.  
 
6.6  INCURRAL OF COSTS 
 
Normally an incurral is a simple matter: If goods or services are delivered and 
an invoice is received that states the amount owing, then the cost of the goods 
may be incurred, although it has not yet been paid for. Incurral is primarily 
applicable to cases in which full delivery has not yet taken place and/or when 
no invoice is available from the third party involved. It then becomes a 
question of law: When does the incurral of the legal obligation or liability take 
place? Justice Corbett battled with this issue in the two cases discussed in the 
following section, namely Edgars Stores and Golden Dumps. 
 
6.6.1  Expense determined after the year end  
 
In Edgars Stores Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue177, the taxpayer’s 
retail clothing business was conducted in leased premises throughout southern 
____________________________________________________________________ 
176 See discussion in paragraph 3.3 
177  1988 (3) SA 876(A), 50 SATC 81 
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Africa. Annual leases provided for a ‘basic rental’ and a ‘turnover rental’. The 
taxpayer claimed deductions in terms of section 11(a) of the Act for rent, 
which represented genuine estimates (the final figures were not yet available) 
of the amounts by which the turnover rental exceeded the basic rental in the 
years of assessment concerned. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction. 
Corbett JA (with Hoexter JA, Vivier JA and Viljoen AJA concurring) held 
that the obligation to pay turnover rental was contingent upon the turnover for 
the lease year being determined. 
 
In a dissenting judgement, Nicholas AJA held that the lease created a single 
obligation to pay rent, which comprised two components, namely basic rental 
and the excess, if any, of turnover rental over basic rental.  Nicholas AJA also 
said that the lease therefore provided for one single obligation to pay rent and 
that, properly interpreted, the lease agreement did not provide for the 
substitution of basic rental by turnover rental.  It did not matter that the actual 
amount could not be established with 100% accuracy. In spite of this powerful 
minority judgement, the majority decision was that it was not possible to 
determine the actual amount owed until the lease year had expired. The appeal 
was therefore dismissed with costs. 
 
This was an unfortunate decision against the taxpayer and could also indicate a 
pro-fiscus approach by Corbett JA. Although it was impossible to calculate the 
exact amount owed at the year-end date, such a calculation is possible within a 
reasonable time frame after the year-end. The cost was in actual fact incurred 
during the period of the rental and not afterwards, as was pointed out in the 
minority judgement. If it is not possible for the taxpayer to calculate the 
turnover within the time limits before submission is due, then a reasonable 
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estimate can be calculated and should be allowed by the Commissioner. 
Should this estimate differ from the actual amount then a correction is possible 
by revising that year’s assessment in accordance with section 79. 
 
6.6.2  Application of the Edgars Stores principle on incurral 
 
A bank that paid interest on Negotiable Certificates of Deposit, which it had 
issued, claimed that it was entitled to make certain deductions in the year of 
assessment concerned, in ITC 1485178.  The bank claimed that, in terms of 
section 11(a), it was entitled to deduct all the interest reflected on the 
Negotiable Certificates of Deposit that it had issued in that year of assessment, 
even though the greater proportion of the said interest was reflected as being 
payable in instalments on specified dates in future years of assessment.  
 
The court held that the actual liability to pay interest was only incurred as and 
when the interest accrued on the outstanding loan. It was incurred and it 
accrued from day to day. Interest payable in future years of assessment was 
therefore not ‘expenditure actually incurred’ during the year of assessment in 
which the instrument was issued. 
 
The court relied on the legal principles that had emanated from the cases of: 
Caltex Oil179, Nasionale Pers180 and Edgars Stores:181 
____________________________________________________________________ 
178 1990 (T), 52 SATC 337 at 341-2 
179 Caltex Oil(SA) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue, 1975(1) SA 665(A) at 674: An 
obligation must be incurred unconditionally before it is allowed as a deduction in the 
year of assessment. 
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The principles to be applied in considering whether expenditure is deductible 
in a particular year of assessment are therefore well established. The court, 
however, imported from English law the principle that interest is incurred on a 
day-to-day basis, which is, it is submitted, not always true – it depends on how 
the capital is invested and the terms and conditions of the contract. 
 
In ITC 1496182, which case involved a plantation-scheme, the taxpayer made 
an investment in a plantation venture by joining a partnership to carry on the 
business of timber plantation farming. The taxpayer paid a contribution to join 
the partnership.  The taxpayer also provided finance by issuing a promissory 
note to the partnership. The promissory note included a capital amount as well 
as interest that accrued thereon. The taxpayer claimed a deduction equalling 
the full amount of the promissory note, in terms of section 11(a), read with 
section 23(g) in his income tax return for the year of assessment concerned. 
This amount comprised interest for five years as well as the actual plantation 
establishment and maintenance costs. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
180 Nasionale Pers Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste, 1986(3) SA 549(A) 
at 564: When an obligation is initially incurred as a conditional obligation during a 
particular year of assessment and the condition is fulfilled only in the following year 
of assessment, then it is deductible only in the latter year of assessment. 
181 The deduction is only allowable if the conditional requirements of deductibility 
have been satisfied. 
182  (1990), 53 SATC 229 (T) at 238 
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The court held that, although the promissory note could be considered to be 
evidence of a contractual liability to pay interest at some future date, the actual 
liability to pay only incurred as and when the interest became due on the 
outstanding loan, which is on a day to day basis. This decision was based on 
English law – it was not South African law at that time. This judgement was 
given by Melamet J, who also gave the judgement in ITC 1485 and, in regard 
to the incurral of interest, was, it is submitted, probably incorrect. 
 
Reliance was placed on the Edgars Stores principle that when an obligation is 
initially incurred as a conditional obligation during a particular year of 
assessment and the condition is fulfilled only in the following year of 
assessment, then it is deductible only in the latter year of assessment. Section 
24J was thereafter introduced and it now regulates the accrual and incurral of 
interest. 
 
6.6.3     Expense to be determined by a court after the year-end 
 
For accounting purposes, a pending court case for a damages claim can be 
either a contingency or an accrual, depending on the circumstances. The 
application of General Accepted Accounting Practice will determine whether 
the damages claim is either a contingent claim or an accrual of an expense.  
 
For tax purposes, the question arises as to when the liability for damages is 
incurred - at the time the claim for damages is made or when the amount of the 
claim is finally determined by a court or even some intermediate time.  
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In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd183, the facts 
were briefly as follows: The taxpayer’s sole shareholder handed Mr Nash a 
letter of appointment that had been written on the taxpayer’s letterhead.  In the 
letter he offered Nash the position of financial director in his group with a 
commencing salary and an entitlement to 200 000 shares in a new company. 
Two months later Nash was summarily dismissed.  
 
Thereafter, the attorneys acting for Nash wrote to the taxpayer to demand 
delivery of the shares that had been referred to in the letter of appointment and 
stated that failing delivery thereof, legal proceedings to compel such transfer 
would be instituted. The attorneys acting for the taxpayer denied liability and 
refused to accede to Nash’s demand. In 1981 Nash proceeded to institute legal 
proceedings. 
  
An appeal by Nash to the Appellate Division was upheld in 1985. The order of 
the court a quo was altered to read that the taxpayer was ordered to deliver to 
Nash 200 000 shares in Consolidated Modderfontein Mines Ltd against 
payment by him of the sum of R 88 250 to the taxpayer. The judgment, which 
was written by Corbett JA, was reported as Nash v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd 
1985(3) SA 1(A).  In the Special Tax Court, the parties accepted as correct the 
findings of the facts that were contained in the judgment. 
 
In support of its return of income for the 1985 year of assessment, the taxpayer 
attached its annual financial statements, which reflected the amount owed to 
Nash for the 200 000 shares under the heading ‘Extraordinary items’. The 
____________________________________________________________________ 
183  1993 (A), 55 SATC 198 
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Commissioner for Inland Revenue disallowed the deduction on the grounds 
that the expense did not accrue in 1985. The taxpayer lodged an objection and 
noted an appeal against the assessment. 
 
In dismissing the appeal and upholding the taxpayer’s contention, Corbett JA 
held that: 
   
(i) A liability is contingent in a case in which a claim is disputed 
genuinely and not vexatiously or frivolously for the purposes of delay. 
In such a case, the ultimate outcome of the situation will be confirmed 
only if the claim is admitted or if it is finally upheld by the decision of 
a court or an arbitrator. 
 
(ii) When, at the end of the tax year in which a deduction is claimed, the 
outcome of the dispute is undetermined, it cannot be said that a 
liability has actually been incurred. 
 
It should be pointed out that if the Commissioner had won the case, then the 
section 79 three year prescription rule would have precluded the taxpayer from 
claiming the expense. This fact, however, did not sway the decision by the 
courts and this decision is still applicable today. 
 
6.6.4  Conclusion on incurrals 
 
In both Edgars Stores and Golden Dumps the question of when an incurral of 
an expense arises, was addressed.  According to Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practice as well as the provisions of section 11(a), expenditure can 
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be incurred or accrued although it has not yet been paid. This is the practice in 
many countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia.  
 
If, however, the outcome of a dispute or court case is not finalised during the 
course of a financial year, then it is a contingent liability for accounting 
purposes for that year and it is not deductible for tax purposes as no liability 
has been established.  
 
To meet the requirements of “actually incurred” and “during the year of 
assessment”, a deduction should be finalised in that fiscal year. This situation 
also prevails in the United Kingdom. In Herbert Smith v Honour184, the rentals 
were fixed in a lease contract and the amount payable had therefore been 
established. If the quantum cannot be established then an extension for the 
submission of the return can be granted by the Commissioner, alternatively a 
reasonable estimate can be provided to the Commissioner in terms of 
section 78 of the Act. In case of an under estimate, the Commissioner should 
be notified and the tax assessment for that year should be re-opened in terms 
of section 79 of the Act.  
 
It is clear that Justice Corbett did not deviate from the international trend. 
Golden Dumps has been cited and applied as reliable references in South 
African tax law.  
 
The Edgars case, however, was an unfortunate case against the taxpayer. 
Justice Corbett found in a majority decision that the turnover rental was 
____________________________________________________________________ 
184 Herbert Smith (a firm) v Honour (Inspector of Taxes) [1999] 173 Chd 
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contingent upon the turnover for the lease year being determined. It is 
submitted that the expense did accrue during the year of assessment, but if it is 
not possible for the taxpayer to calculate the turnover within the time limits 
before submission is due, then a reasonable estimate can be calculated and 
should be allowed by the Commissioner. Should this estimate differ from the 
actual amount then a correction is possible by revising that year’s assessment 
in accordance with section 79.  
 
6.7 CONCLUSION: 
 
6.7.1 Apportionment of expenses: 
 
Justice Corbett applied the apportionment principle in two major cases, 
Nemojim and De Beers Holdings, but did not apply it in the Pick n Pay 
Wholesalers and the Standard Bank cases (supra). In the dividend stripping 
cases of Nemojim and De Beers Holdings Justice Corbett used the formula 
applied in the Guardian Assurance185 case. By apportioning the expense of 
purchasing the shares between the value of the shares after deducting the 
dividends which would be declared and the value of the dividends, he 
effectively closed the loophole for dividend stripping operators.  
 
The Pick ‘n Pay case was probably the most celebrated of the four cases 
decided by Justice Corbett regarding the non-apportionment of expenses. 
Justice Corbett sided with the duality rule186 and could not distinguish a point 
____________________________________________________________________ 
185 SIR v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA) Ltd 1976 (4) SA 522 (A), 38 SATC 111 
186 CIR v Pick n Pay Wholesalers, 49 SATC 132 on  p 148 
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at which the advertising began and the donation ended. With the subsequent 
changes to section 23(g), apportionment is now possible. 
 
6.7.2 The lack of a profit motive 
 
In the De Beers Holdings case, Justice Corbett found it hard to believe that a 
taxpayer would enter into a transaction without the object of making a profit.  
In fact, the object appeared to be to make a loss. Justice Corbett interpreted the 
provisions of section 23(g) to require profits from the taxpayer, in order to 
disallow substantial deductions. He equated the word “trade” with “profit” so 
that failing to demonstrate a profit motive indicated that the taxpayer was not 
trading and hence he could not claim a deduction. 
 
The absence of profit is frowned upon by the authorities, yet the lack of the 
profit motive is not automatically decisive. Contrary to Justice Corbett’s 
decision, it is not a requirement of the general deduction formula that a 
taxpayer should achieve a profit in order to claim a deduction. 
 
6.7.3 The close connection between the expenses incurred and the relevant 
income earning activities 
 
In delivering the judgments of the Standard Bank and Nemojim cases (supra), 
Justice Corbett pointed out the importance of the purpose of the expenditure 
concerned and the closeness of its connection with the relevant income-
earning operations (or exempt income received) when applying the general 
deduction formula (section 11(a) read with section 23(f) and (g)) of the Act). 
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This principle, introduced by Justice Corbett, has been applied and followed in 
subsequent court cases187.  
 
6.7.4 Expenses determined after year end 
 
In Edgars Stores and Golden Dumps the question of when an incurral of an 
expense arises, was addressed.  
 
If the outcome of a dispute or court case is not finalised during the course of a 
financial year, then it is a contingent liability for accounting purposes for that 
year and it is not deductible for tax purposes as no liability has been 
established. This principle in relation to legal disputes was introduced by 
Justice Corbett in the Golden Dumps case. 
 
The Edgars Stores case, however, was an unfortunate case against the 
taxpayer. Justice Corbett found in a majority decision that the deduction for 
turnover rental could not be calculated before the end of the fiscal year as the 
turnover figure was finalised after the end of the fiscal year. The court decided 
that the contingency was not fulfilled and thus the deduction of the turnover 
rental was not allowed in that year of assessment. It is submitted that the 
expense did accrue during the year of assessment, but if it is not possible for 
the taxpayer to calculate the turnover within the time limits before submission 
is due, then a reasonable estimate can be calculated and should be allowed by 
the Commissioner. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
187 See ITC 1603, 58 SATC 212 and CIR v Ticktin Timbers, 59 SATC 60 as 
discussed in #6.4.1 
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CHAPTER 7   SPECIAL DEDUCTIONS – CAPITAL ALLOWANCES 
   AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION: CAPITAL ALLOWANCES AND FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE LOSSES 
 
Section 12A to D of the Income Tax Act provides for capital allowances on 
certain qualifying plant and machinery.  The following are the relevant 
provisions of section 12C which will be discussed further:  
 
“…in respect of machinery or plant …and is used by him directly in a 
process of manufacture … or any other process carried on by him 
which in the opinion of the Commissioner is of a similar nature.”  
 
Justice Corbett clarified the definition of “plant” and “process of 
manufacture” in two cases, namely: Safranmark188 and Blue Circle Cement189. 
These two cases are analysed and discussed in this chapter. The definition of 
“a process of manufacture” was later extended in the Act to include processes 
of  “a similar nature”.  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
188 1982, (1) SA 113 (A), 43 SATC 235 
189 1984, (2) SA 764 (A), 46 SATC 21 
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Justice Corbett’s judgement in CIR v Felix Schuh190, on foreign exchange 
losses, is analysed in part 7.4 of this chapter. 
 
7.2  DEFINITION OF  A “PROCESS OF MANUFACTURE” 
 
Justice Corbett rendered a dissenting judgment in Secretary for Inland 
Revenue v Safranmark (Pty) Ltd191. The panel of judges split 3:2 in coming to 
a decision on the meaning of “a process of manufacture”.  
 
The taxpayer claimed a deduction for a “machinery initial allowance” and 
“machinery investment allowance” respectively in terms of the provisions of 
section 12(1) and 12(2) of the Act (as they then were) for each of the tax years 
ended 31 May 1974, 1975 and 1976. The taxpayer was the holder of a 
franchise issued by Kentucky Fried Chicken (Pty) Ltd to prepare and sell 
”Kentucky Fried Chicken” in a manner prescribed by the holding company. 
 
The Secretary disallowed all the section 12 capital allowances that had been 
claimed. Evidence given before the Special Court detailed the procedure that 
had been followed and the machinery and plant that had been used by the 
taxpayer (as well as by all other like franchise holders) from the receipt of the 
raw product (pieces of chicken) up to the sale of the finished product (namely 
‘Kentucky Fried Chicken’) to the customer. All the holders of this franchise 
received chicken pieces from a single supplier. The chicken reached the 
taxpayer (and all the other franchise holders) in polythene bags, each of which 
____________________________________________________________________ 
190 1994, 56 SATC 57  
191 1982 (1) SA 113(A), 43 SATC 235 
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contained eighteen pieces of chicken comprising identical cuts from two birds 
of specified weight. 
 
The pots that were used were “special patented Kentucky Fried Chicken pots”.  
Each held exactly five litres of shortening (a vegetable oil) and eighteen pieces 
of chicken (two birds) and built up pressure of 15 lbs per square inch. Any 
fried chicken that was not sold within two hours of its removal from the pot 
was discarded. 
 
Galgut AJA, in the majority judgement, found the taxpayer’s operations to 
constitute a process of manufacture. 
 
Corbett JA, in his dissenting minority judgement, stated his position as 
follows:  
 
“Although cooked chicken differs from raw chicken both chemically 
and in utility, and despite the additives (milk-and-egg dip and 
breading mix), the taxpayer’s operation – notwithstanding its wide 
scope – basically consists of cooking pieces of chicken for the purpose 
of sale to the public.” 
 
He found that the cooking of raw chicken was not “a process of manufacture”. 
 
Jansen JA, Miller JA and Holmes AJA, disagreed with Corbett JA and 
concurred in the majority judgment of Galgut AJA.  
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7.2.1 Application of the Safranmark definition  (“process of manufacture”) 
 
Both the minority and majority judgements in Safranmark were discussed in 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd192. The 
court was obliged to and did apply the majority judgement. The taxpayer had 
claimed “machinery initial and investment allowances” on its wine-making 
equipment. The court held that the taxpayer engaged in a “process of 
manufacture” and was therefore entitled to the above-mentioned allowances. 
 
The court had to consider the proposition of whether a particular activity is a 
“process of manufacture” is a question of law or of fact and concluded that it 
is a question of fact. In considering this proposition, the court relied on the 
dicta of Williamson JA in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Hersamar193 and 
Galgut AJA in Safranmark. In the Safranmark case, Galgut AJA cited with 
approval the following dicta of Grosskopf J in the court a quo in that case: 
 
“The expression ‘a process of manufacture’ is not a term of art. ...In 
the present case it seems relevant to me that a standardised product is 
produced on a large scale by a continuous process utilising human 
effort and specialised equipment in an organised manner. When to that 
is added the factor that the end product is, in terms of its nature, utility 
and value, essentially different from its main component, the process 
must, it seems to me, be described as one of manufacture.” 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
192 1988 (CPD), 51 SATC 81 
193 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Hersamar (Pty) Ltd, 1967 (3) SA 177(A), 29 
SATC 53 at 186 
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Safranmark was referred to, discussed and applied in ITC 1465194. The 
taxpayer’s factory dyed yarn, which process was found to be “a process of 
manufacture” as the yarn had in fact  become a different product, physically 
and chemically, from the raw yarn.  
 
Justice Friedman referred to Justice Corbett’s dictum in Safranmark195, 
namely, that the process “basically consists of cooking pieces of chicken”. 
Corbett JA had summarised succinctly the following general propositions that 
could be derived from the decisions: 
 
 “(1) The term ‘process of manufacture’, in the present context, 
denotes an action or series of actions directed to the production of an 
object or thing which is essentially different from the materials or 
components which went into its making. 
 
 (2) The requirement of ‘essential difference’ necessarily 
imports an element of degree. This should be decided on the facts of 
each individual case. 
 
 (3) When deciding whether a particular activity does or does 
not fall within the ambit of a ‘process of manufacture’, the ordinary 
meaning of that phrase in the English language should also be taken 
into account.”  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
194 1989 (C), 52 SATC 1 
195 1982 (1) SA 113 (A), 43 SATC 235 
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Justice Friedman continued by comparing Safranmark to ITC 1465.  He said 
that to analyse and extract general criteria or attributes from a process or 
operation, which amounts to a process of manufacture, and to conclude that 
another process to which the same general criteria apply or which exhibits 
similar general attributes is, therefore, also a process of manufacture, may lead 
to results not intended by the legislature. 
 
Justice Friedman said that although the Kentucky Fried Chicken produced by 
the taxpayer in Safranmark, remained chicken, the Appellate Division, by a 
majority of four to one, held that the process to which the raw chicken was 
subjected, resulted in a new and distinctive product. In the case concerned, the 
end product produced by the processes involving the use of the plant and 
machinery at the taxpayer’s factory, was in fact a different product. 
 
In ITC 1575196, the taxpayer, a manufacturer, distributor and lessor of 
scaffolding and formwork, sought to deduct from its income a “machinery 
investment allowance” in respect of scaffolding and formwork leased to 
construction companies in terms of section 12(2) of the Act. The taxpayer 
contended that it was entitled to a deduction in terms of section 12(2) as the 
lessees used the leased equipment in a process of manufacture. The onus was 
on the taxpayer to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the plant used by 
the lessees was used “directly in a process of manufacture”. The court found 
in favour of the taxpayer relying on the dictum of Galgut AJA in the 
Safranmark’s case (the majority decision): 
(a) that specialised plant and machinery were used; 
____________________________________________________________________ 
196 1989 (T), 56 SATC 203 
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(b) that the method of using the plant and machinery was 
standardised; 
 (c) that human effort and labour were used; 
(d) that the volume of production was based on anticipated 
demand; 
 (e) that the volume of production was large; 
( f ) that the end product was different from the materials from 
which it was produced, not only in nature but also in utility and 
value in that the ingredients of the milk and egg mixture and of 
the breading mixture had ceased to exist and the inedible raw 
chicken had become an edible product; 
(g) that all the above was done for the purpose of Safranmark’s 
trade. 
 
In another case, Automated Business Systems v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue197, the taxpayer contended that the process utilised by the lessees of 
the plant of the taxpayer, had all the features which were deemed sufficient in 
Safranmark (the majority decision) to find that it constitutes a process of 
manufacture. The taxpayer company, Automated Business Systems, operated a 
computer service bureau offering a wide range of services in the electronic 
data processing field and also developed computer programmes and provided 
related documentation handling facilities. The taxpayer acquired two data 
capturing systems ("the machines"). They did not print the background to the 
statements (the blank statements) but the information thereon. The operations 
of the appellant company were conducted on a large scale. Its output was 50 
____________________________________________________________________ 
197 1986 (2) SA 645(T), 48 SATC 41  
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million lines of print per month or the equivalent of 125 million pages. The 
activities of the appellant were spread over an area of eight large rooms. 
 
The court held against the taxpayer, based on the majority decision in 
Safranmark. The court found that two important features mentioned in the 
Safranmark case to consider in determining whether there has been a process 
of manufacture are: 
• whether there is a substantial or essential change in the character of the 
material from which the alleged manufactured articles are made of, 
also 
• whether it can be said that the operations produce a standardised 
product.  
 
It is submitted that the Safranmark majority decision included too wide a 
range of activities into the definition of a “process of manufacture”. This was 
illustrated in the Automated Business Systems case. In this case the activities 
were similar to the requirements described in the Safranmark case, yet the 
court ruled it not to be a process of manufacture. 
 
7.2.2 Conclusion on Safranmark 
 
The majority judgement of Galgut AJA in the Safranmark case was applied in 
the Stellenbosch Farmer’s Winery, ITC1575 and Automated Business 
Machines cases (supra). Justice Corbett’s minority judgement, however, was 
also referred to in those cases but was not applied since it was deemed to be 
too strict an interpretation of a section of the Act that is meant to provide an 
incentive for all forms of manufacturing. Yet, despite the wide interpretation 
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of the word “manufacturing” in the Safranmark case by the majority 
judgement of Justice Galgut, the process in the Automated Business Systems 
case was found not to constitute a process of manufacture. 
 
Section 12 was later amended by the legislature to include a “similar process” 
so that a wider range of business activities could benefit from this tax 
incentive. 
 
 
7.3  DEFINITION OF “PLANT” 
  
In Blue Circle Cement Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue198, the majority 
of the panel of judges supported Justice Corbett’s judgement, in contrast to 
what had occurred in Safranmark. In its factory, the taxpayer manufactured 
cement, which has limestone as its basic raw material. The taxpayer had 
established a new limestone quarry and crushing plant at Springbokpan. 
During the 1975 tax year, the taxpayer completed and began to use an 
extension of the railway line as far as Springbokpan. The length of this 
extension was some 41 kilometres and it was constructed at a cost of 
R2 047 699. The decision to construct the extended railway line was taken 
after careful consideration of possible alternatives and the rejection of these 
alternatives on economic grounds. The limestone that was extracted was 
conveyed on the railway line in issue to the taxpayer’s factory. In its return of 
income for the 1975 tax year, the taxpayer claimed the deduction of a 
machinery initial allowance and a machinery investment allowance (25 per 
____________________________________________________________________ 
198 1984 (2) SA 764(A), 46 SATC 21 
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cent and 30 per cent respectively) in terms of section 12 of the Act. According 
to the section (as it then was), the aforementioned allowances were claimable 
  
“in respect of new or unused machinery or plant which is brought into 
use by any taxpayer for the purposes of his trade . . . and is used by 
him directly in a process of manufacture carried on by him”. 
 
The Special Court dismissed the appeal, holding that “the railway line is not 
used directly in the manufacturing process”. 
 
Counsel for the taxpayer conceded before the Appellate Division that the 
railway line in issue was not “machinery”, but, relying upon dictionary 
definitions and various decisions of English courts in similar contexts, 
submitted that, on the facts, the said railway line was “plant” within the 
meaning of section 12 of the Act. 
 
Counsel for the Commissioner submitted somewhat tentatively, that “plant” 
should be accorded a restrictive meaning that approximates ‘machinery’.  
Counsel relied primarily on the submission that, because of its length and the 
distance between the works at Springbokpan and the factory at L, the railway 
line in issue could not be regarded as being “plant”. 
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The court held that the railway line in issue was “plant” within the meaning of 
section 12 of the Act and that the taxpayer was therefore entitled to the 
allowances claimed.199 
 
To explain the court’s decision, Corbett JA stated the following200: 
 
“The railway line, though needing periodic maintenance and repair, is 
durable and is intended to last the life of the limestone deposits at 
Springbokpan. In my opinion, it has all the characteristics of plant. 
…The line is used solely for the purpose of conveying crushed 
limestone from Springbokpan to the factory. The line is like a very long 
conveyor belt leading from the crushing plant to the factory.” 
 
“…For these reasons I am of the view that, contrary to the finding of 
the Special Court, the railway line constructed by taxpayer did 
____________________________________________________________________ 
199 Justice Corbett referred to certain English cases that dealt with the provisions of 
the English fiscal legislation, which authorised allowances to be made in respect of 
capital expenditure incurred by a person carrying on a trade.  
 
The starting point in all English cases was the famous dictum of Lindley LJ in 
Yarmouth v France(1887) 19 QBD 647 in which the judge said the following in 
regard to the meaning of the word ‘plant’: “There is no definition of plant in the Act: 
but, in its ordinary sense, it includes whatever apparatus is used by a businessman for 
carrying on his business – not his stock-in-trade which he buys or makes for sale; but 
all goods and chattels, fixed or movable, live or dead, which he keeps for permanent 
employment in his business.” 
200 At p 32 of 46 SATC 21 
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constitute ‘plant’ within the meaning of that term in sections 12(1) and 
12(2).” 
 
Having referred to these definitions, Corbett JA in the Blue Circle judgement 
went on to state that201: 
 
“The enquiry is thus whether the items alleged to be ‘plant’ constituted 
fixtures, implements, machinery or apparatus used in carrying on any 
industrial process.” 
 
Corbett JA referred to two tests that had been laid down in the English cases. 
The first of these was the so-called “functional test” and the second was what 
could be described as the “durability test”. The functional test provides the 
criterion to be applied in respect of whether the subject matter is the apparatus 
or part of the apparatus that is employed in carrying on the activities of the 
taxpayer’s business. If it is, then it is plant.  If it is not, then, despite whatever 
other characteristics it may have, it is not plant. 
 
Corbett JA stated the durability test as follows: 
“In addition, it has been held that the word ‘plant’ connotes some 
degree of durability and would not include articles which are quickly 
consumed or worn out in the course of a few operations.”  
 
For this purpose the learned judge referred to the case of Hinton (Inspector of 
Taxes) v Maden & Ireland, Limited.202  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
201 At p 32 of 46 SATC 21 
202 [1959] 3 All ER 356(HL). 
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Corbett JA ended his discussion of the meaning of the word “plant” by saying: 
 
“Of course, ultimately each case must be decided by a careful 
consideration of its own particular facts and by a common sense 
approach to what subject-matter can, and what subject-matter cannot, 
properly be classified as ‘plant’. “ 
 
7.3.1  Application of the definition of “plant” as espoused in the Blue Circle case  
 
The definition of “plant” as applied in Blue Circle was cited in ITC 1447203.  
In that case, a co-operative society claimed the deduction of a special 
machinery allowance on the construction costs of access lines and sidings that 
connect silos with the railway lines to enable agricultural products in the silos 
to be loaded directly onto trucks.  
 
The court held that the Blue Circle and other decisions, on which the taxpayer 
relied, were not applicable in the case and that the ‘integral whole’, ‘part and 
parcel’ or ‘functional’ criteria enunciated in those cases had no application in 
the present case.  The taxpayer was therefore not entitled to the allowances 
claimed. 
 
In ITC 1468204, the taxpayer, a shoe manufacturer that used cutting knives and 
lasts in its production processes, claimed a manufacturing investment 
allowance that was based on the assumption that it was a manufacturer. It was 
held that, while each case should ultimately be decided on its own facts, the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
203 51 SATC 53 at 56-57 
204 1989 (C), 52 SATC 32 at 35 & 38 
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general approach to the use of functional and durability tests in an enquiry by 
the English courts, and which had been referred to in Blue Circle Cement 
Limited v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, may usefully be applied in the 
interpretation of “plant” as used in section 12 of the Act. The court also found 
that, for the purposes of section 12(2)(c), the cutting knives and lasts should 
accordingly be treated as “plant”.  
 
In ITC 1469205, a printing and packaging firm which used small capital items 
in its printing presses and cutting and creasing dies, claimed a machinery 
allowance. It was held that the definition of “plant” that had been given by 
Lindley LJ in Yarmouth v France206 and approved in Blue Circle Cement 
Limited207 should be applied, that is, “plant” includes “whatever apparatus is 
used by a businessman for carrying on his business, not his stock-in-trade … 
that he keeps for permanent employment in his business”. On this basis the 
court held that the printing presses were “plant” and approved the machinery 
allowance. 
 
In ITC 1479208, the court had to decide what constitutes a “process of 
manufacture”. In particular, the court had to decide whether the site 
manufacture and the erection of transmission line towers, including the laying 
____________________________________________________________________ 
205 1989 (C), 52 SATC 40 at 43-4 & 45 
206 (1887) 19 QBD 647 at 658 
207 1984(2) SA 764(A), 46 SATC 21 
208 1989 (T), 52 SATC 264 at 273-4 
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of foundations and the site stringing operations, constituted a “process of 
manufacture” within the meaning of section 12(2)(c) of the Act. 
 
Justice Melamet relied on the dicta in Blue Circle Cement (supra): 
 
”As the facts show the process of manufacture commences at the 
[taxpayer’s] works at Springbokpan, where the limestone is quarried, 
crushed. The next stages of the manufacturing process are necessarily 
performed at taxpayer’s factory in Lichtenburg, some forty odd 
kilometres away. Obviously this circumstance compels the [ taxpayer] 
to provide some form of conveyance for the crushed limestone from 
Springbokpan to Lichtenburg. …The function performed by the 
railway line is, in my opinion, part and parcel of the taxpayer’s 
industrial process and I can see no reason why the railway line should 
not be regarded as apparatus used in carrying on the industrial 
process of manufacturing cement.” 
 
The court was therefore of the opinion that the process of manufacturing a 
tower continued until such time as the tower was completed and laid out in a 
horizontal position at the site where it was to be erected. The plant and 
machinery that were used at the site to complete the fabrication of the tower to 
the stage at which it was laid out on the ground in a horizontal position were 
therefore used in a process of manufacture and the taxpayer was entitled to the 
relevant deduction provided for in section 12(2) of the Income Tax Act. 
 
7.3.2 The definition of “plant” in the United Kingdom 
 
Justice Corbett made several references to English law in the Blue Circle case. 
He based his definition of “plant” on cases in the United Kingdom as there 
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were no cases to refer to in South Africa. Income tax legislation in the United 
Kingdom, like South Africa, does not define a “process of manufacture” for 
the purposes of claiming capital allowances. Case law, however, endeavours to 
define the meaning of “plant”.  One of the best known statements concerning 
the meaning of “plant” in the United Kingdom is that of Lindley L.J. in 
Yarmouth v. France209, namely: 
 
"…in its ordinary sense, it includes whatever apparatus is used by 
a businessman for carrying on his business, - not his stock-in-trade 
which he buys or makes for sale; but all goods and chattels, fixed 
or movable, live or dead, which he keeps for permanent 
employment in his business.". 
 
The above-mentioned test led Lindley L.J., in common with the other 
members of the court, to hold that a cart-horse belonging to the defendant was 
"plant" within the meaning of section 1 of the Employers' Liability Act, 1880. 
However, in London and Eastern Counties Loan and Discount Co. v. 
Creasey210 cab-horses were held not to be "plant" within the meaning of 
section 6 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882. The reason for this finding was that in 
the latter statute the word "plant" appeared in a context that required the 
conclusion that it should be read in a restricted sense. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
209 Yarmouth v. France (1887) 19 QBD 647 
210 London and Eastern Counties Loan and Discount Co. v. Creasey (1897) 1 QB 442 
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According to Lord Donovan in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Barclay, 
Curle & Co Ltd 211 there are three main submissions regarding the meaning of 
the word “plant”.  Firstly, the fact that the object concerned is a structure or 
forms part of a structure which is not itself plant, does not exclude the 
possibility of the object being considered to be plant.  Secondly, the question 
to be answered is whether the object concerned is something “with” which the 
taxpayer carries on his business rather than something “in” which he carries on 
his business. Thirdly, if there is a test to determine whether an object is plant, 
the test is what has been described as "the functional test" as applied in Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v Barclay, Curle & Co Ltd, (supra)212 in which Lord 
Donovan stated that:  
 
“Some plant may perform its function passively and not actively.” 
 
In this case the taxpayer company carried on the trade of a shipbuilder, 
repairer and engineer. Between 1962 and 1965, the taxpayer had constructed a 
dry dock and claimed the full cost of excavation and construction as plant for 
the purpose of a capital allowance. The taxpayer contended that the dock was 
subject to wear and tear, but, if it were properly maintained, it might last some 
80 to 100 years. The Crown contended that each item had to be considered 
separately in order to determine whether it was plant or machinery. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
211 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Barclay, Curle & Co Ltd [1969] 1 All ER 732 
212 at p 691 
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The court held that both items of expenditure, excavation and construction, 
were incurred on the provision of plant or machinery. Lord Guthrie remarked:  
 
“In deciding whether expenditure qualifies for capital allowances the 
crucial question is the object of the expenditure.” 
 
In Jarrold v John Good & Sons Ltd213, the taxpayer claimed initial allowances 
in respect of expenditure incurred in connection with the installation of 
moveable partitions that had been installed by shipping agents to satisfy the 
taxpayer’s fluctuating accommodation requirements. It was held that the 
partitioning was plant. It was pointed out that “…the setting in which the 
business is carried on and the apparatus used for carrying on that business 
are not necessarily exclusive”.  
 
7.3.3 The definition of “plant” in Australia 
 
At the time when the Blue Circle case was decided, Australian judgements 
were also available as to how that county interpreted the meaning of “plant”.  
 
In Carpentaria Transport (Pty) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation214, 
the objection that was lodged, claimed that certain roller shutter doors were 
plant or articles for the purposes of section 54 of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936 and were also the subject of an investment allowance in terms of 
____________________________________________________________________ 
213 Jarrold v John Good & Sons Ltd [1962] 2 All ER 971 
214 Carpentaria Transport (Pty) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 21 
ATR 513; 90 ATC 4590). 
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section 82AA of their Act.  The tribunal concluded that the roller shutter doors 
were not plant, but that they formed an integral part of a building structure, 
which was not plant. The tribunal held that the roller doors formed a part of 
the setting in which the warehouse operation was conducted.  The tribunal 
referred to Quarries Ltd v FCT215 as the authority on the issue. The taxpayer 
claimed investment allowances on the sleeping units that provided 
accommodation for employees while they were engaged in operations. The 
court found that the “structural improvements”, which provide 
accommodation for employees, cannot be regarded as "plant" and therefore the 
term cannot accommodate the sleeping units in question.  
In Macquarie Worsteds Pty Ltd v FCT216, the taxpayer submitted that the 
ceiling of a building constituted plant for the purposes of claiming an 
allowance. The court decided that the ceiling appeared to perform no other 
function, in relation to the taxpayer's operations, than would be performed by 
any normal ceiling. In this regard Mahoney J stated:  
 
“I do not think that the fact that the nature of the taxpayer's operations 
makes it expedient that the building has a ceiling means that the 
ceiling is part of the plant with which the operations are conducted.”  
 
The definition of “plant” in Australia was in line with Justice Corbett’s 
definition at the time as they had also applied the “functional test” and the 
“durability test” derived from English tax law. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
215 (1961) 106 CLR 310; 8 AITR 383 
216 Macquarie Worsteds Pty Ltd v FCT (1974) 4 ATR 334; 74 ATC 4121 
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7.3.4 Conclusion on the definition of “plant” and “a process of manufature” 
 
The wording of section 12 of the Act was changed to include “a process of 
manufacturing or a similar process” as a result of the narrow definition 
provided by Justice Corbett in the Safranmark case. In Stellenbosch Farmer’s 
Winery it was stated that the intention of Parliament was to provide a tax 
incentive for investment in plant and equipment used in a manufacturing 
process and the initiative was to be applied as widely as possible, since capital 
allowances are intended to be incentives in the context of the economy.  Very 
rigid and stringent rules regarding these allowances may be counterproductive 
for the achievement of the purpose for which the incentives were introduced 
into the Act.  
 
In CIR v Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd (supra), the view was expressed 
that the word “manufacturing” — and, presumably, by implication, the words 
”process of manufacture” — should be given a wide meaning in order to 
promote the aims of the legislature in attaching industrial concessions to the 
tax law. 
 
The “general propositions” that may be derived from many of the cases that 
have been referred to were summarized by Corbett JA, in his judgement in SIR 
v Safranmark (Pty) Ltd. These general propositions are: 
(1) The term “process of manufacture’’, denotes an action or series 
of actions that are directed at the production of an object which 
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is essentially different from the materials or components that 
went into its making. 
(2) The requirement of “essential difference” necessarily imports 
an element of degree and should be decided on the grounds of 
the facts of each case. 
(3) The ordinary, natural meaning of that phrase in the English 
language should be taken into account. 
 
The decisions in the United Kingdom and Australia, generally accepted that a 
capital allowance is an incentive that governments devise to promote 
manufacturing (in all of its forms) by means of tax incentives. This may be the 
reason why courts and revenue authorities have been more lenient in granting 
capital allowances to taxpayers when considering the issue of “plant” and “the 
process of manufacturing or similar process” rather than in other areas of tax 
law. Virtually all forms of manufacturing and its associated plant are allowed 
for this purpose. It appears as if Justice Corbett overlooked the incentive 
programme for manufacturing. His formative approach in the Safranmark case 
appears to be rigid, in comparison with the majority judgement.  
 
In Australia some taxpayers tried to take advantage of this incentive and their 
claims were disallowed, as indicated in Carpentaria Transport (Pty) Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Quarries Ltd v FCT and Macquarie 
Worsteds Pty Ltd v FCT. It became necessary for the legislator to define in 
precise terms the wording of section 12 in order to curb the abuse of tax 
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incentives, such as claiming initial allowances on ceilings as happened in the 
Macquarie Worsted case (supra). 
  
7.4  THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES 
 
  Justice Corbett delivered the majority judgement on the deductibility of 
unrealised foreign exchange losses in Commissioner For Inland Revenue v 
Felix Schuh (SA) (Pty) Ltd217: In 1983, the taxpayer received the proceeds of a 
loan in Deutschmark. The loan was repayable in Deutschmark (“DM”). 
During 1983, the value of the rand against the DM declined substantially. The 
indebtedness of the taxpayer increased accordingly. The taxpayer claimed the 
increase in the loan as a deductible loss in its income tax return for the 1983 
tax year.  The Commissioner for Inland Revenue apparently allowed the 
deduction of this loss in the assessment of the taxpayer’s taxable income for 
that tax year. 
 
During the 1984 tax year, another loan was granted to the taxpayer by its 
holding company and this loan was also payable in DM. The value of the rand 
continued to decline against the DM. In its income tax return for the 1985 tax 
year, the taxpayer again claimed the foreign exchange loss as a deduction 
against its taxable income, but the Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
disallowed the deduction. The taxpayer’s main submission was that the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
217  1994 (A), 56 SATC 57 
 166
deduction of the foreign exchange loss that it had claimed was justified on the 
authority of the Caltex case218.  
 
Corbett CJ held that the loss would only be deductible in the year of 
repayment, because only then would such a loss have actually been incurred. 
The foreign exchange loss that the taxpayer claimed as a deduction under 
section 11(a) was not a loss “actually incurred . . . in the production of the 
income.” Accordingly, the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct the loss as being 
an “unrealized loss” that resulted from exchange rate variations.  
 
7.4.1 Conclusion on the treatment of foreign exchange losses: 
 
The principle that unrealised foreign exchange losses are not deductible is not 
part of the South Africa’s tax law anymore. Section 24I on the taxability of 
foreign exchange profits and losses, was introduced after the Felix Shuh case. 
“Actually incurred” according to section 11(a) is not the only criteria 
applicable to foreign exchange transactions. Section 24I now has to be applied 
to foreign exchange transactions. According to section 24I, foreign exchange 
profits and losses, realised and unrealised, are taxable or deductible. The 
inclusion of this principle in the Act is different to the outcome of the Schuh 
case. The outcome of the Felix Shuh case has thus been overruled by 
subsequent legislation. 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
218 Caltex Oil(SA) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue, 1975(1) SA 665(A) 
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7.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Process of manufacture 
 
Justice Corbett’s minority judgement in the Safranmark case is considered to 
be too strict an interpretation of a section of the Act that is meant to provide an 
incentive for all forms of manufacturing and although referred to in 
subsequent cases, was never applied. 
 
On the other hand the Safranmark majority decision has always been applied 
although, it is submitted, it includes too wide a range of activities in the 
definition of a “process of manufacture”. The problem has been settled by the 
legislature with an amendment to section 12 to include a “similar process” to 
“a process of manufacture”, so that a wider range of business activities could 
benefit from this tax incentive. 
 
Definition of “plant” 
 
Justice Corbett’s definition of “plant” in Blue Circle Cement has been 
followed in subsequent cases. He referred to two tests that had been laid down 
in the English cases. The first of these was the so-called “functional test” and 
the second was what could be described as the “durability test”. The functional 
test provides the criterion to be applied in respect of whether the subject 
matter is the apparatus or part of the apparatus that is employed in carrying on 
the activities of the taxpayer’s business. If it is, then it is plant.  If it is not, 
then, despite whatever other characteristics it may have, it is not plant. 
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The durability test implies that the word ‘plant’ connotes some degree of 
durability and would not include articles which are quickly consumed or 
worn out in the course of a few operations.  
 
Foreign exchange losses 
 
Justice Corbett held in the Felix Shuh case (supra) that the loss would only be 
deductible in the year of repayment, because only then would such a loss have 
actually been incurred. The foreign exchange loss that the taxpayer claimed as 
a deduction under section 11(a) was not a loss “actually incurred . . . in the 
production of the income.” Accordingly, the taxpayer was not entitled to 
deduct the loss as being an “unrealized loss” that resulted from exchange rate 
variations.  
 
Section 24I which deals with the taxability of foreign exchange profits and 
losses, was introduced after the decision in the Felix Shuh case. Section 24I 
applies to all foreign exchange transactions. In terms of section 24I, all foreign 
exchange profits and losses, realised and unrealised, are now taxable or 
deductible. 
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CHAPTER 8   THE HIERARCHY OF DOUBLE TAX 
 AGREEMENTS IN RELATION TO THE 
 INCOME TAX ACT  
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
For many years, South Africa has had double tax agreements (“DTAs”) or tax 
treaties with other countries. Some DTAs were in operation before 1962, when 
the new Income Tax Act was promulgated, but after 1994 many more such 
agreements have been entered into. 
  
In the case described below, the Commissioner appeared to be under the 
impression that the double tax agreement in question had a lower status than 
that of the Income Tax Act or that it was not compliant with the Act. Justice 
Corbett pointed out that, in terms of section 108 of the Income Tax Act, DTAs 
are part of the Act and in fact overrule domestic legislation.  
 
In the United Kingdom changes to legislation were introduced to combat the 
avoidance of tax by using DTAs between the United Kingdom and tax havens. 
Unlike the UK legislation, there are no sections in the South African Income 
Tax Act that override the articles of any DTA. 
 
 
 
 
 170
8.2 A DOUBLE TAX AGREEMENT IS PART OF THE INCOME TAX 
ACT. 
 
In Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing, 1975 (A), 37 SATC 249, the 
court was asked to determine whether a DTA overrides the Income Tax Act. 
In 1960, the taxpayer, who had previously been resident and domiciled in 
South Africa, went to live in Switzerland on a permanent basis. When he 
departed from South Africa in 1960, he delegated his authority to S (with 
whom he had had dealings since 1948) to manage his portfolio with the 
objective of yielding the greatest possible income for the taxpayer to enjoy in 
Switzerland. 
 
P held the taxpayer’s power of attorney, retained custody of his shares, 
collected his dividends and kept his accounts. Pursuant to his mandate, S sold 
and purchased shares on the taxpayer’s behalf.  He did not consult with the 
taxpayer in advance, but merely informed him and P of each transaction after 
it had been concluded. Article 3(1) of the Double Tax Agreement between 
South Africa and Switzerland stated the following:  
 
“The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable 
only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other 
Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein 
. . .” 
 
The term “permanent establishment” is defined comprehensively in article 5 
of the DTA. Paragraph 5 of article 5 reads as follows: 
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“An enterprise of a Contracting State shall not be deemed to have a 
permanent establishment in the other Contracting State merely 
because it carries on business in that other state through a broker, 
general commission agent or any other agent of an independent status, 
where such persons are acting in the ordinary course of their 
business.” 
 
Justice Corbett held that paragraph 5 of article 5 of the DTA should be 
construed to mean that, when a Swiss resident does no more than carry on 
business through a South African broker and the latter, in transacting that 
business on behalf of his Swiss principal, acts in the ordinary course of his 
business, the Swiss resident must be deemed not to have a ‘permanent 
establishment’ in South Africa. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. 
 
He also pointed out the significance of the convention between the two states 
of South Africa and Switzerland. He noted that the convention was signed on 
behalf of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and of the Swiss 
Federal Council and was notified by proclamation in South Africa, in terms of 
s 108(2) of the Act, on 29 September 1967. While in force it applies, in South 
Africa, to any year of assessment beginning on or after 1 March 1965. The 
effect of the proclamation is that, as long as the convention is in operation, its 
provisions have effect as if enacted in terms of section 108(2) of the Act. The 
terms of the convention are based upon a model convention contained in the 
1963 report of the fiscal committee of the Organization for European 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This model has served as 
the basis for the veritable network of double taxation conventions existing 
between this country and other countries.  
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The articles of the convention will override the sections of the South African 
Income Tax Act. This interpretation by Justice Corbett was applied and 
followed in several subsequent court cases. 
  
8.2.1 Application of the Downing case 
 
In ITC 1544219, reference was made to the judgement in the Downing case. 
ITC 1544 concerned the question of whether a non-South African company 
was justified in claiming a refund of non-residents shareholder’s tax on the 
grounds that the imposition of such a tax contravenes the non-discrimination 
clause, that is, article 25(1), contained in the DTA that had been concluded 
between the Republic of South Africa and the Netherlands. The taxpayer 
claimed a refund of NRST in terms of section 102(1) of the South African 
Income Tax Act.  
 
It was held that the taxpayer had discharged the onus of proving that NRST 
had been wrongly deducted from the dividends paid to it and that it was 
entitled to the refund of the amounts already paid over to the Commissioner. 
This decision was based on the principle established in SIR v Downing, 
namely that: 
 
“The effect of section 108(2) of the Act is to grant statutory relief in 
certain circumstances where the South African Act imposes a tax, 
where the provisions of a double-tax Convention grants an immunity 
or exemption from such tax to persons governed by the Convention. 
Tax is not payable to the extent to which an immunity or exemption 
____________________________________________________________________ 
219 ITC 1544 (1992), 54 SATC 456   
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from tax is granted in terms of a binding double tax Convention which 
has been proclaimed and thus has statutory effect.” 
 
8.3  Conclusion     
 
Double Tax Agreements form part of the Income Tax Act. Section 108(2) of 
the Act states that: 
 
 “… after the approval by Parliament of any such agreement…and the 
arrangements so notified shall thereupon have effect as if enacted in 
this Act.” 
 
In the Downing case (supra) Justice Corbett concluded that a double tax 
agreement is signed on behalf of the governments of the Republic of South 
Africa and the other country. In South Africa it is ratified by proclamation in 
terms of section 108(2) of the Act. The effect of the proclamation, according 
to Justice Corbett, is that as long as the convention is in operation, its 
provisions, as far as they relate to immunity, exemption or relief in respect of 
income tax in the Republic, have the same effect as if they were enacted in Act 
58 of 1962 (see section 108(2)).  
 
He further stated that in South Africa, legislation intended that the status of tax 
agreements should override that of the Income Tax Act. No provision in the 
internal laws of South Africa can override a double tax agreement, unless it is 
specifically provided for in the double tax agreement. Although this rule 
generally applies to most countries, it does not apply to all countries. An 
investigation of a country’s income tax act and Constitution will reveal 
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whether the double tax agreement overrides the provisions of its income tax 
act. 
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CHAPTER 9   THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION 
AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The adoption of new principles of law from other legal systems can impact 
upon and expand our common law and this is the case even in tax matters. One 
such adaptation is the principle of legitimate expectation.  
 
The principle of legitimate expectation is the protection of an individual’s 
expectation that a particular decision will be taken by the state based on an act 
or advice from state officials. In National Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Phillips and Others220, Hefer J stated that:  
 
“The requirements for legitimacy of the expectation include the 
following:  
(i) The representation underlying the expectation must be clear, 
unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification . . . 
(ii)  The expectation must be reasonable: . . .  
(iii) The representation must have been induced by the decision-maker 
(iv) The representation must be one which it was competent and lawful 
for the decision-maker to make without which the reliance cannot be 
legitimate. .”.  
____________________________________________________________________ 
220 2002 (W), 4 SA 60 at p 28 
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In 1989, in the Traub case221, Justice Corbett introduced into the South 
African legal system the principle of legitimate expectation, a principle that 
has had a far-reaching impact on the prevailing common law.  
 
9.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION.  
 
In the case of Traub, the applicants, all medical interns, stated that they had 
been offered positions at Baragwanath Hospital by the Administrator of 
Transvaal. They were employed as interns and practitioners and were given 
the impression that they would be offered full-employment contracts upon the 
completion of their internship. The Administrator then changed his mind and 
did not offer such contracts to these prospective employees. Their applications 
were rejected by a provincial director of hospital services, solely because they 
had been party to a published letter that severely criticised the Provincial 
Administration's attitude to the conditions prevailing in the Hospital. The 
director concerned considered these dissenting medical practitioners to be 
unsuitable for the post for which they had applied. The Administrator did not 
formally give them reasons for the decision, nor did he permit a hearing at 
which they could discuss the issue or voice their concerns. 
 
The court found in favour of the applicants. To “observe the principles of 
natural justice”, Corbett CJ said at 761E–H that: 
 
“The law should in such cases be made to reach out and come to the 
aid of persons prejudicially affected. At the same time, whereas the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
221 Administrator, Transvaal and others v Traub and Others, 1989, (4) SA 731 (A) 
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concepts of liberty, property and existing rights are reasonably well 
defined, that of legitimate expectation is not. Like public policy, unless 
carefully handled it could become an unruly horse. And, in working 
out, incrementally, on the facts of each case, where the principle of 
legitimate expectation applies and where it does not, the courts will, 
no doubt, bear in mind the need from time to time to apply the curb. A 
reasonable balance must be maintained between the need to protect 
the individual from decisions unfairly arrived at by public authority 
(and by certain domestic tribunals) and the contrary desirability of 
avoiding undue judicial interference in their administration.” 
 
9.3       THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION IN ENGLISH 
 LAW.  
 
The principle of legitimate expectation was initially recognized in English law 
by the renowned Lord Denning in the Schmidt222 case. The plaintiffs, all 
foreigners, were students at the Hubbard College of Scientology. They were 
granted permits for a limited sojourn in the United Kingdom for the purpose of 
full-time study at a recognised educational institution. The secretary of the 
Hubbard College applied to the Home Secretary, on behalf of the plaintiffs, for 
an extension of their sojourn to enable them to complete their studies. Before a 
reply to the applications was received, the government announced that it was 
satisfied that Scientology was socially harmful and that, although there was no 
power under the existing law to prohibit the practice of Scientology, the 
government would take steps to curb its growth. One of the steps to be taken 
was that foreign nationals who were already in the United Kingdom for the 
purpose of attending Scientology establishments would not be granted an 
____________________________________________________________________ 
222 Schmidt and Another v Secretary of State For Home Affairs, [1969] 1 All ER 904 
 
 178
extension of stay to continue their studies. In July 1968, the Home Secretary 
rejected the plaintiffs’ application for an extension of stay. The plaintiffs 
issued a writ, on behalf of themselves and fifty other foreign students of the 
Hubbard College, claiming that the Home Secretary’s decision not to consider 
any application for an extension of stay that was made on behalf of a student 
of Scientology, was unlawful and void and that he was obliged to consider 
such application on its merits and in accordance with natural justice. 
 
Lord Denning MR, held that an administrative body may, in a proper case, be 
bound to give a person who is affected by its decision, an opportunity to make 
representations. Lord Denning stated that it all depends on whether the person 
concerned has some right or interest, or some legitimate expectation, of which 
it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say. 
In his obiter dictum, Lord Denning continued by stating that the statute gave 
immigration officers complete discretion to refuse an application. They were 
under no obligation to tell the foreigner why he had been refused admission 
and were not bound to give him an opportunity to make representations. A 
foreigner does not have the right to enter the country other than by virtue of 
permission granted to him to enter for a limited period.  If he is given leave to 
enter for a limited period, he does not have the right to stay for a day longer 
than the permitted period. If his permit is revoked before the permitted period 
expires, he ought to be given an opportunity to make representations, because 
he would have a legitimate expectation of being allowed to stay for the 
permitted period.  
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9.4 APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN TAX LAW 
 
In Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v Commissioner for 
SARS223, the Commissioner obtained a search warrant against the taxpayer in 
order to determine whether there had been non-compliance by any persons 
with regard to the obligations imposed on them by the Value-Added Tax Act 
89 of 1991. VAT assessments had been issued to the taxpayer and the 
Receiver of Revenue had appointed Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd as the 
taxpayer’s agent in terms of section 47 of the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 
1991. The taxpayer applied for interim orders for the review and setting aside 
of the decision to issue notices in terms of section 47 of Act 89 of 1991. The 
taxpayer contended, with reference to the principle of legitimate expectation, 
that: 
 
(i) The principle of audi alteram partem should have been observed by 
all the decision makers who authorised the administrative action 
referred to in the notice of motion. 
(ii) As the appointment of the bank as the agent took place before the 
assessments were issued, the issue of the section 47 notice was ultra 
vires.  
(iii) The notices issued in terms of section 47 should be set aside, because 
the amounts of VAT referred to as being payable therein were in issue 
as an objection to them had been lodged. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
223 61 SATC 338, Also cited as 1999 (3) SA 1133 (WLD) 
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It was held that not all administrative acts require the application of the audi 
alteram partem principle before they are put into effect.  Furthermore, 
section 47 itself requires no prior hearing and, in addition, the requirement of a 
prior hearing would defeat the very purpose of the notice by alerting the 
defaulting VAT taxpayer and, in so doing, enabling the taxpayer to receive 
payment of the funds due and providing him with an opportunity to spirit such 
funds away.  Where prior notice and a hearing would render the proposed act 
nugatory, no such prior notice or hearing is required and, by necessary 
implication, the provisions of section 47 exclude the audi alteram partem 
principle. The application was therefore dismissed. 
 
In Carlson Investments Share Block (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for South 
African Revenue Services224, the taxpayer contended that its right to fair 
administrative action had been infringed. The alleged infringement had 
occurred in circumstances in which the Commissioner had revised an 
assessment, within the three-year period, after a decision had been taken to 
allow an objection thereto.  This action had resulted in unfairness by reason of 
the fact that taxpayers are “entitled” to rely upon the “finality” of a decision 
that allows an objection. The Commissioner had initially disallowed the 
deduction of interest that had been paid by the taxpayer in terms of 
section 11(a), but later allowed the deduction.  However, in the light of a 
(separate) decision of the Supreme Court, the Commissioner later reversed his 
decision to allow the deduction of interest. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
224 63 SATC 295 
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It was held that the taxpayer’s reliance on the principle of legitimate 
expectation was without substance as the Commissioner had an express power 
as well as an obligation to revisit a tax assessment and that this power had 
been granted to the Commissioner in the national interest. There was therefore 
no justifiable charge of an abuse of power.  
 
In COT v Astra Holdings (Private) Ltd t/a Puzey & Payne225, the Supreme 
Court of Zimbabwe overturned the decision of the court a quo, which court 
had recognised the principle of legitimate expectation in the matter.  Its 
overturning represented a major setback for Zimbabwean taxpayers who had 
hoped to rely on the principle of legitimate expectation in circumstances in 
which they have acted on the advice that was provided by the revenue 
authorities.  Malaba JA, who delivered the judgment of the court, noted that 
section 5(1)(b) of the Zimbabwean Income Tax Act imposed upon a motor 
dealer the obligation to pay the tax charged and collected on the sale value of 
a motor vehicle that he has sold to a member of the public.  The tax was 
payable by the motor dealer when the purchase price on which it was levied 
was in his possession, that is, after the sale transaction has been completed. 
On the authority of HTV Ltd v Price226, the error of law committed by the 
revenue officer who had written a letter227 to the taxpayer confirming that no 
____________________________________________________________________ 
225  66 SATC 79 
226  [1976] 1 CR 170 
227 The letter exempted all sales in foreign currency from sales tax, it stated: 
“SALES TAX: EXEMPTION FROM TAX ON GOODS BOUGHT 
USING MONEY FROM A FOREIGN SERVICE 
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tax was payable, had already brought about unfairness to the fiscus by 
depriving it of the sales tax which was due to it.  Continued maintenance of 
the status quo would have resulted in further injustice.  
 
In answering the question whether the Commissioner had bound himself to 
accept as valid the actions of the taxpayer regarding the non-payment of the 
sales tax that had been based upon the error of law, the answer would be that 
such an arrangement would be null and void ab initio as it was a bargain that 
the Commissioner could not make at law.   Condoning the action of the 
taxpayer would be tantamount to the Commissioner being in breach of his 
statutory duty to collect the tax that is due to Revenue.  It is one thing for 
Revenue to enter into an arrangement with a taxpayer on how, in the exercise 
 
                                                                                                                                            
I refer to our telephone interview on 4 May 1995 concerning the 
above mentioned subject. 
 
This is to confirm that goods or services bought using foreign funds 
(money from a foreign source) are exempt from sales tax.  
'Foreign source' in this case means: 
1 Payment using foreign bank drafts. 
2 Payment using foreign cheques. 
3 Payment using foreign credit cards 
but does not include payment in Zimbabwe cash. 
 
I hope this clarifies the issue." 
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of its managerial powers, it would collect tax, but it is another for it to seek to 
decide that a particular tax that had been imposed by Parliament is not due by 
a taxpayer, when in fact it is, and in so doing disclaim the right to the tax and 
abandon the statutory power to collect it. 
 
It is submitted that the reasoning behind Zimbabwean decision would not 
apply in South Africa, as reliance needs to be placed, in many instances, on the 
decision of an officer of the state. The Income Tax Act itself recognizes 
this228In addition section 33 of the Constitution229 read together with the 
Promotion of Administration Justice Act230 formally recognizes the legitimate 
expectation principle. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
228 In many instances the Commissioner has to exercise his discretion, for example  
• section 81(2): extension for a late objection, or  
• section 11(e): the wear and tear allowance is dependant upon what the 
Commissioner finds to be just and reasonable 
229 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996, section 33 states:  
1)    Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.  
2)    Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has 
the right to be given written reasons.  
3)    National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must  
a)    provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal;  
b)    impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and 
(2); and  
c)    promote an efficient administration. 
230 In its preamble the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, states that it 
is  
• to promote an efficient administration and good governance; and 
• create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public 
administration or in the exercise of a public power or the performance of a 
public function, by giving effect to the right to just administrative action. 
 184
9.5 THE PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act231 was introduced in 2000. The 
purpose of this Act is to streamline the interaction between government 
departments and citizens in order to ensure that the interaction is just, fair 
and reasonable. Naturally, it includes the interaction between SARS and 
taxpayers.   
 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act incorporates the principle of 
legitimate expectations into the South African law, including taxation. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
231 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
Section 3:  Procedurally fair administrative action affecting any person 
  
1) Administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or 
legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair. 
 
2) 
a) A fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each 
case. 
b) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative 
action, an administrator, subject to subsection (4), must give a person 
referred to in subsection (1)  
c) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed 
administrative action; 
d) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
e) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
f) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where  
applicable; and 
g) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5. 
 
3) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an 
administrator may, in his or her or its discretion, also give a person referred to 
in subsection (1) an opportunity to 
a. obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal representation; 
b. present and dispute information and arguments; and 
c. appear in person. 
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Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act embodies the entire 
theory of the principle of legitimate expectation. 
 
In ITC 1751232, the taxpayer company was in liquidation, but its liquidators 
had continued to collect money from persons to whom money had been 
advanced and to repay money to persons from whom the taxpayer had 
borrowed money. The Commissioner for SARS had initially raised no 
objection to the liquidation and distribution accounts in which no provision 
had been made for tax on the post-liquidation income of the taxpayer. The 
Commissioner thereafter objected on the basis that the balance of assessed loss 
should not be offset against the taxpayer’s post-liquidation income as it had 
not carried on trading after liquidation. The court held that if it were accepted 
that a liquidated company could continue to trade, then the facts regarding the 
operation of the taxpayer in each case becomes the determining factor. The 
court considered the issue of whether the taxpayer had a legitimate 
expectation, which was based upon an agreement reached between the parties. 
Furthermore, the court had to consider the Commissioner’s conduct thereafter 
until he objected to the fourteenth liquidation and distribution account, which 
assumed that the taxpayer was entitled to offset its post-liquidation income 
against the assessed loss brought forward from the date of liquidation for each 
subsequent year.  The court said that, although it was not necessary to decide 
the matter on the basis of legitimate expectation, it noted that the 
Commissioner was not entitled to simply change his mind, when there was no 
____________________________________________________________________ 
232 65 SATC 294, 2002 
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factual justification for the change, by making assumptions that could not be 
sustained after a vigorous examination of the facts before a court. 
 
9.6 CONCLUSION ON THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATION. 
 
The introduction of the principle of legitimate expectation into South African 
law by Justice Corbett was some four years prior to our new constitutional 
dispensation and is an important milestone in the development of the South 
African law.  It highlights his understanding of the law and its international 
development and his foresight in respect of the application and 
implementation of legal principles. 
 
Taxpayers now have more rights in respect of their ability to put forward 
representations or to be heard before SARS takes a major decision. “To be 
heard”, or the audi alteram partem principle, has always existed in South 
African law. The principle of justifiable expectation extends and gives greater 
meaning to the audi alteram partem principle in the sense that, in certain 
circumstances, a person’s right to be heard cannot be taken away by statutory 
means.  
 
9.7 THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
 
Whereas Justice Corbett’s formative approach was his attempt to determine 
and apply what Parliament wanted to accomplish by means of the Act, the 
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa233 (“new Constitution”), provides 
a new perspective to the way in which judgements are given in the High Court 
and the Constitutional Court. The courts have to consider the effect on 
taxpayers’ rights.  
 
Shortly after the new Constitution came into effect in 1996 (the 1996 Act 
embodies the principles of the 1993 Interim Constitution234), the validity of 
Acts, or parts thereof, were questioned in several court cases where allegations 
were made of the contravention of the Constitution. An Act is invalid if it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution235 and many Acts and sections of Acts have 
been repealed or amended to comply with the Constitution. The Constitution is 
supreme and no Act may contravene it236.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, Chief Justice Corbett was instrumental in the 
initiation and implementation of the new Constitution. Unfortunately he 
retired before he had the chance to examine taxpayers’ rights in detail in the 
light of the new Constitution.  
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
233 Act 108 of 1996 
234 Act 200 of 1993 
235 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
236 According to the section 2 of the Constitution 
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9.7.1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON TAXPAYERS’ 
RIGHTS237 
 
Chapter 2, section 7 to 39, of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
Act 108 of 1996, includes a Bill of Rights.  The rights contained in the chapter 
are of general application insofar as the state and the citizens are concerned. 
The Bill of Rights contains a comprehensive listing of rights that are protected 
under the Constitution and certain of these rights are applicable to tax 
administration. For example, section 9 of the Constitution, which deals with 
equality, holds that all persons are equal before the law and prohibits 
discrimination on various grounds. It is for this reason that South Africa now 
has a unitary tax rate for natural persons. The previous system of taxing 
married persons, unmarried persons and married woman at different rates is 
considered to be unconstitutional. 
 
Section 14 of the Constitution deals with taxpayers’ right to privacy, which 
includes the right not to have their homes searched or possessions seized. 
Before the adoption of the 1993 Interim Constitution, SARS could arrive 
unannounced at a taxpayer’s premises and search and seize whatever records it 
deemed necessary, with only the signature of the Commissioner necessary to 
authorise the search, according to the rules laid down by the old section 74.  
 
Section 74 of the Income Tax Act has now been repealed and replaced by a 
series of sections, namely sections 74A to 74D, which deal with the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
237 An article “Your Rights as a Taxpayer” by B Croome in the SA Accountant of 
June 1999 
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procedures required to be followed before SARS may conduct a search of 
premises or seize documents. If SARS now wishes to conduct an investigation 
at a taxpayer’s premises, it should approach a judge of the High Court to 
obtain a warrant that grants it the authority to search the premises and seize 
records.  
 
The only other time that a SARS official may visit a business to examine 
records is when due and proper notice has been given in accordance with the 
Income Tax Act. SARS officials may therefore not arrive unannounced at a 
taxpayer’s premises to conduct routine VAT, PAYE or other inspections, 
unless it has made prior and proper arrangements with the taxpayer. 
 
9.7.2 Section 74(3) as it then was prior to amendment of the Income Tax Act 
(search and seizure provisions – possible contravention of the 
Constitution) 
 
In Rudolph and Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue and Others238, 
Justice Corbett had his only opportunity to examine a taxpayer’s right to 
privacy and property in terms of the new Constitution. Unfortunately, being 
Chief Justice of South Africa rather than President of the Constitutional Court, 
meant that he had to refer all Constitutional issues raised in terms of the 
Interim Constitution, to the Constitutional Court239 for a decision. The new 
Constitution of 1996 now enables the High Court to give decisions on 
____________________________________________________________________ 
238  [1996] 2 All SA 553(A), 58 SATC 183 
239 According to section 103(2) of the Interim Constitution, Act No 200 of 1993 
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Constitutional issues240,which, if appealed, would be finally arbitrated by the 
Constitutional Court. In the Rudolph case a search and seizure of books, 
accounts and records took place in terms of section 74(3) of the Act. In the 
court a quo, the taxpayer contended that the search and seizure constituted an 
infringement of, or a threat to, his rights in terms of section 13 of the Interim 
Constitution.  
 
On appeal, the issues before Justice Corbett in the Appellate Division were: 
 
 -  whether the Appellate Division was competent to adjudicate and determine, 
on common law grounds, the validity in regard to the power to search that was  
granted to the Commissioner by the Act  or  
- whether these issues fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court and  
-  whether section 74(3) was inconsistent with Chapter 3 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.  
 
It was held that the Court did not have a parallel common law jurisdiction and, 
in any event, in order to decide whether the Court would have such a 
jurisdiction, it would be obliged to interpret the Constitution, which it was not 
entitled to do. Justice Corbett therefore referred the case to the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
240 According to section 169 of the Constitution, Act No108 of 1996  
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9.8  CONCLUSION ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
 
In 1993, Chief Justice Corbett accepted an invitation to “play a prominent role 
in the transitional process”. His acceptance was welcomed by Mr Mandela, 
the then leader of the ANC, and the then Democratic Party spokesman on 
justice, Mr Tony Leon. 
  
Chief Justice Corbett played a major role in the drafting of the Constitution as 
well as the formation of the Constitutional Court. After a visit to the United 
States in 1976, he said that he had become a convert to a Bill of Rights, which 
has a power of review vested in the courts. In this regard he later commented 
that “What I said at the time caused many an eyebrow to lift in governmental 
and judicial circles241.” However, in the negotiations at CODESA it was 
accepted that a Bill of Rights should form an integral part of any new South 
African constitution.  
 
The Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights has had a major impact on 
legislation in South Africa. Several cases242 have been heard in the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
241 The Quest for Justice, p. 40. 
242 Rudolph and Another v CIR, 1996, (4) SA 552 (CC), as discussed 
Others include: 
- Metcash Trading Limited v CIR, 2001, (1) BCLR 1 (CC) on the pay-now-argue-later 
principle as contained in section 36 of the Value Added Tax Act. 
 
- Motsepe v CIR, 1997, (2) SA 898 (CC), on the proceedings when taxes are 
recovered. The constitutionality of the provisions of sections 92 and 94 of the Income 
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Constitutional court regarding sections of the Income Tax Act that were in 
contravention of the Constitution. Many amendments243 have been made to the 
Income Tax Act to meet the stringent requirements of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Tax Act was referred to the Constitutional Court. The taxpayer contended that 
sections 92 and 94 were inconsistent with the equality provisions, the access to court 
right and the right to administrative justice contained in sections 8(1), 22 and 24 of the 
Interim Constitution respectively. Section 92 and 94 of the Income Tax Act deems an 
assessment to be correct and unquestionable, except if an objection or appeal has been 
lodged. 
 
The Constitutional Court observed that the referral was incompetent for the reason 
that the taxpayer had failed to exhaust her non-constitutional remedies of objection 
and appeal in terms of Part 3 of the Income Tax Act. 
 
 
243 For example, South Africa now has a unitary tax rate for natural persons, as the 
previous system of taxing married persons, unmarried persons and married woman at 
different rates is considered to be unconstitutional in terms of equality. 
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CHAPTER 10  REVIEW OF JUSTICE CORBETT’S CONTRIBUTION 
TO SOUTH AFRICAN TAX LAW 
  
 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Watermeyer CJ has been recognised as one of the judges who has made a 
substantial contribution to the development of the law in South Africa244. This 
was especially so in the field of the law of taxation. A review of the contents 
of chapters four to nine of this dissertation reveals that Justice Corbett 
continued this tradition and had a special interest in developing the law of 
taxation. Even some of his minority judgements have had impact on the 
development of tax law in South Africa. He was not afraid to disagree with his 
fellow judges when circumstances warranted it. Some of these minority 
judgements have been referred to in subsequent cases and in some instances 
the law was changed as a result of his minority judgement245  
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
244 Watermeyer CJ gave judgements in the following landmark cases, to name but a 
few: Lategan v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1926 CPD 203; Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v Lever Bros and Unilever 1946 AD 441; New State Areas Ltd v CIR 
1946 AD; Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company v CIR, 1936 CPD 241. 
245 See part 7.2 on SIR v Safranmark (Pty) Ltd 43 SATC 235, 1982 (1) SA 113 (A) 
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10.2 A BRIEF EVALUATION OF JUSTICE CORBETT’S CONTRIBUTION 
TO SOUTH AFRICAN TAX LAW  
 
How can Justice Corbett’s contribution to the South African Tax Law be 
evaluated? Fortunately, in a speech delivered just before his retirement in 
1993246, Justice Corbett gave his own version of what is expected of the 
members of the Supreme Court (now the High Court). He outlined the 
following expectations: 
 
-    knowledge and experience 
      -    independence  
- judgement 
- character and industry. 
 
Justice Corbett had all these attributes. It is clear that he had the knowledge 
and experience necessary for the position not only as a judge of the highest 
court of the land at the time, but also Chief Justice of South Africa. He was 
always up to date with international trends in the law and he often used the 
decisions of foreign courts to find an equitable solution to a South African 
problem. 
 
As far as independence is concerned, he has been accused of being pro-fiscus - 
a charge which is not, it is submitted, sustainable. In any event, even if the 
charge of being pro-fiscus was warranted, it did not mean that he was not 
independent. A statistical review of his decisions and the number of times that 
____________________________________________________________________ 
246 1993 De Rebus issue 959 at 962-3; see Chapter 1 
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he decided in favour of the Commissioner cannot be used to support this 
accusation247.  
 
The clarity of his judgements have been acknowledged and acclaimed by the 
judiciary and academics alike and the fair and equitable way in which he 
treated litigants, from criminals to innocent taxpayers is a revelation. Where 
criticism was necessary, he was not afraid to dish it out to government 
officials, including the Revenue Authorities, and to the various litigants.  
 
Justice Corbett had the impeccable birth credentials to become a famous judge 
and contribute substantially to the development of the law in South Africa. 
This was particularly so in tax matters.248 
 
10.3 KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE TO INTERPRET TAX LAW 
 
Justice Corbett served on many panels for income tax cases heard in the 
Appellate Division (now referred to as the High Court of Appeal). His 
judgements created a precedent for subsequent cases of a similar nature. 
  
On occasion, the Income Tax Act appears to be vague and general. This is 
probably unavoidable in many instances as it applies to all sectors of the 
economy. The main reason for tax cases being brought before a court is a 
difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of one or more of the 
sections of the Income Tax Act and needs clarification by the court. In this 
____________________________________________________________________ 
247 See part 1.6   
248 Refer chapter 2. 
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respect, case law plays a major role in interpreting the Income Tax Act.  It is 
important that the decision in one case does not conflict with the decision in 
another case, because such conflicting interpretations cause confusion for both 
the taxpayers and the tax authorities. In most instances, however, some reason 
is given in a judgement as to why a particular line of thought of a previous 
decision is not followed in a later case. Conflicting decisions arise mostly 
because  
 
     a.   the case was blatantly incorrectly decided 
     b.   the case was not correctly argued by the taxpayer or the  
 Commissioner 
     c.   the taxpayer failed to discharge the onus placed upon him by 
  section 82. 
 
Thus, many decisions, thought to be in conflict, are not actually in conflict.   
 
A typical example of a case in which the interpretation of a section of the Act 
is required, would be to establish whether a particular taxpayer could be 
classified as a “manufacturer” in order to qualify for certain incentives that are 
applicable to manufacturers. Such an interpretation was required in 
Safranmark249, in which Justice Corbett, in his dissenting judgement, gave an 
excellent interpretation of the meaning of the word “manufacturing”. The 
purpose of his judgement was to convey the normal meaning of the word that 
had been included in the Act. He did not attempt to second guess what 
Parliament’s motives were with the introduction of that section of the Act. He 
____________________________________________________________________ 
249SIR v Safranmark (Pty) Ltd, 43 SATC 235  
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gave an independent point of view that was based on his (substantial) 
knowledge of the interpretation of section 12. It was not the duty of the court 
to criticize the Act or particular sections of the Act. His interpretation, it is 
submitted, gives an accurate definition of the normal meaning of the word 
“manufacture”. He left it to the legislature to amend the section to include a 
wider meaning to the section, which they later did. The majority of the panel 
concerned, however, understood the intention of the legislature in their 
interpretation of the section, but their interpretation was not particularly 
accurate in that it stretched the meaning of “manufacturing”. Even the layman 
would, it is submitted, find difficulty in acknowledging that cooking chicken 
is regarded as a manufacturing process.  
 
It is ironical that in the Automated Business Systems case250, the court 
followed a narrow interpretation of the meaning of “manufacture” in spite of 
the fact that all the essential elements regarded as necessary for the process 
involved to be classified as a manufacturing process, were present. The 
automated process of clearing bank cheques was held not to be a process of 
manufacture. It is submitted that this was a correct decision by the court but 
was not in accordance with the majority decision in the Safranmark case. 
 
In his dissenting judgement in Safranmark (supra), Justice Corbett had said: 
  
“When deciding whether a particular activity does or does not fall 
within the ambit of a ‘process of manufacture’ the ordinary, natural 
____________________________________________________________________ 
250 1986 (2) SA 645(T), 48 SATC 41 
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meaning of that phrase in the English language must not be lost sight 
of.” 
 
Where sections are vague, outdated or incomplete, the judgements that are 
delivered may cause amendments to be made to the Act. A major change to a 
leading section of the Act was the amendment of section 23(g) to exclude the 
wording “wholly and exclusively”. This amendment occurred shortly after the 
judgement was delivered in the Solaglass case251. The judgement dealt with 
the strict application of section 23(g). The court in that case did not apply 
apportionment of expenses incurred partly for trade and partly non-trade 
purposes. When the changes to section 23(g) were instigated, the legislature 
relied heavily on the judgements of Justice Corbett in Nemojim252, Pick n 
Pay253 and De Beers254, which, together with Rand Selections255, are the major 
apportionment cases in South African tax law.  
 
Justice Corbett decided on the apportionment of expenses in the Nemojim’s 
(supra) case, even though the Act ostensibly excluded apportionment at that 
time, or at the very least was silent on the matter. Inland Revenue noted this 
decision and the “wholly and exclusively” provision in section 23(g) was 
amended as a result of the very narrow interpretation given in the Solaglass 
(supra) case, a case in which Justice Corbett was involved. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
251 Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1991 (2) SA 257 (A), 53 SATC 1. 
252 CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd, 45 SATC 241 
253 CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd, 49 SATC 132 
254 De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 47 SATC 229 
255 CIR v Rand Selections Corporation Ltd, 20 SATC 390 
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Justice Corbett had an excellent ability to analyse and evaluate the facts of a 
case and to apply the letter of the Act to each case. The decision that he made 
in Gallagher256 was instrumental in the amendment of section 103(1) to 
include the avoidance of “estate duty” as a tax included within the ambit of 
section 103(1). Before the amendment was promulgated, only income tax 
avoidance could trigger an attack from the Commissioner in terms of section 
103(1). 
 
It is not the duty of a judge to make law.  It is up to Parliament to pass 
legislation and the courts to interpret such legislation. 
 
In Nemojim (supra), Justice Corbett stated that “there is no equity about a 
tax”. He added, however, that  
 
“…there is nevertheless a measure of satisfaction to be gained 
from a result which seems equitable, both from the point of view of 
the taxpayer and from the point of view of the fiscus.”  
 
Judge Corbett’s findings in Edgars257 and Golden Dumps258 provided greater 
clarity on the interpretation of the general deduction formula. He found that in 
order to fulfil the requirements of “actually incurred” and “during the year”, in 
accordance with section 11(a), it is necessary that a claim for a deduction 
should have been finalised in the same fiscal year. This requirement also 
____________________________________________________________________ 
256 SIR v Gallagher, 40 SATC 39 
257 Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR, 50 SATC 81  
258 CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd, 55 SATC 198 
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applies in the United Kingdom. In Herbert Smith v Honour (supra), the rentals 
were fixed in a lease contract and the amount payable had therefore been 
established. It is clear that Justice Corbett did not deviate from the 
international trend. Edgars Stores and Golden Dumps (supra) have been cited 
and applied as reliable references in South African tax law although the  
Edgars Stores case does create some problems259. 
 
In Berea West260 and JM Malone261, Justice Corbett approved the use of a 
realisation company and a trust for the purpose of preserving the capital nature 
of the proceeds on realisation. However, this method of realisation has had 
limited use since the introduction of Capital Gains Tax in 2001.  Paragraph 
12(2)(c) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act provides for the valuation of 
property when there is a change in the intention of the holding it as an asset. 
This means that a revenue profit on the sale of an asset will only be realised 
after the asset was re-valued at the time of the change of intention. Current 
legislation does not have the “all or nothing” effect, as occurred in the case in 
Berea West (supra). 
 
10.4 INDEPENDENCE OF THE COURT 
 
As already mentioned, a judge does not make law, he interprets law.  
Similarly, the Commissioner may not apply practices that are not sanctioned 
____________________________________________________________________ 
259 See paragraph 6.6 
260 Berea West Estates v SIR, 38 SATC 43 
261 JM Malone Trust v SIR, 39 SATC 83  
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by the Act. The reality is that the tax laws are essential elements in ensuring 
that the government has the funds that it requires to provide the services that 
fulfil the needs of the population of the country. In this regard, it is possible 
that the judiciary might lean towards supporting the government in its quest to 
obtain as much tax as possible at the expense of the taxpayer, which is the pro 
fiscus approach. Nevertheless, the judiciary have a duty to act independently. 
The judiciary certainly do not condone all the actions of the Commissioner in 
the collection of taxes. Taxpayers are able to submit their interpretation of the 
Act to the Court for proper and neutral consideration. 
 
In South Africa, a tax case does not depend on the judgement of a single 
judge. The Special Tax Court, as provided for in section 83 of the Act, 
requires that three persons should serve on the Board, including at least one 
judge. In the High Court of Appeal there has never been less than three judges 
on the panel in any one tax case.  At present five judges serve on the panel. 
The use of an uneven numbers of judges is to ensure that a majority outcome 
is achieved in each case. This arrangement ensures a fair degree of 
independence and neutrality.  It also ensures a large measure of competence as 
a result of the combined knowledge and experience of the greater number of 
judges. 
 
Justice Corbett delivered judgements in eighteen tax cases in the Appellate 
Division. Ten judgements were delivered in favour of the taxpayer, the 
remainder in favour of the Commissioner. 
 
 These statistics appear to indicate a fair degree of neutrality by him (and the 
court), albeit with perhaps a slight favouring of the taxpayer. However, in the 
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cases of De Beers and Pick ‘n Pay Wholesalers (supra), Justice Corbett 
appeared to be pro-fiscus. This also occurred in his minority judgement in 
Safranmark, whilst in Gallagher and his minority judgement in Elandsheuwel 
(supra), his formative approach favoured the taxpayer. In Pick ‘n Pay (supra), 
his decision not to apportion expenses was in favour of the Commissioner, but 
in Standard Bank262 his decision was against the Commissioner.  
 
The major case on which the perception of Mr Justice Corbett’s pro-fiscus 
approach has been based, is De Beers Holdings (supra). Corbett JA (as he then 
was) held that the taxpayer had not entered into a normal share-dealing 
transaction. The scheme was not entered into with the intention of making a 
profit, but in the contemplation of registering a loss and ultimately obtaining a 
substantial tax deduction. In short, Justice Corbett extended the limitation of a 
tax deduction in terms of section 23(g) by equating trade with profit. In this 
manner he was able to examine the substance of the transaction, that is, the 
exploitation of certain loopholes in the Act to construct a tax loss. 
Commentators have suggested that in this case the Appellate Division had 
followed the recent jurisprudence practice in England where the courts had 
favoured a substance over form approach. As one commentator argued:  
 
“…in order to achieve his disallowances… he has… had to ride 
roughshod over the trading stock provisions of the Act in order to 
achieve so-called equity.” 263  
____________________________________________________________________ 
262 CIR v Standard Bank of SA Ltd, 47 SATC 179 
263 “The Appellate Division and Equity in Taxation” an essay by T Emslie in the 
Income Tax Reporter, No. 26 (1987) at p51. 
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In De Beers Holdings Justice Corbett used the substance over form approach 
which contrasted with his usual formative approach.  
 
10.5 SUBSTANCE OVER FORM 
 
The taxpayer has the right to arrange his financial affairs in a suitable manner 
so as to minimise his tax liability. Such tax planning or tax avoidance activity 
is certainly not illegal. The Commissioner finds it difficult to combat these 
actions within the framework of the Act. Creative taxpayers constantly target 
loopholes in the Act and the courts are the last resort for the fiscus to combat 
existing tax-avoidance schemes until amendments are made to the tax 
legislation. Because the Commissioner cannot attack an avoidance scheme in 
terms of section 103 in all instances, the court is obliged to choose between 
the “purposive” approach (substance) and the “formative” approach (form) in 
interpreting legislation.264 
  
Justice Corbett’s formative approach was evident in Elandsheuwel. The 
section 103 cases of Gallagher, Louw and Burgess confirmed his formative 
approach to the legislation and the facts of the case. The fact that he was 
____________________________________________________________________ 
264 Section 39 of the Constitution appears to advocate a purposive interpretation of 
Acts in terms of the fundamental values of the Constitution. Sub-section 2 
reads:    When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
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formative does not imply that he overlooked the substance of the matter. 
When applying section 103 to tax avoidance, he used a formative approach. In 
other avoidance cases, such as Nemojim and De Beers, he did not use the 
formative approach, but used the substance approach instead. The substance 
over form approach may favour the Commissioner. 
 
An analysis of the judgement in De Beers Holdings reveals that the court 
applied the provisions of section 23(g) to disallow a substantial deduction, 
which had clearly been the major objective of the transaction. The only 
possible criticism of the judgement could be that the court equated the word 
“trade” with “profit” so that the taxpayer’s lack of a profit motive meant that it 
was not trading and hence could not claim a deduction. In itself, this approach 
to the section can hardly be equated with the substance over form approach to 
the interpretation of tax legislation that was adopted in certain English cases.  
 
Even the substance over form approach cannot stop taxpayers from making 
“paper losses”, a term that Justice Corbett used in the De Beers case. The tax 
authorities cannot disallow losses purely on the grounds that the taxpayer 
never had a realistic possibility of making a profit. Legislation has recently 
been changed to ring-fence losses that may be incurred in tax-avoidance 
schemes265. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
265 Section 20A – Ring-fencing of assessed losses; with effect from 2005 tax year.  
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Justice Corbett delivered judgements that have made a significant impact on 
South African tax law, especially the judgements in Elandsheuwel and Louw. 
In addition, he served on the panel of judges that delivered the judgement in 
Burgess. According to Justice Dennis Davis266 South African courts should be 
cautious in following a purposive approach to tax law. This was the strategy 
that Justice Corbett followed in the Gallagher case, namely a formative 
approach in applying the rules of section 103(1) of the Act as they were then 
understood. The important cases that have been discussed reveal that Mr 
Justice Corbett’s record admirably reflects such caution. 
It should be noted that the courts have moved away from the purely rigid and 
formative approach that was evident in Justice Corbett’s earlier cases and 
legislation has been introduced in section 103(1) to sanction such 
movement267. Instead, both the substance and the legal format of each case are 
noted and considered before judgement is given. The legal format of a case 
can never be ignored, but the underlying economic reality of a case should 
also be evaluated. It is submitted that Justice Corbett ignored the economic 
incentive of granting capital allowances to taxpayers in his dissenting 
judgement in the Safranmark case (substance) and concentrated instead on the 
clear and unambiguous wording of the section in the Act (form).  
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
266  An essay by D M Davis on Substance over form in tax law: The contribution of 
Mr Justice Corbett. The Quest for Justice, p. 151. 
267 The bona fide business purpose test 
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10.6 INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE  
 
It is clear that Justice Corbett consulted case law of other countries before he 
delivered judgements. In most of his judgements he referred to foreign cases, 
especially to the tax reports of the United Kingdom. This referral is evident in 
the Pick ‘n Pay case (supra).  In this case, Justice Corbett opted for the “dual 
purpose” principle, which is an established part of the tax law in the United 
Kingdom. It implies that if an expense is incurred with mixed motives, then it 
is not deductible, unless the main motive can be proved. This was the state of 
affairs under the old wording of section 23(g) which only allowed expenses 
that were “wholly and exclusively” incurred for the purposes of trade. 
 
Although no reference is made to the fact, it was known that donations to 
charitable organisations were never allowed as a general deduction in 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. This fact ultimately 
prevented the courts in South Africa from allowing this expense as a 
deduction. Having been a scholar at Cambridge, Justice Corbett was exposed 
to a wider legal background than was possible only in South Africa. His 
training background at Cambridge gave him some insight into the legal system 
of the Commonwealth, as well as personal contact with persons in the legal 
field in the Commonwealth. On the other hand, his dissenting judgements in 
Safranmark and Elandsheuwel (supra) did appear to be at variance with 
international thought and case law. 
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The introduction of the principle of legitimate expectation by Justice 
Corbett268 was an important milestone in the development of the South African 
law.  It highlights his understanding of the law and its international 
development and his foresight in respect of the application and 
implementation of legal principles. This principle is embodied in our new 
Constitution. 
 
Taxpayers now have more rights in respect of their ability to put forward 
representations or to be heard before SARS takes a major decision. “To be 
heard”, or the audi alteram partem principle, has always existed in South 
African law. The principle of justifiable expectation extends and gives greater 
meaning to the audi alteram partem principle in the sense that, in certain 
circumstances, a person’s right to be heard and considered cannot be taken 
away by statutory means. The principle of legitimate expectation is applicable 
to decisions by officials in Alternative Dispute Resolutions269, Settlement 
Disputes270 and Advanced Rulings situations.  
 
The principle of legitimate expectation specifically targets the relationship 
between the government and the citizen. This principle has been applied in 
several court cases, which illustrates the value of Justice Corbett’s foresight in 
introducing it into South African law.  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
268 Administrator, Transvaal and Others v Traub and Others, 1989, (4) SA 731 (A) 
269 Section 107A of the Act 
270 Section 88A of the Act 
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10.7 THE CONSTITUTION271 
 
Justice Corbett’s greatest legacy is probably that he was one of the main 
proponents of a Bill of Human Rights and its incorporation in the Constitution 
of South Africa. Chief Justice Corbett played a major role in the drafting of 
the Constitution as well as in the formation of the Constitutional Court. After a 
visit to the United States in 1976, he said that he had become a convert to a 
Bill of Rights, with a power of review vested in the courts. He stated the 
following in this regard: “What I said at the time caused many an eyebrow to 
lift in governmental and judicial circles272.” However, during the negotiations 
at CODESA it was accepted that a Bill of Rights should form an integral part 
of any new South African constitution. 
  
Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 
1996, contains a Bill of Rights.  The rights contained in the chapter are of 
general application insofar as the state and citizens are concerned. Many of the 
rights do, however, apply to tax administration and to how the South African 
Revenue Service conducts itself in dealing with the South African taxpayer.  
 
The Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights had a major impact on 
legislation in South Africa. Several cases were heard in the Constitutional 
court regarding sections of the Income Tax Act that were in contravention of 
the Constitution. Many amendments were made to the Income Tax Act to meet 
the terms of the Constitution. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
271 “Your Rights as a Taxpayer”, Accountancy South Africa, June 1999 by B. Croome                   
272 The Quest for Justice at page 40 
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Unfortunately, however, Justice Corbett never had the opportunity to 
pronounce on Constitutional issues in general and taxpayer’s rights in 
particular, since he retired in 1993, shortly after the Interim Constitution came 
into force. The only time he was faced with a Constitutional issue after the 
promulgation of the Interim Constitution, he had to refer the matter to the 
Constitutional Court, a court to which he was not appointed as a member.  
 
10.8 FINAL WORDS ON JUSTICE CORBETT’S CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF TAXATION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
Justice Corbett had a long and illustrious career. It is a daunting task to be a 
judge in the Supreme Court who must deal justly with the opposing 
viewpoints of the plaintiff and the defendant. All his judgements were 
valuable contributions to the South African tax law.  
 
All his judgements, including his dissenting judgements, were cited and 
applied, if applicable, in subsequent cases as being valid references. Some of 
his decisions although convincing, were not accepted as part of our law, such 
as his minority judgements in Elandsheuwel and Safranmark, as well as his 
view on the deductibility of expenses in the De Beers case, if the transactions 
did not have a profit motive. These views were overturned in subsequent 
cases. 
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Some judgements led to changes being made in the prevailing legislation. His 
decisions to apportion expenses as well as income received, played a major 
role in the development of tax law in South Africa although his decision when 
to apply or when not to apply the apportionment rule were criticised273. 
Section 22 relating to the definition of trading stock, had to be amended 
directly as a result of his decision in the De Beers case. 
 
Justice Corbett will be remembered, inter alia, for his formative approach to 
section 103(1), the introduction of the legitimate expectation principle to 
South Africa and, finally his part in the drafting of the new Constitution.  
 
To repeat the words of Lord Steyn274 in his tribute to Justice Corbett:  
 
“Taking qualities of judicial temperament for granted, it seems to me 
that the tribute of greatness must be reserved for judges who satisfy 
five requirements which overlap to some extent. First there is style and 
theme. Then, critical faculties and powers of legal analysis.  Profound 
knowledge of the law. A great judge must have a coherent philosophy 
of the role of the courts of law as an arm of government in a broad 
sense. He must also develop the law in a principled manner. Michael 
Corbett has in my view displayed all the qualities which I have 
described.” 
____________________________________________________________________ 
273 His judgement in the Pick n Pay case was criticised for not apportioning the 
expense between deductible and non-deductible portions, see chapter 6.5. 
274 The Quest for Justice, p. 115, Tribute to a Great Judge, An essay by Lord Steyn, 
PC BA LLB (Stell) MA (Oxon), Bencher of Lincoln’s Inn, Lord of Appeal in 
Ordinary, Great Britain. 
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APPENDIX A:  
TAX CASES IN WHICH JUSTICE CORBETT WAS INVOLVED  
       
Mr Justice Corbett served on the panel of judges in the following Appellate Division 
cases. The cases where he delivered a judgement are underlined. His minority 
judgements are highlighted: 
 
African Detinning Works (Pty) Ltd v SIR    44 SATC 1 
Berea West Estates v SIR      38 SATC 43 
Blue Circle Cement Ltd v CIR     46 SATC 21 
Bozzone and others v SIR      37 SATC 262 
Brodie and Another v SIR      36 SATC 159 
Buglar’s Post (Pty) Ltd v SIR     36 SATC 71 
Burgess v CIR       55 SATC 185 
Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR      37 SATC 1 
Chairman, Board on Tariffs and Trade and Others 
v Teltron (Pty) Ltd      59 SATC 363 
Chancellor, Master and Scholars of the University 
of Oxford v CIR      58 SATC 45 
Charles Velkes Mail Order 1973 (Pty) Ltd v CIR  49 SATC 109 
CIR v Bowman       52 SATC 69 
CIR v Brollo Properties (Pty) Ltd    56 SATC 47 
CIR v Collins       54 SATC 371 
CIR v D & N Promotions (Pty) Ltd    57 SATC 178 
CIR v Da Costa       47 SATC 87 
CIR v Dunlop South Africa Ltd     49 SATC 51 
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CIR v Estate Late Hulett      52 SATC 109 
CIR v Felix Schuh SA (Pty) Ltd    56 SATC 57 
CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd    52 SATC 224 
CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd    55 SATC 198 
CIR v Guardian Assurance Company South Africa Ltd  53 SATC 129 
CIR v Kuttel       54 SATC 298                                                  
CIR v Law Society, Transvaal     53 SATC 399 
CIR v Louw        45 SATC 113 
CIR v NCR Corporation of Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd  50 SATC 9 
CIR v Nedbank Ltd       48 SATC 73 
CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd      45 SATC 241 
CIR v Nussbaum      58 SATC 283 
CIR v Ocean Manufacturing Ltd     52 SATC 151 
CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty)Ltd   52 SATC 9  
CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd    49 SATC 132 
CIR v Pretorius       47 SATC 285 
CIR v SA Mutual Unit Trust Management Company Ltd  52 SATC 205 
CIR v Shell Southern Africa Pension Fund    46 SATC 1 
CIR v Southern Life Association Ltd    48 SATC 191 
CIR v Standard Bank of SA Ltd     47 SATC 179 
CIR v Wandrag Asbestos (Pty) Ltd    57 SATC 123 
Constantia Heights v SIR      41 SATC 77 
De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR     47 SATC 229 
Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR      50 SATC 81 
Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms ) Bpk v SIR    39 SATC 163  
Essential Sterolin Products (Pty) Ltd v CIR   55 SATC 357 
Estate Dempers v SIR      39 SATC 95 
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Gerber v CIR       51 SATC 183 
Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd SIR   37 SATC 319 
Hilda Holt Will Trust v CIR     55 SATC 1 
JM Malone Trust v SIR      39 SATC 83 
Malan v CIR        45 SATC 59 
Matla Coal Ltd v CIR      48 SATC 223 
Nasionale Pers Bpk v CIR       48 SATC 55 
Natal Estates Ltd v SIR      37 SATC 193 
National Co-operative Diaries Ltd v CIR   54 SATC 1 
Ovation Recording Studios (Pty) Ltd v CIR    52 SATC 163 
Ovenstone v SIR       42 SATC 55 
Plobar Estates (Pty) Ltd v CIR     47 SATC 98 
R Koster and Son (Pty) Ltd v CIR     47 SATC 23 
Rand Mines (Mining & Services) Ltd v CIR   59 SATC 85 
Richards Bay Iron and Titanium (Pty)Ltd and Another  
v CIR        58 SATC 55  
Rudolph and Another v CIR     58 SATC 183 
Sentra-Oes Ko-operatief Bpk v KBI    57 SATC 109 
SIR v Aveling       40 SATC 1 
SIR v Connan       36 SATC 87 
SIR v Downing       37 SATC 249 
SIR v Eaton Hall (Pty) Ltd      37 SATC 343 
SIR v Gallagher       40 SATC 39 
SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert      33 SATC 113  
SIR v Guardian assurance Holdings (SA) Ltd   38 SATC 83 
SIR v Olifantsrivierse Ko-operatiewe Wynkelders Bpk  38 SATC 79 
SIR v Rile Investments (Pty) Ltd     40 SATC 135 
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SIR v Safranmark (Pty) Ltd      43 SATC 235 
SIR v Sidley        39 SATC 153 
SIR v Trow        43 SATC 189 
Stone v SIR        36 SATC 117 
Taeuber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd v SIR    37 SATC 129 
Tieber v CIR       55 SATC 10 
Tuck v CIR        50 SATC 98 
Warren Marine (Pty) Ltd v SIR     44 SATC 69 
Werklike Aantreklike Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v KBI  50 SATC 47  
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APPENDIX B 
Supplement from Butterworth’s Books on Screen (on CD) 
Justice Corbett’s judgments were cited as follows: 
 
SIR v Downing 37 SATC 249 
 referred   
1 ITC 1544 (1992) 54 SATC 456 (T) at 460 
 
Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SBI 39 SATC 163, 1978 (1) SA 101 (A) 
referred 
SIR v Rile Investments (Pty) Ltd 40 SATC 135 at 141 & 152, 1978 (3) SA 732 (A) 
ITC 1278 (1978) 40 SATC 210 (R) at 212 
referred & applied 
Greenband Properties (Pty) Ltd v CIR 43 SATC 151 at 155, 156 & 157, 1981 (C) 
referred 
CIR v Modified Investments (Pty) Ltd 43 SATC 257 at 263, 1982 (1) SA 331 (T) 
ITC 1344 (1981) 44 SATC 19 (C) at 19 
ITC 1348 (1981) 44 SATC 46 (EC) at 47 
cited 
ITC 1355 (1981) 44 SATC 132 (C) at 138 
cited & referred 
ITC 1379 (1983) 45 SATC 236 (C) at 237 & 238 
referred 
ITC 1388 (1983) 46 SATC 126 (EC) at 136 
referred & distinguished 
ITC 1406 (1985) 48 SATC 12 (T) at 14 & 16 
cited 
Werklik-Aantreklik Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v KBI 48 SATC 112 at 130, 1986 (O) 
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referred 
ITC 1413 (1985) 48 SATC 167 (C) at 171 
cited & applied 
ITC 1418 (1986) 49 SATC 42 (C) at 44 
referred 
CIR v Pick ’n Pay Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd 49 SATC 132 at 154, 1987 (3) SA 453 (A) 
cited & referred 
ITC 1427 (1987) 50 SATC 25 (T) at 31 & 33 
referred 
ITC 1431 (1986) 50 SATC 60 (T) at 67 
cited 
CIR v Gribnitz 50 SATC 127 at 130, 1988 (T) 
referred 
ITC 1462 (1988) 51 SATC 168 (U) at 171 
CIR v Malcomess Properties (Isando) (Pty) Ltd 53 SATC 153 at 164, 1991 (2) SA 
27(A) 
ITC 1494 (1990) 53 SATC 206 (EC) at 213 
ITC 1498 (1989) 53 SATC 260 (E) at 265 
referred & cited 
ITC 1509 (1990) 54 SATC 18 (EC) at 25-67 
referred 
ITC 1522 (1989) 54 SATC 185 (C) at 189 
ITC 1526 (1991) 54 SATC 216 (T) at 223 
referred & cited 
54 SATC 271 at 279, 290 & 293, 1992 (A) 
ITC 1541 (1991) 54 SATC 408 (T) at 413-14 
ITC 1543 (1992) 54 SATC 446 (C) at 448-9 & 454 
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ITC 1560 (1990) 55 SATC 294 (EC) at 300-1 
referred 
Berea Park Avenue Properties (Pty) Ltd v CIR 57 SATC 167 at 171, 1995 (2) SA 
411(A) 
ITC 1597 (1993) 58 SATC 27 (T) at 33 
Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR 58 SATC 229 at 238, 1996 (A) 
CIR v Nussbaum 58 SATC 283 at 290, 1996 (A) 
referred & cited 
ITC 1608 (1993) 59 SATC 63 (T) at 67 
CIR v Nel 59 SATC 349 at 354-5, [1997] 4 All SA 310 (T) 
referred 
ITC 1636 (1997) 60 SATC 267 (EC) at 303 
ITC 1638 (1995) 60 SATC 423 (C) at 427 
referred & cited 
ITC 1639 (1997) 60 SATC 430 (EC) at 433 & 436 
CSARS v Knuth Industrial Mouldings (Pty) Ltd 62 SATC 65 at 70-3, 1999 (E) 
ITC 1659 (1998) 61 SATC 239 (E) at 242, 244-5 & 247 
ITC 1672 (1998) 62 SATC 47 (G) at 59 
ITC 1680 (1999) 62 SATC 355 (E) at 358 & 360 
CSARS v Volkswagen of SA (Pty) Ltd 63 SATC 109 at 111, 2000 (SCA) 
ITC 1719 (2001) 64 SATC 73 (SEC) at 75 
referred 
CSARS v Heron Heights CC 64 SATC 433 at 437, 2002 (EC) 
 
SIR v Rile Investments (Pty) Ltd 40 SATC 135, 1978 (3) SA 732 (A) 
referred 
Constantia Heights (Pty) Ltd v SIR 41 SATC 77 at 91, 1979 (3) SA 768 (A) 
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SAM v COT 42 SATC 1 at 6, 1980 (2) SA 75 (ZR) 
Ropty (Edms) Bpk v SBI 43 SATC 141 at 148, 1981 (A) 
Greenband Properties (Pty) Ltd v CIR 43 SATC 151 at 156 & 157, 1981 (C) 
CIR v Modified Investments (Pty) Ltd 43 SATC 257 at 262-63, 1982 (1) SA 331 (T) 
cited 
ITC 1406 (1985) 48 SATC 12 (T) at 14 
ITC 1431 (1986) 50 SATC 60 (T) at 66 
referred & cited 
CIR v Malcomess Properties (Isando) (Pty) Ltd 53 SATC 153 at 164, 1991 (2) SA 
27(A) 
referred 
ITC 1510 (1989) 54 SATC 30 (Z) at 36 
referred & cited 
ITC 1522 (1989) 54 SATC 185 (C) at 189 
ITC 1541 (1991) 54 SATC 408 (T) at 413-14 
referred 
ITC 1639 (1997) 60 SATC 430 (EC) at 441 
 
 
SIR v Gallagher 40 SATC 39, 1978 (2) SA 463 (A) 
referred & discussed 
Hicklin v SIR 41 SATC 179 at 185 & 191-93, 1980 (1) SA 481 (A) 
cited 
ITC 1348 (1981) 44 SATC 46 (EC) at 49 
referred 
COT v AB Company Ltd 45 SATC 78 at 83, 1982 (BCA) 
CIR v Louw 45 SATC 113 at 139, 1983 (3) SA 551 (A) 
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cited & referred 
ITC 1388 (1983) 46 SATC 126 (EC) at 132 & 135 
referred 
Plobar Estates (Pty) Ltd v CIR 47 SATC 98 at 101, 1985 (A) 
ITC 1518 (1989) 54 SATC 113 (T) at 135 
ITC 1606 (1995) 58 SATC 328 (C) at 335-6 
ITC 1518 (1989) 54 SATC 113 (T) at 135 
ITC 1606 (1995) 58 SATC 328 (C) at 335-6 
referred & cited 
ITC 1635 (1997) 60 SATC 260 (O) at 265 
referred 
ITC 1636 (1997) 60 SATC 267 (EC) at 318 & 334 
ITC 1638 (1995) 60 SATC 423 (C) at 429 
ITC 1639 (1997) 60 SATC 430 (EC) at 438 
referred & cited 
CSARS v Knuth and Industrial Mouldings (Pty) Ltd 62 SATC 65 at 74-5, 1999 (E) 
KSAI v Botha 62 SATC 264 at 273, 2000 (1) SA 908 (O) 
ITC 1684 (1998) 62 SATC 413 (E) at 422 
referred 
Weybro Boerdery BK v KBI 62 SATC 464 at 470, 1996 (T) 
ITC 1699 (1999) 63 SATC 175 (C) at 180 
ITC 1714 (1996) 63 SATC 507 (G) at 513 
 
SIR v Safranmark (Pty) Ltd 43 SATC 235, 1982 (1) SA 113 (A) 
referred & cited 
Automated Business Systems (Pty) Ltd v CIR 48 SATC 41 at 45-8, 1986 (2) SA 
645(T) 
 223
ITC 1445 51 SATC 40 at 44 & 45 
cited 
ITC 1449 51 SATC 65 at 68 
referred, cited & applied 
CIR v Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd, 51 SATC 81 at 86, 87 and 88, 1988 (C) 
cited & applied; referred & distinguished 
ITC 1465 (1989) 52 SATC 1 (C) at 3-4 and 6 
referred & cited 
Ovation Recording Studios (Pty) Ltd v CIR 52 SATC 163 at 172, 175 & 176, 1990 
(3)SA 682 (A) 
ITC 1479 (1989) 52 SATC 264 (T) at 271-2 
Formscaff Investments (Pty) Ltd v CIR 55 SATC 251 at 255, 256 & 258, 1993 (4) 
SA76 (T) 
ITC 1559 (1989) 55 SATC 286 (C) at 290 & 293 
referred, discussed & cited 
ITC 1575 (1989) 56 SATC 203 (T) at 211-12 
referred 
ITC 1591 (1993) 57 SATC 212 (O) at 220 
 
CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 45 SATC 241, 1983 (4) SA 935 (A) 
referred, discussed, cited & applied 
CIR v De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd 46 SATC 47 at 53-7, 1984 (3) SA 286 (T) 
referred 
CIR v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 47 SATC 179 at 194, 1985 (4) SA 485 (A) 
De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR 47 SATC 229 at 252-57, 1986 (1) SA 8 (A) 
referred & cited 
KBI v Van Der Walt 48 SATC 104 at 108-10, 1986 (4) SA 303 (T) 
 224
referred 
CIR v Pick ’n Pay Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd 49 SATC 132 at 147, 1987 (3) SA 453 (A) 
Tuck v CIR 50 SATC 98 at 114 & 115, 1988 (3) SA 819 (A) 
referred & applied 
Gerber v CIR 51 SATC 183 at 187, 190, 192 and 194, 1989 (4) SA 855 (A) 
referred, discussed & applied 
CIR v SA Mutual Unit Trust Management Company Ltd 52 SATC 205 at 213-4, 
219,221, 222-3, 223-4, 1990 (4) SA 529 (A) 
referred 
Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR 53 SATC 1 at 12, 1991 (2) SA 257 (A) 
referred & cited 
ITC 1521 (1989) 54 SATC 175 (C) at 182 & 184 
referred 
ITC 1553 (1989) 55 SATC 105 (T) at 112 
Oosthuizen and Another v Standard Credit Corporation Ltd 55 SATC 338 at 351,1993 
(3) SA 891 (A) 
referred & cited 
CIR v VRD Investments (Pty) Ltd 55 SATC 368 at 380, 1993 (4) SA 330 (C) 
referred 
ITC 1566 (1993) 56 SATC 34 (C) at 43-4 
ITC 1583 (1993) 57 SATC 58 (C) at 61 
referred & cited 
ITC 1584 (1994) 57 SATC 63 (C) at 70 
ITC 1589 (1993) 57 SATC 153 (Z) at 159 
referred 
ITC 1593 (1994) 57 SATC 251 (T) at 255 
referred & cited 
 225
ITC 1595 (1993) 57 SATC 321 (N) at 328 
referred 
Richards Bay Iron & Titanium (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR 58 SATC 55 at 64 & 
66,1996 (1) SA 311 (A) 
ITC 1600 (1995) 58 SATC 131 (EC) at 135 
ITC 1602 (1995) 58 SATC 205 (N) at 209 
ITC 1603 (1995) 58 SATC 212 (N) at 216 
CIR v Sunnyside Centre (Pty) Ltd 58 SATC 319 at 324, 1996 (A) 
referred 
ITC 1619 (1995) 59 SATC 309 (C) at 316 
CIR v DG Smith 60 SATC 397 at 402, 1997 (N) 
referred & cited 
ITC 1636 (1997) 60 SATC 267 (EC) at 316, 326 & 388 
ITC 1641 (1998) 60 SATC 493 (C) at 500-2 
referred 
KBI v Van Blommestein 61 SATC 145 at 154 & 159, [1999] 1 All SA 463 (A) 
(Transkei) (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 61 SATC 213at 216, [1999] 2 All SA 249 (N) 
Ticktin Timbers CC v CIR 61 SATC 399 at 401, [1999] 4 All SA 192 (A) 
ITC 1644 (1995) 61 SATC 23 (T) at 27 
ITC 1694 (1999) 63 SATC 127 (C) at 131 
CSARS v Van der Westhuizen 63 SATC 191 at 195-6, 2001 (C) 
CSARS v Dunblane (Transkei) (Pty) Ltd 64 SATC 51 at 54, 2001 (SCA) 
CSARS v Scribante Construction(Pty) Ltd 64 SATC 379 at 383, 2002 (SCA) 
 
CIR v Louw 45 SATC 113 
referred & applied 
ITC 1470 (1989) 52 SATC 88 (T) at 96 
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referred 
ITC 1518 (1989) 54 SATC 113 (T) at 133 
referred, discussed, cited & distinguished 
ITC 1542 (1989) 54 SATC 417 (O) at 421 & 423-4 
referred 
ITC 1558 (1992) 55 SATC 231 (T) at 246 
referred, discussed & cited 
ITC 1625 (1995) 59 SATC 383 (T) at 392-5, 395 & 397 
referred, cited & applied 
ITC 1636 (1997) 60 SATC 267 (EC) at 318, 321, 326, 330, 331-2 & 390 
referred 
CSARS v Knuth and Industrial Mouldings (Pty) Ltd 62 SATC 65 at 78, 1999 (E) 
referred & cited 
ITC 1669 (1999) 61 SATC 479 (Z) at 492 
 
Blue Circle Cement Ltd v CIR 46 SATC 21, 1984 (2) SA 764 (A) 
referred 
ITC 1421 (1986) 49 SATC 78 (C) at 80 
referred, cited & distinguished 
ITC 1447 51 SATC 53 at 56-57 
referred, cited, discussed & applied 
ITC 1468 (1989) 52 SATC 32 (C) at 35 & 38 
referred, cited & applied 
ITC 1469 (1989) 52 SATC 40 (C) at 43-4 & 45 
ITC 1479 (1989) 52 SATC 264 (T) at 273-4 
 
CIR v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 47 SATC 179 
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referred & cited 
ITC 1504 (1991) 53 SATC 349 (C) at 352 & 355 
ITC 1521 (1989) 54 SATC 175 (C) at 182 
ITC 1553 (1989) 55 SATC 105 (T) at 112 
CIR v G Brollo Properties (Pty) Ltd 56 SATC 47 at 53-4, 1993 (A) 
referred 
ITC 1602 (1995) 58 SATC 205 (N) at 211 
referred, cited & applied 
ITC 1603 (1995) 58 SATC 212 (N) at 215-6 
cited 
ITC 1604 (1995) 58 SATC 263 (EC), 268 
referred 
CIR v Elma Investments CC 58 SATC 295 at 296-7, 1996 (C) 
Van Blommestein v KBI 59 SATC 221 at 232 & 234, 1997 (C) 
referred & applied 
CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC 59 SATC 260 at 263, 1997 (C) 
referred & cited 
ITC 1620 (1995) 59 SATC 316 (T) at 322 
referred 
CIR v DG Smith 60 SATC 397 at 402, 1997 (N) 
referred & cited 
ITC 1641 (1998) 60 SATC 493 (C) at 501 
Ticktin Timbers CC v CIR 61 SATC 399 at 401-2, [1999] 4 All SA 192 (A) 
referred 
ITC 1643 (1998) 61 SATC 12 (E) at 18-19 
ITC 1690 (1999) 62 SATC 497 (G) at 500 
CSARS v 121 Castle Street Cape Town CC 63 SATC 185 at 188, 2001 (C) 
 228
ITC 1727 (2001) 64 SATC 275 (C) at 280 
 
De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR 47 SATC 229, 1986 (1) SA 8 (A) 
cited & referred 
1 Werklik-Aantreklik Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v KBI 48 SATC 112 at 121 & 135, 
1986(O) 
referred 
2 Werklike Aantreklike Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v KBI 50 SATC 47 at 49, 1988 (A) 
3 ITC 1524 (1990) 54 SATC 201 (C) at 206 
4 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 54 SATC 271 at 280, 1992 (A) 
5ITC 1592 (1994) 57 SATC 247 (C) at 250 
referred, discussed & cited 
6 Richards Bay Iron & Titanium (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR 58 SATC 55 at 68 & 
712, 1996 (1) SA 311 (A) 
referred & cited 
7 CIR v Sunnyside Centre (Pty) Ltd 58 SATC 319 at 325-6, 1996 (A) 
8 ITC 1644 (1995) 61 SATC 23 (T) at 27 
9 ITC 1662 (1999) 61 SATC 357 (C) at 361 
referred & considered 
10 Syfrets Participation Bond Managers Ltd v CSARS 63 SATC 1 at 6-7 , 2000(SCA) 
referred & cited 
11 ITC 1700 (1997) 63 SATC 206 (O) at 212 
12 CSARS v AA The Motorist Publications (Pty) Ltd 63 SATC 325, 2001 (C) at 329 
referred  
13 ITC 1720 (1999) 64 SATC 80 (G)at 87 
referred & distinguished 
14 ITC 1723 (1999) 64 SATC 165 (G) at 173 
 229
CIR v Pick ’n Pay Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd 49 SATC 132, 1987 (3) SA 453 (A) 
referred & discussed 
Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR 53 SATC 1 at 20, 1991 (2) SA 257 (A) 
referred 
ITC 1499 (1989) 53 SATC 266 (T) at 272 
ITC 1518 (1989) 54 SATC 113 (T) at 130 
ITC 1614 (1995) 59 SATC 236 (T) at 243 
referred & cited 
ITC 1627 (1997) 60 SATC 26 (T) at 31 
ITC 1641 (1998) 60 SATC 493 (C) at 497 
Ticktin Timbers CC v CIR 61 SATC 399 at 403, [1999] 4 All SA 192 (A) 
referred & discussed 
ITC 1700 (1997) 63 SATC 206 (O) at 212 
referred & cited 
ITC 1727 (2001) 64 SATC 275 (C) at 278 
 
Tuck v CIR 50 SATC 98 
referred & applied 
ITC 1479 (1989) 52 SATC 264 (T) at 275 
referred 
ITC 1512 (1989) 54 SATC 45 (Z) at 55 
ITC 1518 (1989) 54 SATC 113 (T) at 131 
ITC 1521 (1989) 54 SATC 175 (C) at 183 
referred & applied 
CIR v VRD Investments (Pty) Ltd 55 SATC 368 at 381, 1993 (4) SA 330 (C) 
referred, discussed, cited & applied 
ITC 1703 (1999) 63 SATC 247 (C) at 253-5 
 230
CSARS v McRae 64 SATC 1 at 6-7, 2001 (C) 
referred, cited & applied 
ITC 1725 (2000) 64 SATC 223 (C) at 230-1 
referred 
ITC 1732 (2000) 64 SATC 403 (G) at 407 
CSARS v Heron Heights CC 64 SATC 433 at 446, 2002 (EC) 
 
Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR 50 SATC 81, 1988 (3) SA 876 (A) 
referred & applied 
ITC 1485 (1990) 52 SATC 337 (T) at 341-2 
ITC 1496 (1990) 53 SATC 229 (T) at 238 
referred 
ITC 1531 (1991) 54 SATC 323 (T) at 330 
referred & cited 
CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd 55 SATC 198 at 206, 1993 (A) 
referred 
ITC 1587 (1994) 57 SATC 97 (T) at 103 
ITC 1588 (1994) 57 SATC 148 (C) at 151 
ITC 1634 (1997) 60 SATC 235 (T) at 257 
ITC 1697 (1999) 63 SATC 146 (N) at 159 
 
CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd 55 SATC 198 
referred 
CIR v Felix Schuh (SA) (Pty) Ltd 56 SATC 57 at 69-70, 1994 (A) 
ITC 1587 (1994) 57 SATC 97 (T) at 103 
ITC 1634 (1997) 60 SATC 235 (T) at 247 & 257 
referred & cited 
 231
ITC 1725 (2000) 64 SATC 223 (C) at 232-3 
Henbase 3392 (Pty) Ltd v CSARS and Another 64 SATC 203 at 213-4, 2002 (2) SA 
(SCA) 
 
Essential Sterolin Products (Pty) Ltd v CIR 55 SATC 357 
referred 
ITC 1585 (1994) 57 SATC 81 (T) at 87 
referred & cited 
First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v CSARS 64 SATC 245 at 250-1, 2002 
(SCA) 
Referred & applied 
First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v CSARS 64 SATC 245 at 252, 2002 
(SCA) 
 
CIR v Felix Schuh (SA) (Pty) Ltd 56 SATC 57, 1994 (2) 801 (A) 
referred & cited 
Sentra-Oes Koöperatief Bpk v KBI 57 SATC 109 at 115, 1995 (A) 
referred 
ITC 1588 (1994) 57 SATC 148 (C) at 151 
ITC 1634 (1997) 60 SATC 235 (T) at 248 
ITC 1650 (1998) 61 SATC 72 (C) at , 79 
 
Rudolph and Another v CIR and Others 58 SATC 219, 1996 (7) BCLR 889 (CC) 
58 SATC 183, [1996] 2 All SA 553 (A) 
referred 
Naidoo and Another v CIR 58 SATC 251 at 259, 1996 (SE) 
Rudolph and Another v CIR and Others 59 SATC 399 at 403, 1997 (4) SA 391 (SCA) 
 232
CCE v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Rennies Group Ltd t/a Renfreight 62 SATC 
138 at 143, 1999 (3) SA 771 (SCA) 
referred & applied 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v CSARS and Another 63 SATC 432 at 
436, 2001 (7) BCLR 715 (C) 
referred 
Haynes v CIR 64 SATC 321 at 345, 2000 (6) BCLR 596 (Tk) 
 
 
 
